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1 
The Foundation of the Institution of Professional Civil 
Servants (Ireland). 
 
Introduction 
On 25 February 1920, following a meeting in late January to discuss the status 
and future of the professional civil service in Ireland, a group of professional civil 
servants met and resolved to form the Institution of Professional Civil Servants 
(Ireland).1  That an organisation to represent the interests of scientific, professional 
and technical civil servants was necessary was a belated recognition of the sweeping 
changes that were transforming the civil service in both Great Britain and Ireland.  
Despite their title as professional civil servants these officials saw themselves 
primarily in terms of their professions and only incidentally as servants of the state.  
Too reliant on their professional status they had been left behind in the rapid evolution 
of civil service organisation that was now being driven by the administrative and 
clerical grades, marginalizing the professional and technical staffs.    
 
 
Organisation in the British civil service. 
Although there was a long history of discontent in the civil service on issues of 
recruitment, promotion and mobility across departments, pay was the main driving 
force behind the wave of organisation which the Irish professional grades were now 
joining.  During the First World War the government had allowed inflation to rise.  
The consequent  rise in the cost of food and rent was not matched by rises in  wages 
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and salaries.  In 1915 two million working days were lost in strikes in Britain as 
workers fought to protect living standards.  Within the civil service agitation for pay 
increases was led by the postal workers.  After the Treasury rejected the post office 
workers’ demand for a pay increase the government, fearful of strike action, referred 
the claim to an arbitrator, Sir James Woodhouse.  Woodhouse awarded a ‘war bonus’ 
as a percentage increase on basic pay in compensation for wartime inflation.  The war 
bonus was first awarded in July 1915 to the postal workers but by the end of the year 
had been extended to all civil servants on the lower pay scales.  The war bonus was to 
make up for the loss of value due to inflation and, it was supposed, would be 
eventually phased out as prices would return to normal after what was still expected to 
be a short war.  But the war dragged on and inflation continued to rise and so led to 
applications for further increases in the bonus.  By September 1916 the cost of living 
had increased by fifty per cent since July 1914 and continued its upward rise.  The 
increased pressure for compensation led to the establishment of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Board for Government Employees early in 1917.  The conciliation and 
arbitration board formalised a system of hearings on pay issues, awarding thirteen war 
bonus increases in the period 1917-19.  The conciliation and arbitration board was a 
great advance for civil service trade unionism as it was only through properly 
organised associations and trade unions that effective and formal applications could 
be made to the arbitrator.  Arbitration gave recognition to the organisations, conceded 
some influence over their conditions to civil servants and also took the issue of pay 
out of the control of the Treasury.2    The number of civil service associations and 
trade unions grew from 80 in 1913 to 194 by the end of the war.3   
However this boost to organisation applied only to the clerical and 
administrative grades below £500 per annum.  It was until August 1918 that the 
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higher civil servants of the executive and higher grades over £500 got a modest war 
bonus on their salaries.  A further factor inhibiting organisation amongst professional 
civil servants was the lack of a bond across the many professions within the civil 
service and therefore a fragmentation of effort.  It seemed that an architect and an 
agricultural advisor had nothing in common except that they were both employed by 
government departments. 
Before the end of the war the British government began to recognise that 
collective bargaining and trade unions were becoming an established part of the 
industrial landscape.  This was prompted in part by fear of the unofficial ‘Shop 
Stewart’s Movement’.  Originally based in the craft workers in the Clyde war 
factories this movement of locally elected activists was supported by some workers 
within the assembly industries who were angry at what they saw as co-operation by 
official trade union leadership with government attacks on their conditions, especially 
in undermining craft regulation, and the military conscription of formerly exempt 
skilled workers.  There was also a recognition that the experience of war had shown 
that a more co-operative system of industrial relations was possible.4  The Deputy 
Speaker of the House of Commons, J.H. Whitley, chaired a committee drawn from 
the leading industrialists and trade unions, appointed to examine the problem of 
industrial unrest and to make proposals for ‘securing a permanent improvement in 
relations between employers and workmen and to recommend ways of systematically 
reviewing industrial relations in the future’.5  The committee’s recommendation on 
the creation of joint worker-employer industrial councils did not survive the end of 
the war so far as industry was concerned.  In fact it was never even established in the 
major sectors of mining, engineering and ship-building.  However in the one 
environment in which it was argued that Whitleyism was completely unsuitable, the 
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civil service, it quickly took root.  This success was due to a unified effort across all 
of the civil service organisations.  
With the publication of the Whitley committee report the civil service unions 
demanded that the government should set an example to all other employers by 
establishing a Whitley council to cure its own industrial ills.  At a meeting in April 
1919 in Caxton Hall near the Houses of Parliament attended by Austen Chamberlain, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and by his Treasury officials the civil service unions 
united behind the postal workers representative Stuart-Bunning in demanding a 
Whitley Council for the civil service.  Chamberlain reluctantly conceded and in July 
1919 a two-tier Whitley Council was agreed with a ‘local’ Departmental Council in 
each department made up of departmental heads as the official side and local 
associations as the staff side.  There was also an over-arching National Council made 
up of the senior civil servants (not politicians as the civil servants wished) as the 
official side and civil service associations and trade unions as the staff side.  Civil 
servants, through their organisations, would now enjoy something more than mere 
consultation but would have real power in determining their conditions.  It brought an 
end to the tyranny of departmental heads being ‘humbly’ requested to consider 
petitions of grievances by individual civil servants and compelled them to recognise 
civil service trade unions.  To fully exploit the advantages of Whitleyism civil 
servants would have to form and join recognised associations and embrace combined 
action.6  
The first issue that the Whitley councils addressed was the cost of living 
bonus.  A Joint Cost of Living Committee of the National Whitley Council agreed a 
sliding scale of bonus for the civil service.  Taking 100 as the base line for the cost of 
living in July 1914 and 130 as the index figure for 1 March 1920, the committee gave 
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full compensation of 130 percent on the first £91.15s.0d of salary,  60 percent on 
salaries between £91.15s.0d and £200 and 45 percent on salaries between £200 and 
£500 per annum.  The cost of living figure would be re-calculated every six months 
and the bonus either increased or decreased by the new figure.  The result was a 
flattening of salaries through the grades of the civil service as the higher paid civil 
servants, such as professional grades, received less and less compensation for the 
increased cost of living in comparison to the clerical and administrative grades.   
The Whitley Council then turned to the question of the reorganisation of the 
civil service clerical and administrative classes.  Each government department had its 
own classification of work and its own grading tradition.  Working from October 
1919 to January 1921 the Reorganisation Committee re-organised the civil service 
classes and grades, re-classified work, revised pay and leave and reformed 
recruitment.  The civil service in each government department was to be assimilated 
into the new and universal administrative, executive, clerical and writing assistant 
grades, all on the same pay scales and conditions.  This would provide an effective 
division of labour with maximum flexibility.  Civil servants could be redeployed 
within their grade to any department and could compete for promotion to vacancies in 
the higher grades across the service.   
In the rapid development of civil service trade unionism the professional and 
technical grades found themselves being sidelined.  In Great Britain the professional 
civil servants in the Admiralty were the driving force behind the creation of the 
Institution of Professional Civil Servants (IPCS) in January 1919.  The British 
Institution had two out of the twenty-five staff side representatives on the National 
Whitley Council, reflecting the dominance of the post office, clerical and 
administrative associations.  The British IPCS did attempt to secure the same 
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thorough-going investigation into the grading of the professional and technical civil 
service as the Whitley Reorganisation Committee was putting into the clerical and 
administrative grades.  Eventually the official side did concede three joint committees 
to consider the cases of the engineers and architects, the valuers, and the analytic 
chemists.  The official side, by taking each profession one by one, was intent to run 
the inquiry into the ground.7  It was the experience of the civil service trade unions 
that the official side, made up of the most senior civil servants, were at best reluctant 
participants in the Whitley process and at worse frankly hostile.  The professional 
civil servants had neither the numbers nor the organisation to overcome the habitual 
autocracy of the departmental elites.   
 
Organisation in the Irish Civil Service. 
As Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, Irish civil servants participated in 
the wave of organisation that transformed civil service trade unionism.  Irish branches 
of the various associations were formed, delegates attended meetings and 
representatives of the Irish civil service negotiated alongside their British colleagues.  
At the Caxton Hall meeting that led to the creation of the National Whitley Council a 
delegation of Irish civil servants secured agreement for an Irish Civil Service Joint 
Whitley Council.  This was in recognition of the necessity for some mechanism to 
protect the interests of the Irish civil service with Home Rule apparently imminent.  
Initially the British Treasury wanted the Irish Joint Council to be subject to the 
National Council, thus making the Irish council a sub-committee of the British body.  
This was unacceptable to the Irish representatives.  After many meetings with 
proposals and counter-proposals it was finally allowed in March 1920 that an 
autonomous Irish Joint Council could be created.8  The official side was made up of 
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the Under-Secretary James MacMahon accompanied by the heads of the Irish 
departments.  The staff side was made up of the elected delegates of the Irish branches 
of the grade associations and was dominated by the trade unions of the clerical grades.  
As the civil service associations nominated the staff side to the Whitley Council the 
professional civil servants who were as yet unorganised were left outside.  Because of 
the failure of the professional civil servants to organise it seemed the professional and 
technical grades would not have a place at the negotiation table.9  It was the sense that 
the general service grades were setting the pace and that the professional grades were 
being left behind that prompted the formation of the Institution of Professional Civil 
Servants (IPCS) (Ireland).  Many years later, during the 1932 Brennan Commission 
hearings into the civil service, Dominick Brunicardi, president and founding member, 
described the IPCS (Ireland) as a 'relic of the Whitley system'.10  Clearly, were it not 
for the establishment of the Whitley councils, it is unlikely the professional and 
technical civil servants would have managed to organise themselves. 
The British Institution of Professional Civil Servants was led and dominated 
by scientific and technical civil servants within the military establishment, particularly 
in the Admiralty’s naval dockyards, thus reflecting the sort of expertise demanded by 
the British state.  In contrast the IPCS (Ireland) founding members drew largely from 
the body of experts that had grown around the British government’s efforts to solve 
the problem of Irish poverty and to improve the condition of the people in Ireland.  
These efforts were shaped and administered by expert advisors and civil servants.   
The main Irish department driving organisation was the General Valuation and 
Boundary Survey Office, usually known as the General Valuation Office, located at 5 
and 6 Ely Place off St Stephen’s Green.  The General Valuation Office had been 
created under the Irish Valuation Act of 1852.  Its main task was to calculate the value 
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of all lands and tenements in Ireland for rates and taxation.  William Power Steele, 
B.E., F.S.I. was one of the three senior staff valuers.  He organised the initial meeting 
on 30 January 1920 that called for professional civil servants to form an association to 
represent and defend their interests.  In the notice calling the meeting, held at the 
offices of the Architectural Association of Ireland in 15 South Frederick Street, he 
cited the British institution as a precedent and urged all officials ‘as may be members 
of their own medical, legal, engineering or architectural societies’ to join the new 
organisation to safeguard their interests.11  It is recorded that a representative of the 
Irish General Valuation and Boundary Survey had attended at the meeting to organise 
the British IPCS in January 1919 and this may well have been Power-Steele.12  Other 
founding members from the valuation office were Major Dominick Nicholas 
Brunicardi B.E., F.S.I., and James J. McAuley F.S.I.  The Brunicardi family was of 
Italian descent, though long settled in Co Cork.  His father was Sebastian Brunicardi, 
the borough surveyor of Clonmel Corporation.  Brunicardi enlisted in the British army 
in January 1915 and served in the 3rd Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers in France from 
1915 to early 1918 and then in the expeditionary force sent to assist the Italians in 
their campaign against the Austrians in 1918.  He was demobilised in April 1919 as a 
commissioned officer with the rank of Major.13  Brunicardi was to dominate the IPCS 
(Ireland) for many years and it was his determined leadership ensured its survival in 
the lean years of the 1920s and 1930s.   
Luther George Banton and William Patey, both land surveyors, represented 
the Irish Land Commission.  The Irish Land Commission was set up by the Land Act 
of 1881 to set ‘fair rents’ that were binding on both landlords and tenants.  It was later 
given the additional task of facilitating the transfer of the land from the landlords to 
the tenants under the land purchase acts, mainly by surveying and establishing title 
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deeds to the lands being transferred.  As such its work was highly political.  It was 
also very onerous outdoor work in remote regions.  The Land Registry mapping 
section was represented by Edward Palmer, a quantity surveyor.   
The Congested Districts Board was established in 1891 to encourage 
agriculture and industry in the most impoverished western areas of the country.  It 
was also empowered to purchase land for redistribution to tenants in the congested 
districts.  Although its effectiveness in addressing poverty has been questioned there 
is no doubting its popularity amongst the people of the west.  It was represented by 
H.W. Stephenson (sometimes Stevenson) and W.J. O’Farrell.   
The Local Government Board, as well as supervising local authorities, had 
accumulated many responsibilities in public health, welfare and in the environment. It 
was represented by Robert Percy McDonnell, a medical inspector, and Arthur Scott 
Quekett, B.L. a solicitor.  Quekett later transferred to the administration in Northern 
Ireland where he wrote the definitive legal guide to the 1920 Government of Ireland 
Act.   
The Board of Public Works was established in 1831 to encourage economic 
improvement in Ireland through public works and loans.  Created originally to 
maintain civic properties its responsibilities were expanded to include all harbours, 
canals, railways, fisheries, drainage and the care of national monuments.  It both 
initiated its own work schemes and supervised works undertaken by local authorities 
and financed by Board loans.  It was represented by Harry Alberry, deputy principal 
architect, and J. Chaloner-Smith, a civil engineer.   
The National Education Board was established in 1831 to supervise the first 
national education system in Great Britain or Ireland, a unique experiment for its time 
in state intervention in mass literacy.  It never succeeded in overcoming the 
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entrenched sectarian interests of both Protestant and Catholic churches but it did 
succeed in establishing a state-financed and monitored education system available to 
even the poorest in Ireland.  It was represented by J. Yates M.A., a senior inspector.  
These founding members of civil service trade unionism were united simply 
by their professional status.  In religion, nationality and presumably politics they were 
a diverse group.  William Power Steele, the driving force in organising the Institution, 
was a Cork-born member of the Church of Ireland.  William Alberry was English-
born and a member of the Church of England.  Married to a Catholic Irish woman all 
their children were raised as Catholics.  Quekett, of the Local Government Board was 
English-born, of the Church of England but McDonnell, also of the Local 
Government Board, was Catholic.  Both McAuley and Brunicardi of the valuation 
office were Catholics.  Other Protestants were George Luther Banton (a 
Congregationalist) and William Patey.  Protestants formed a majority of the founding 
members, reflecting the Protestant dominance of the professional classes.  It would be 
safe to assume that these men, all middle-aged, were constitutional nationalist or 
unionist in their politics and definitely out of sympathy with the republican revolution 
that was sweeping away the state they served.14            
At its first meeting the IPCS council referred to the new Whitley Council for 
Ireland and sent Messrs Power-Steele, Alberry, Banton and Yates along to observe the 
conference which was called to establish the Irish Civil Service Joint Whitley 
Council.  As the significance of the Whitley Council for future conditions in the Irish 
service began to dawn on the Institution a more urgent note crept in.  By March 1920, 
one month after its foundation, the IPCS (Ireland) was insisting on having their own 
representative of the professional civil service, William Alberry, on the Joint Whitley 
Council.  In response to English precedents, and IPCS (Ireland) pressure, a 
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professional and technical civil service group was formed within the Joint Council.  
The IPCS (Ireland) then organised its constituent associations to back Alberry as their 
representative.  By the end of March, as the Whitley Joint Council held its initial 
meetings, the IPCS (Ireland) had been recognised and accepted as the organisation of 
the professional civil servants in Ireland, though as yet it actually represented very 
few of them.  The ICPS (Ireland) was now provided with the forum within which it 
could raise the problems of the professional and technical civil service.15 
 It would have been more precise for the IPCS council to call their organisation 
a federation of professional and technical associations as all those on the founding 
council attended as honorary secretaries representing their various departmental 
professional associations.  The creation of the IPCS (Ireland), its name and the 
constitution it adopted, closely followed the precedent of the Institution of 
Professional Civil Servants in England in January 1919.  it was this close association 
with the English Institution that probably led to the belief that the Irish Institution had 
been formed in the same year.  Just like the English institution the IPCS (Ireland) was 
essentially an alliance of the associations of the professional and technical civil 
servants in the various government departments.  Again, just like the English 
institution, there was great anxiety to ensure that only professionally qualified civil 
servants would be admitted to membership.16  The first council of the IPCS (Ireland) 
was made up of representatives of  'associations whose constitutions have been found 
by the drafting committee to contain a qualifying clause in accordance with the 
constitution of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants'' and that 'the honorary 
secretaries of associations send in individual applications for members of their 
associations together with qualifications of applicant'.17  The constitution formalised 
the rules for admission to membership of the IPCS (Ireland) through a 'properly 
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constituted Association of professional civil servants' who might nominate any of its 
members to the Institution.  The council of the IPCS (Ireland) was required to satisfy 
itself firstly, that the membership of the nominating association was confined to 
professionals and secondly, that the individual proposed had recognisable professional 
or technical qualifications and duties as a civil servant.18  Just as in England the status 
of draughtsmen led to a long discussion.  "Draughtsmen" was at that time a general 
term for technical staff below the professionals, and usually employed as their 
assistants, but above the ordinary workmen.  In England these were not allowed 
become full members of the Institution, only associate membership being allowed.  
The IPCS (Ireland) again deferred to the English precedent and created an associate 
membership following precisely the same constitutional formula as used in the 
English case; 'any member of the Civil Service...whether a professional civil 
servant...or not and whether established or unestablished, but who is engaged on 
technical or scientific work, and who is a member of a Constituent Association, 
provided that no person who may be a workman within the meaning of the Trades 
Union Acts shall be eligible'.19  During the summer of 1920 the council canvassed the 
possibility of affiliating the IPCS (Ireland) with the English Institution, but as the 
English institution was less than enthusiastic and as the constitutional situation in 
Ireland became more uncertain the proposal was allowed to lapse.20 
 Most of the early council meetings were spent in vetting the proposals for 
membership coming in from the constituent associations.  It might be supposed that 
any member of such an association was, by virtue of such membership, entitled to join 
the IPCS (Ireland).  However this was not the case.  The IPCS (Ireland) was 
determined that, based on education and qualifications, professional status would be 
determined by the professionals themselves.  Government would be asked to accept 
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their own evaluation in determining their status as professional.  There was therefore a 
ruthless and minute scrutiny of the qualifications of the candidates and their 
associations.  In March all the applicant members of the Association of Divisional and 
Senior Inspectors, National Education Office and of the Professional Association 
General Valuation & Boundary Survey Office Ireland were admitted.  But in April, of 
the nineteen applicants from the OPW Professional Staff, only seventeen were 
admitted and of the fifty-seven applicants from the Congested Districts Board only 
twenty-two were admitted.  This selectivity caused trouble with the applicants from 
the Surveyors Association of the Irish Land Commission when out of the ten 
applicants only one was accepted.  Paley of the Land Commission, who was a 
member of the council, objected strongly to this extreme exclusivity but to no effect.21  
In the case of a new association the council scrutinised its constitution very carefully 
to ensure that it admitted only properly qualified professional staff before considering 
the question of admitting members to the IPCS (Ireland).22   By May the constitution 
was agreed and, by the time of the annual general meeting of March 1921, the first 
annual report of the IPCS(Ireland) could record eleven constituent associations drawn 
from the Local Government Board, The National Education Board, the Office of 
Public Works, the Valuation Office, the Land Commission, the Department of 
Agriculture and Technical Instruction and the Land Registry.  It had 367 full members 
and 71 associate members.  As it found its organisational feet the Institution faced 
into dealing with the complexities of the reorganisation of grades and the application 
of the Government of Ireland Act, issues which dominated the Institution through 
1920 to 1922. 
 Combining the full and associate members indicates the full membership of 
the IPCS (Ireland) was 438, organised in eleven constituent organisations.  This 
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suggests an average membership of each association of just forty.  The IPCS (Ireland) 
was being optimistic in expecting that associations with membership of just forty 
would each be able to sustain a functioning executive with a full range of officers 
willing to put in the effort that would be necessary to sustain the Institution by 
gathering information and helping in forming policy, especially in its first years.  The 
labour historian Emmet O’Connor has argued that the Irish trade union movement 
was mentally colonised by the British movement.   He suggests that Irish trade unions 
were reliant on British organisation and followed the rhythms of British militancy.23   
The mobilisation of the IPCS (Ireland) and the organisation of civil service in Ireland 
would tend to support his argument.  All the Irish civil service associations were 
branches of the same British organisations.  The result was a proliferation of 
associations in a small service where the entire Irish membership was less than that of 
a single branch in the same British association.  Ronald Mortished, of the Association 
of Executive Officers and vice-chairman of the Irish Whitley Council, was the only 
leader within Irish civil service organisations to consistently warn of the danger of the 
special concerns of the Irish civil service being smothered by the British organisations 
and the danger of relying on them.  He used his civil service journal, the Irish Civil 
Servant to urge the creation of a single national union of the Irish civil service with an 
explicit separatist agenda.24  
 In fact just such a single national organisation of the Irish civil service had 
been in existence since April 1893 and the second home rule bill of the Liberal Prime 
Minister Gladstone.25  The General Committee of the Irish Civil Service, as we shall 
see, united all the classes, grades and departments of the Irish civil service in a 
powerful single organisation in defence of the status and security of the membership 
in the event of a home rule government being established in Dublin.   
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The Provisional Government 
On Saturday 7 January 1922 the Dáil narrowly approved the Treaty.  The Southern 
Irish Parliament, consisting of the pro-Treaty members of Dáil Éireann with the four 
Dublin University MPs, then met briefly for the first and last time to ratify the Treaty 
and elect the Provisional Government.  On the following Saturday 14 January the 
Treaty was signed and on Monday 16 January, with Collins at its head, a delegation of 
the Provisional Government swept into the Castle Yard to ‘receive the surrender of 
Dublin Castle to the Irish Nation'.26  The Provisional Government immediately took 
control of the entire civil service, directing that ‘civil servants and all public servants 
and functionaries hitherto acting under the authority of the British government shall 
continue to carry out their functions unless and until otherwise ordered by us pending 
the Constitution and Government of Saorstát Éireann and we do further prohibit the 
removal, tampering with or destruction of any records, documents, correspondence, 
accounts, books, writings or papers of a public nature or relating to, or which come 
into existence for the purposes of government or public administration in Ireland…’.27  
The Order also prohibited any action 'altering the status, rights, perquisites or stipends 
or the transfer, or dismissal of any officer, servant, employee or functionary of the 
state'.28  Though the country had been partitioned the entire civil service remained 
united, available and firmly under the control of the Provisional Government.  The 
constitutional and parliamentary form in which it happened concealed the extent to 
which, by abolishing all Irish offices in the service of the crown, the entire existing 
machinery of government had been swept away.29  Between 1916 and 1922 Ireland 
experienced a revolution that was not only political but also economic and social.  
The country was partitioned and the Irish Free State emerged as an overwhelmingly 
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Catholic and agricultural society.  The brief post-war boom ended in 1922 and prices 
and wages began to fall.   
 
Civil service reaction 
The civil service that the Provisional Government took over was battered and 
confused.  The British departments and boards were still in the midst of reorganisation 
and the rationalisation of the Irish administration, which had been long recognised as 
urgent, was still incomplete.  During the World War normal recruitment procedures 
had been ignored and many temporary or unqualified positions had been created.  In 
addition during demobilisation unqualified ex-soldiers had been given civil service 
jobs.  The revolutionary Dáil in addition had several departments that duplicated those 
in Dublin Castle, such as local government or agriculture, as well as other 
departments that had no equivalent, such as economic development or defence.  Also 
it would now be necessary to create wholly new departments, notably Finance, which 
had no previous existence in Ireland.  Rather than being smooth transfer of authority 
the provisional Government operated in a country where the existence of any central 
government as a functioning reality could be questioned.   
Dr Cornelius (Conn) Murphy, secretary of the Irish branch of the Civil Service 
Alliance, who had impeccable Sinn Féin, Gaelic League and revolutionary 
credentials, wrote to the secretary of Dáil Éireann Diarmaid O'Hegarty, introducing 
himself as the secretary of the new “Executive Committee of the Conference of All 
Associations of Irish Civil Servants” with whom any future Irish government may 
conduct such negotiations as may be deemed necessary’.  This Executive Committee 
was in fact the staff side of the Irish National Whitley Council. He also forwarded a 
detailed fifteen-page memorandum on the history and functions of the Whitley 
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councils.30  In the cabinet the offer and correspondence were noted but ignored.31  An 
early meeting of the Provisional Government decided that the Whitley Councils posed 
an unacceptable limitation to the power of the executive and ordered that they should 
immediately cease working.32  However the decision was not actually announced to 
the civil service until December 1924.     
Article 10 of the Treaty stated that 'the government of the Irish Free State 
agrees to pay fair compensation on terms not less favourable than those accorded by 
the Act of 1920 to judges, officials, members of police forces and other public 
servants who are discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the change of 
government...'.  The inclusion of this assurance in the Treaty, in effect a constitutional 
guarantee of their status, seemed to assure a fair deal in future negotiations and was 
initially of great relief to the civil service.33  However for the IPCS (Ireland) the 
proclamation by the Provisional Government, which banned any interference with 
their status, also prevented any alteration to their grades and pay.  The often promised 
re-grading was still incomplete, and it seemed would remain so despite the many 
pledges received.  Reorganisation was still unfinished amongst the senior inspectors 
of the National Education Board, the surveyors attached to the Land Commission, the 
outdoor staff of the Congested Districts Board and amongst the auditors and 
inspectors of the Local Government Board.  Letters of complaint were immediately 
sent to Waterfield, to the British Chancellor Woods, and to Gallagher on the staff side 
of the Irish Civil Service Joint Whitley Council, though none were sent to the 
Provisional Government.34  The failure to complete the re-grading meant that those 
professional civil servants who opted to retire, or were compelled to retire, would 
receive pensions calculated on pre-reorganisation grading or, if their status as civil 
servants was not confirmed, perhaps no pension at all.         
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 The take-over of the Castle by the Provisional Government with many of the 
reorganisation schemes still incomplete provoked another wave of despair in the IPCS 
(Ireland) council.  Many of the council members, who represented their own 
departmental professional and technical officers, simply stopped attending council 
meetings.  The general purposes committee failed to achieve a quorum through 
December 1921 and January 1922. Office procedures collapsed as applications and 
correspondence were left unanswered or were lost.  Again it was Brunicardi provided 
the energy to maintain the IPCS (Ireland) council, organising discussions on a 
proposal to reserve a number of seats on the council for women members and 
suggesting that the Institution and the various professional associations consult with 
the Provisional Government on recruitment policy for professionals in the civil 
service.  Discussion however was desultory and it seemed the council might simply 
fade away from inactivity.35   
With the death of Griffiths and the shooting of Collins the Provisional 
Government lost its visionaries.  The killing of Collins also heightened the 
Provisional Government’s sense of siege and strengthened the conservative aspects of 
the national revolution.  In September 1922 the executions of anti-Treaty republicans 
by military tribunals began.  No challenge to the authority of the state was tolerated.  
Even the September withdrawal of labour by the post office workers in a strike 
against wage cuts was treated as subversion and ruthlessly crushed.   
 
Confronting the postal workers 
With post-war deflation the cost of living figure and therefore the ‘war bonus’ 
paid to civil servants began to fall.  Civil servants, having got used to thinking of their 
combined basic and bonus as their real salaries, now faced what was in effect a cut in 
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pay.  As the Provisional Government came into office the British government had 
already made a decision that the civil service would face a reduction in pay.  The 
post-war euphoria had evaporated in Britain and boom had gone bust.  In reaction the 
British government, in February 1922, imposed a “Supercut” of between ten and fifty 
per cent on civil service salaries along with an overall maximum total remuneration of 
£2000.36  The Postmaster General of the Provisional Government James J. Walsh 
decided to apply the same cut in the Irish civil service.  Post office workers, who were 
then classed as civil servants, went on strike to protest against the cuts.  A request by 
Walsh to the British Postmaster General to provide strike-breakers got a positive 
response.  The British government was anxious about the impact on their own civil 
service of any successful agitation in Ireland against cuts at a time when the two civil 
services were still closely linked.37  The strike was settled by a temporary rise in the 
basic salary, a promise to create a commission of inquiry into working conditions and 
wages in the post office under James Douglas, the Quaker businessman and 
nationalist who acted an advisor on the Free State Constitution Committee.38  It was 
also agreed to calculate an Irish cost of living figure rather than rely on the British 
figure.39  The Economics Affairs Department of Dáil Éireann was given the task of 
calculating an Irish figure based on the cost of basic foodstuffs.40   
 In September the next cost of living calculation, based on the new Irish 
figure, was due.  By now the civil war was entering its darkest phase in the weeks 
after the killing of Michael Collins.  Faced with another strike by the post office 
workers the government responded as if the strike was inspired by ‘Irregulars’ rather 
than by the postal workers union.  The Provisional Government recruited pensioners 
and unemployed to act as strike-breakers and issued a statement that ‘the government 
does not recognise the right of Civil Servants to strike.  In the event of a cessation of 
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work by any section of the Postal Service picketing such as is permitted in connection 
with industrial disputes will not be allowed’.41  It was implied In the Dáil that the 
strikers were Dublin-based irregulars intent on subverting the government.42  The 
army broke up the attempted pickets and eventually the postal workers returned to 
work defeated.  Few civil servants would have conceived of ever going on strike, but 
to be told that the right to strike was expressly denied them by their employer was a 
shock, especially since that same government had dismantled the Whitley Councils, 
the only institutional forum for addressing grievances in the civil service.  
  
Transferred civil servants and the Provisional Government 
The postal workers September strike coincided with the first meeting of the Dáil 
which had been elected in June 1922, just as the civil war broke out.  This Dáil was in 
fact a constituent assembly, elected to debate and pass the constitution of the Irish 
Free State and so allow the Irish Free State come into official existence on December 
6, the anniversary of the Treaty.  The debate on the status of the transferred civil 
servants was brief and uncontroversial.43  All of the 21,000 officials transferred had, 
under Article 10 of the Treaty, a right to compensation if they resigned as a 
consequence of the transfer of government, or were dismissed.  In fact however the 
majority of this apparently vast bureaucracy was post office workers, whilst in the 
professional, technical and supervisory grades there were about one thousand civil 
servants.  Reviewing its options on compensation for retiring or dismissed civil 
servants the Provisional Government decided to establish an advisory committee, 
chaired by Justice Wylie, of two senior officers of the Department of Finance with 
two representatives of the Civil Service Federation. The terms of reference of the 
Wylie advisory committee were: ‘to enquire into and advise as to the compensation 
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and all matters consequent thereon which should be paid under Article 10 of the 
Treaty to any civil servant or other public servant or officer of the Irish government 
who may be discharged or may retire in consequence of the change in government’.44   
  Coinciding with the establishment of the Irish Free State the civil service was 
experiencing another wave of organisation.  The government repression of the 1922 
strike against the cuts in the cost-of-living bonus in the Post Office helped to create 
the powerful Post Office Workers’ Union (POWU), through the amalgamation of the 
smaller postal workers unions in June 1923.  In February a conference of Irish civil 
service organisations established the Civil Service Federation to act as a single voice 
in negotiation with the Provisional Government.  The Federation was an alliance of 
various staff federations that grew out of the ad hoc “Executive Committee of the 
Conference of All Associations of Irish Civil Servants”, in fact the staff side of the 
Irish National Whitley Council.  Thus the Federation sought to act as an umbrella 
organisation for the autonomous and diverse civil service organisations.  As well as 
the relatively numerous executive officers and clerks, the Civil Service Federation at 
its foundation included many of the smaller sections of the civil service that would in 
later years be members of the professional and technical civil servants trade union, 
such as the ordnance survey staff and the inspectors of taxes.45  Paradoxically 
therefore, it was to be the experience of the Irish civil service that it began as a tightly 
organised and united movement but then, over time, gradually fragmented into a 
multiplicity of smaller organisations.     
The IPCS (Ireland) joined the initial steering committee of the Federation and 
though the Institution delegates contributed to the discussions, the Institution 
remained deeply split on whether it should actually join the Federation, finally 
deciding by the narrowest majority to remain outside.  The Federation was dominated 
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by the clerical and executive grades, most of them nationalist and many of them 
Gaelic League members.  To the many politically ‘imperial’ IPCS members the 
defiantly nationalist Federation was probably distasteful company.  More 
fundamentally, the IPCS (Ireland) was always conscious that it represented an outlook 
very different to the mass of the civil service.  For most of the clerical and executive 
grades work involved the application of known and established procedures in a 
familiar hierarchy of responsibility.  For professional and technical civil servants 
work involved the application of their specialist knowledge in unfamiliar and novel 
situations in which responsibility was assumed rather than conferred.  The Post Office 
Workers Union, which was in dispute with the government on pay reduction, also 
remained outside the Federation.  Thus the government, in appointing the Federation 
to represent the civil service interests on the Wylie compensation committee, 
excluded not only the Institution representing the professional grades but also the 
POWU, representing by far the largest single body of civil servants.46     
 
IPCS (Ireland) and the Provisional Government 
Almost every aspect of the emerging government policy on compensation for 
discharged and retired civil servants was disturbing to the IPCS (Ireland).  Firstly, it 
would only deal with those civil servants who were leaving the service and thus 
would have nothing to say on those who remained; secondly, the committee was 
purely advisory and could not make any decisions; and thirdly it assumed that the 
recently created Civil Service Federation represented all civil servants.  The initial 
response of the IPCS (Ireland) to the establishing of the Provisional Government was 
one of a guarded optimism.  At the annual general meeting in March 1922 the 
President spoke warmly about the ‘new vistas of usefulness that was gradually 
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opening before the Institution’.47  The optimism within the IPCS (Ireland) was 
guarded however after a close reading of the text of the Treaty, when it was realised 
that, though the interests of those civil servants who choose to leave were protected, 
the interests of those who choose to remain (presumably the majority) were not 
safeguarded.  This would be of particular concern to the professional and technical 
civil servants in the permanent employ of the government.  It was also of concern that 
the committee would be advising the minister of Finance on compensation rather than 
making a firm determination.  A minister is always free to reject advice.48   
In June 1922 the Institution’s council summarised their concerns in a formal 
‘Statement Relative to the Effect of the Treaty on the Position of Professional and 
Technical Civil Servants In Ireland’, which was printed and forwarded to the 
Provisional Government.49  Unfortunately for the Institution this coincided precisely 
with the attack on the Four Courts and the beginning of the Civil War.  Nor would it 
have helped that the ‘Statement’ consistently refers to the state as “Southern Ireland”.  
Not surprisingly therefore the government was tardy in its response.  In September the 
Institution turned to Professor Ernest Henry Alton, the former Unionist MP and now 
TD for Trinity College, to get some answers to the questions raised in their Statement. 
The Statement described the civil service as ‘beset by doubts and perplexities’, some 
of which were shared by all in the service and some of which were peculiar to the 
professional and technical grades.  First and foremost was the status of those civil 
servants who remained.  For the professional branches of the civil service (which the 
Statement list as including architects, engineers, surveyors, doctors, chemists, 
bacteriologists, pharmacists, valuers, geologists, botanists, auditors, solicitors, 
barristers, veterinary surgeons and others) there were additional anxieties.  Of 
necessity professionals entered the civil service later in life than the common civil 
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service clerical and executive grades, having spent years acquiring qualifications.  
Under the British service the Superannuation Act of 1859 acknowledged this and 
conceded added years for qualifications.  The IPCS (Ireland) wanted the new 
government to re-enact those benefits.  On these anxieties the Department of Finance 
could offer an explicit assurance that all civil servants carried with them into the new 
government all their existing rights in regard to superannuation, salary scales, and 
conditions of service.  On the other problems; the number of unestablished men who 
had been employed for many years in a temporary capacity and the unfinished re-
grading in some of the professional posts; the Department of Finance could only offer 
the Wylie committee, which was then being established.  As the Wylie committee was 
only dealing with those civil servants who opted to retire, or were dismissed, the 
Department of Finance was in effect saying that those civil servants of uncertain 
status who opted to stay in the service of the Irish free State would have to take their 
chances.  However, the department did promise that though the Civil Service 
Federation would ordinarily represent the staff, whenever the committee would be 
dealing with a special class then one of the representatives of the Federation would 
stand down and be replaced by a representative of that class.  Under this arrangement 
the Institution of Professional Civil Servants would have a representative on the 
committee when it came to deal with any of its members.50 
 As is so often the case promise and performance were far apart.  In an 
interview with the Minister for Finance Ernest Blythe the IPCS (Ireland) council 
discovered that they would only be invited to attend the committee hearings if the 
chairman Wylie thought it fit.  He, in turn would only agree if the other members of 
the committee agreed.  In an intensely argumentative meeting with Wylie the 
Institution council was dissuaded from pressing its entirely legitimate claims to 
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representation.  The IPCS (Ireland) council turned to the British parliament, which 
was debating the bill to confirm the Treaty and the constitution of the Irish Free State.  
The IPCS (Ireland) wanted the British parliament to accept responsibility for the 
pensions of the civil servants who, in the view of the Institution, were in reality being 
ejected from the imperial service.  Not surprisingly the claims of the IPCS (Ireland) 
received scant sympathy there.  The British Parliament, having seen the Irish problem 
safely disposed of, was not going to welcome its revival in any form.51                
1922 was a deeply traumatic rite of passage for Irish democracy.52  The civil 
service was, initially, fired with a sense of mission and a determination to serve the 
new nation fully and faithfully.  The first issue of IRIS SEIRBHÍSE AN 
STÁIT/CIVIL SERVICE JOURNAL (henceforth Iris), the Journal of the Civil 
Service Federation, noted that at the time of the Treaty the civil service had been 
enthused at the opening up of brighter prospects of an efficient service, and celebrated 
the camaraderie which had infused the Gaelic League in the old days and, it was 
hoped, would infuse the nation and its civil service once again.  Most civil servants 
anticipated that national independence would mean a civil service in which patronage 
and nepotism would be a thing of the past, entrance would be by a ‘ruthlessly just’ 
competitive system and industry, integrity and intelligence in the service of the state 
would prove the only passports to promotion.  However, one year later the mood was 
one of foreboding.  National freedom meant an attack on workers, on trade unions and 
on the civil service.53  The opportunity had passed.  The Provisional Government 
squandered the goodwill of its civil service and as 1923 dawned and, under the same 
hands, the Irish Free State came into office the attitude of the civil service was one of 
suspicion and defensiveness.  For many civil servants the state, rather than embodying 
the bright ideals and generous ambitions of the nation, was simply their employer.       
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THE IPCS (IRELAND) AND CUMANN na nGAEDHEAL 
 
 
Introduction 
In August 1923 the ‘Constituent’ third Dáil dissolved and the general election 
returned the Cumann na nGaedheal government led by W.T. Cosgrave.  Cumann na 
nGaedheal, formed in April 1923, consisted of the pro-Treaty members of Sinn Féin.  
Although a minority in the Dáil, the party remained in government due to the absence of the 
anti-Treaty deputies.  The Cosgrave governments were in fact all minority administrations 
empowered by the abstention of republican TDs.1  The Labour Party, under the leadership of 
Thomas Johnson to 1927 and T.J. O’Connell to 1932, was limited in its role of opposition by 
its few TDs, its conservative leadership and by the divisions in the trade union movement 
that followed Jim Larkin’s return.    
Assailing civil servants fast became a regular ritual of the Dáil debates and 
allegations of a bloated public service living off the fat of the land became a cliché of 
political comment on the civil service. 2   The underlying assumption of these 
pronouncements was that the civil service of the Irish Free State ought to be significantly 
smaller than that handed over by the Treaty.  Under the British regime Ireland had developed 
a large and decentralised civil service a large number of whom served as experts in 
departments whose objective was the transformation of Irish society and economy through 
government action.  In the last decades of the British regime professional civil servants were 
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recruited to run the many autonomous institutions being developed as a solution to the 
problems of Irish society, especially its chronic poverty and under-development.  The 
government of the independent state inherited the pre-independence nationalist suspicion of 
the civil service as an alien influence.  Yet alongside this suspicion there was  a strong 
nationalist belief, shared by Sinn Féin and by all parties in the state including Cumann na 
nGaedheal, that state aid was necessary to achieve the economic development of Ireland.  In 
contradiction to the unthinking hostility to the civil service, this implied that the professional 
civil service would have a central role in the future of the state and nation.    
  
 
Economy in the public service 
In May 1923, as an investigation into the financial position of the Irish Free State 
revealed a deficit of £1.2 million for the current year.3  In pursuit of a balanced budget, and 
fearful of the hyperinflation that was sweeping the Weimar Republic of Germany, the 
Cosgrave government cut old age pensions, blind pensions and teacher salaries.4  In this 
pursuit of an economic strategy of severe retrenchment the civil service was an obvious 
target.  As economy in the public service emerged as an insistent theme of government it was 
linked to the cost of compensation for civil servants dismissed or resigned under Article 10 
of the Treaty.5  The Department of Finance’s review of the budget position late in 1923 
identified the civil service as being ripe for “economy”.  The review identified a two-pronged 
approach to lower costs by, firstly, scrapping inessential services and ending the 
‘unnecessary multiplication of departments as an obvious source of waste’ and, secondly, by 
cutting the cost of the services then remaining.  The objective of the review was to ensure 
that the costs of the public services would reflect the diminution of work that was necessarily 
consequent on the ‘exclusion of the six-counties’.6  
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In 1924, as part of its economy drive and also to assert control over the civil service, 
the government substantially reduced the basic salary scales and annual leave for new 
entrants to the clerical and executive classes.  It also introduced a new differentiated scale 
between married and unmarried civil servants.7  From that point on there were in fact two 
completely different salary schemes in the civil service; for the transferred civil servants 
protected by Article 10 there was a continuance of the old scales, with the new lower scales 
being applied to the new entrants.  The Civil Service Federation publicised its objections to 
these changes introduced without any negotiation, which tended to drive experienced officers 
out from the service protected as they were by Article 10 of the Treaty and to create 
resentment between the old and the new civil servants.8 
 
Legislative changes and the civil service 
The Cumann na nGaedheal government transformed the legislative base for the 
relationship between the state and its civil service.  Under the British regime the various 
boards and commissions in Dublin Castle, including those that recruited professional and 
technical officers, worked to a budget and recruited and paid their own staff.  The Irish 
government’s Civil Service (Regulation) Acts of 1923 and 1925 swept aside all of these 
Boards and brought their staffs into a single civil service under the control of the Minister of 
Finance.  The Civil Service (Regulation) Acts of 1923, 1924 and 1925 established the Civil 
Service Commission to recruit future civil servants by open competitive examinations.  
These acts also empowered the Minister of Finance to make, change or revoke regulations 
for establishing the classification, remuneration, conditions and terms of service of the civil 
servants.  Thus while the Civil Service Commission controlled recruitment the Minister 
would remain solely responsible for management of the civil service.  In line with the general 
expectation for a minimal state apparatus Blythe, Minister for Finance, expected that the 
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Commission would have very little work to do and the commissioners would be very much 
part-time positions.9   The first commissioners were the Ceann Comhairle of the Dáil and the 
secretaries of finance and of education, the two departments most directly involved.  The 
Civil Service Federation protested, with no effect, at the appointment of the Ceann 
Comhairle to chair the commission as his was a political position.10 
In the Dáil the opposition, whilst approving of the Commission, proposed that it 
ought to report to the Dáil rather than to the Minister for Finance and that control of the civil 
service ought to lie ultimately with the Dáil as the legislative assembly rather than with the 
executive.  The intent was to make the management of the civil service of the new state 
subject to a detailed code enshrined in legislation rather than to ministerial prerogative.11  
Although this was rejected as unpractical it does underline the extent to which the Dáil was 
determined to de-politicise the question of recruitment and control of the civil service.12  The 
executive council equally strongly opposed any attempt by the Dáil or Senate to interfere in 
its control of the civil service.13 
The Civil Service Regulation Act allowed for recruitment of professional or technical 
civil servants whose expertise was such as could not be determined by the usual competitive 
examination.  Introducing this section of the 1923 bill Blythe said ‘there is a class of post 
which requires a man of experience, administrative ability, certain force of character, and 
knowledge of the world, and you might easily have the best candidate for that class of 
position surpassed in examination by a bookworm or quite a young student, who would be 
altogether unfit for the post’.14 In recruiting these professional civil servants the Commission 
was directed to assemble a suitably qualified interview board to help it in its selection.      
The Ministers and Secretaries Act centralised the departments of government in an 
executive of nine ministers under the president.  During the second reading Cosgrave 
described it as second only to the constitution in importance in laying down the foundations 
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of the state.15  The broad principle of the bill was to take the multiplicity of boards and 
commissions of the British administration, and reorganise them into departments under 
ministers described as “corporation sole”; in other words the minister was the department and 
all acts of the civil servants of that department were done as if directly ordered by the 
minister.  For many professional civil servants this would have represented a loss of the 
personal autonomy that marked the more casual and decentralised Castle administration.  The 
creation of nine ministerial-controlled departments also, of course, created a small, elite corp 
of top civil servants as departmental secretaries.  The key department was that of Finance, 
which took charge of the administration and business of public finances and to which was 
assigned the civil service commission.  Although each department continued to appoint their 
own civil servants each appointment required the express permission of the Minister of 
Finance.  The former departmental autonomy of the old British regime had truly passed 
beyond recall.  The Ministers and Secretaries Act involved a significant redistribution of 
many of the civil servants, especially those in the professional and technical grades of the 
former Land Commission, Congested Districts Board and those in the Education Boards, to 
the new government departments.   
  
Adapting to change in the IPCS (Ireland) 
In the light of the changes in the government and the creation of the Irish Free State 
revision to the constitution of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants (Ireland) was 
clearly necessary.  A proposal to allow those who retired under Article 10 of the Treaty to 
retain membership was rejected, reflecting, perhaps, some hostility to those civil servants 
who refused the chance to serve the new independent Irish state.  They were ultimately 
allowed retain a non-voting membership.16   The revised and amended constitution deleted all 
references to “H.M.’s Civil Service” but retained the name of the institution as “ The 
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Institution of Professional Civil Servants (Ireland)”, implying either a hope for retaining an 
all-Ireland organisation or a refusal to accept the title “Saorstát” for the state. However, 
recognising the fact of national partition, the IPCS (Ireland) admitted that, of necessity, it had 
to be primarily occupied with defending the interests of the professional civil servants in the 
Irish Free State as in reality there was little or nothing that it could do for those professional 
and technical civil servants transferred to Northern Ireland.17  The objects of the Institution 
now were ‘the improvement and maintenance of the position and status of civil servants 
(established or unestablished) of the directing administrative or higher grades who are 
engaged in professional, technical or scientific work; the protection, assertion, and defence, 
or the assisting therein, of the status, position, rights, remedies and interests of civil servants 
engaged in professional, technical or scientific work; the advancement of efficiency in the 
civil service; the promotion and extension of science, knowledge and practice, and the 
interchange of views thereon either alone or in combination with other persons or bodies; and 
the representation of the Institution by properly appointed persons on any body formed in 
pursuance of the objects contained herein’.18  Membership was through approved 
associations of professional and technical civil servants, the Institution retaining its role of 
essentially acting as an umbrella body for these associations.  Associate membership was 
available to those civil servants engaged in technical or scientific work, whether established 
or unestablished, whether or not described as a professional appointment, provided that such 
a person could not be described as a workman under the Trade Union Acts.  An honorary 
membership was created for outside members of kindred professional bodies who might be 
available to act on consultative committees. 
 As well as the usual work of acting on behalf of individual members, the council also 
maintained a watch over the constituent associations and encouraged them to re-organise in 
response to departmental changes.  Thus the Inspectors in the Department of Education were 
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encouraged to amalgamate the senior, divisional and junior inspectorate associations into a 
new Association of Inspectors.  The established and unestablished officers of the former 
Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction were also encouraged to amalgamate 
into a new Association of Professional and Technical Officers of the Department of Lands 
and Agriculture.  Prison Governors were admitted as professional civil servants.19  Contact 
was maintained with professional associations such as the Royal Institute of Architects, who 
were objecting to architects in the Board of Works poaching on their livelihood by 
maintaining private practices on the side, though there is little evidence of the IPCS (Ireland) 
doing anything about it.20 
 The IPCS (Ireland) also began to develop contacts in the Oireachtas and to learn the 
skills of political lobbying in the newly independent state.  Departmental changes were 
monitored and the IPCS council kept up correspondence on these changes with either the 
President of the Executive or the responsible Minister.21  In the Senate they used Sir Edward 
Coey Biggar, Sir John Keane and Samuel Lombard Brown K.C.  Coey Biggar was the former 
head of the Castle Local Government Board.  Liberal in his politics he opposed the 
government on the 1927 Juries Bill to exclude women from jury service.  He was prominent 
on public health issues generally.  Sir John Keane was an ex-Unionist landowner nominated 
to the Senate.  His mansion in Cappoquin, County Waterford was burnt down in February 
1923 during the civil war.  He was most prominent during the debate on the 1923 Land Act 
that completed the end of landlordism in Ireland.  Other senators with whom the IPCS 
(Ireland) maintained contact were Brigadier General Sir Edward Bellingham, a figurehead to 
the Irish ex-servicemen of the British army, J.J. Parkinson and Dr Henry L. Baniville.  In the 
Dáil they used the independent TCD TD Sir James Craig, professor of Medicine at Trinity, 
and the Cumann na nGaedheal TD T.P. Hennessy.22  At general elections the membership 
were urged to press the claims of the civil service if canvassed.  However, although the IPCS 
 35 
(Ireland) may have had many members who were imperial in their political instincts it also 
supported William Norton, leader of the POWU, as the Labour Party candidate in Dublin 
South constituency by-election in February 1926.23  When successfully elected Norton 
proved a staunch defender of the civil service in the Dáil chamber. 
 The council used these parliamentary supporters to ask questions in the Dáil or to 
prompt ministers on issues that concerned the IPCS and on which they could get no progress 
through the official channels.  One such issue was allowances for travel and accommodation.  
As professional officers the IPCS membership, more than the mass of civil servants, had to 
travel the country on official business.  Allowances were a persistent and vexatious issue 
with a government that regularly and unilaterally reduced these allowances.  Faced with a 
refusal by the government to discuss these allowances, and failing also to secure concerted 
action with the other civil service associations (few of whom utilised these allowances to any 
great extent) the IPCS (Ireland) turned to Dáil and Senate sympathisers to intervene with the 
Department of Finance.24 
 
The IPCS (Ireland) in the 1920s 
As the Cosgrave governments settled into normal politics the Institute of Professional Civil 
Servants (Ireland), in common with other civil service unions, faced the task of mobilising its 
membership on two opposed fronts.  On the one hand it had to fight to defend the interests of 
the civil servants who opted to remain in the civil service of the Free State whilst on the other 
hand fighting for the best terms possible for those who wished to retire under the provisions 
of Article 10 of the Treaty.  However, although the other civil service organisations soon 
concentrated on fighting the cause of those civil servants that remained, the IPCS (Ireland) 
got further and further embroiled in the cases of those who opted to retire.  As was the 
experience of some other civil service associations this concentration on the rights of those 
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who were “deserting the ship” led to tensions and disagreements with those who remained.25  
By the end of the 1920s the Institution was losing members and, just in time, turned to 
defending the position of those professional civil servants that stayed on.26 
  Through the early years of the new state it is striking how unaware the IPCS 
(Ireland) seems to have been of the important and fundamental changes that were taking 
place in the civil service.  The fourth Dáil, from September 1923 to May 1927, saw the 
issuance of many ministerial orders and the enactment of laws to regulate the civil service.  
These included the Civil Service (Regulation) Act, which created the civil Service 
Commission; also the Ministers and Secretaries Act, which was the legislative basis for a 
highly centralised and politically directed civil service; as well as the creation of the ESB, the 
first state-sponsored industry.  Yet on all of these key events for the state’s civil service the 
IPCS (Ireland) records are silent.  This lack of awareness was most likely due to the self-
image that the professional civil servants had of themselves as being professionals primarily, 
who happened to work for the state.  This meant that they saw themselves as being 
fundamentally different to the mass of ordinary civil servants who had entered the service 
through competitive examinations and worked within an established grading structure.  It is 
also possible that the IPCS (Ireland) expected that the professional associations would defend 
the interests of the professional civil servants who were undoubtedly being affected by 
legislative changes.  This is in marked contrast to the Civil Service Federation that 
maintained a close watch on political changes and was not afraid to publicise its grievances.   
 
The end of the Whitley Councils and the search for civil service unity 
In May 1922 Collins had assured a delegation of the civil service that though he could not 
commit any future government to accept the Whitley councils he personally accepted the 
need for some consultative body.  The Whitley Joint Council was abolished but the 
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departmental councils were allowed continue as an ad hoc consultative council for the 
transition period.  Whilst the staff representatives saw this arrangement as a temporary 
substitute for some future form of reinstated Whitleyism, Collins and the provisional 
government saw this as a purely temporary arrangement to facilitate the transition from 
British to Irish rule.  The IPCS (Ireland) was suspicious of this consultative council created in 
early 1923 as it was clear that as a purely ad hoc and temporary body it as no substitute for 
the Whitley Joint Council.  The IPCS (Ireland) remained sceptical despite the enthusiasm of 
the Civil Service Federation for the consultative council and opted to insist on separate 
representation for the professional grades.27  The Federation continued to hope for a Whitley-
like body on which ‘representatives of official and staff sides meet, not for mere ventilation 
of grievances but to give both sides co-equal interest and power…a body for action not talk, 
fostering and developing in the staff that spirit of co-operative responsibility which was the 
guiding principle in the Irish-Ireland movement’.28       
A year later, with the transition period complete and the Civil Service Regulation Act 
in force, the civil service associations continued to expect the reinstatement of something like 
the Whitley Council.  However in February 1924 the Whitley Council was formally 
abolished with the government offering a meeting with civil service representatives nothing 
more than a promise to establish new machinery ‘more suited to Saorstát Éireann 
conditions’.29  This rhetorical flourish might have seemed promising to the more nationalist 
members of the civil service, but few were convinced and most of the associations continued 
to press for a restoration of a Whitley-type council.  In the Dáil deputies Cooper and 
Johnson’s repeated questioning of Cosgrave and Blythe on the Whitley Councils got vague 
and non-committal replies.  Within cabinet however, and eventually in a statement to the 
Dáil, Cosgrave took the view that sole power to determine pay and conditions within the civil 
service lay with the government and that therefore only a consultative body could be 
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allowed.30  Finally, in December 1924, the Minister for Finance issued without discussion or 
consultation a scheme for a purely consultative representative council for the civil service 
made up of official and staff sides, all civil servants.31   
 With the question of representation for civil servants reopened by the abolition of the 
Whitley councils the IPCS (Ireland) once again considered joining the Civil Service 
Federation.  Affiliation to the Federation was quickly rejected but the Institution sought to 
create a working basis for co-operation.  By the end of 1924, when the government finally 
unveiled its scheme for a civil service representative council, the civil service was 
represented by three main blocs; the Civil Service Federation, the Post Office Workers’ 
Union and the Institute of Professional Civil Servants (Ireland).32 
 As soon as the government circulated its scheme the IPCS warned the constituent 
associations not to commit themselves in any way until their council had determined a line of 
action.  Unhappy at the government scheme, which was a considerable retreat from the 
powers of the Whitley councils, the IPCS council drew up counter-proposals and worked to 
co-ordinate a cross-service response with the Federation and the POWU.  A Provisional Staff 
Side was drawn together equally from the three bodies and a meeting with the Minister for 
Finance was requested.  Initially the joint approach worked well.  When the minister, 
predictably, refused to meet the Provisional Staff Side it was pointed out to the government 
that it had already broken a pledge to consult the service and that any scheme drafted and put 
into operation by one side lacked the first element of conciliation, agreement by both sides.33 
 Within a few weeks however the unity of the service associations was broken.  The 
Civil Service Federation, assured by the minister that the conciliation scheme could be 
revised to remedy any defects that might emerge once it was working, decided to give it a 
trial.  In fact the Federation, as the largest and most nationalist organisation in the civil 
service, had come under considerable pressure to work the government scheme.  The POWU 
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and the IPCS (Ireland) decided to stick with the decision that the scheme was completely 
unacceptable and both protested at the Federation’s decision to break ranks with the rest of 
the service.  Confident that the other associations would have to eventually come on board 
the government pressed ahead and the Civil Service Representative Council, without either 
the POWU or the IPCS (Ireland), held its first meeting on 15 March 1926.  The POWU 
description of the scheme as ‘utterly worthless’ proved correct.  Whilst the civil servants 
might have continued to refer to it as a “conciliation” council the minister, correctly, referred 
to it as a “representative” council.  From the beginning the Civil Service Representative 
Council proved unsatisfactory and the “recognised” associations within the Civil Service 
Federation unanimously pressed an unconvinced minister to accept that the constitution had 
to be revised.34 
 1927 was a crucial year in stabilising the Free State.  This was the year in which, in 
the aftermath of the murder of the government minister Kevin O’Higgins, the republican 
Fianna Fáil party was manoeuvred into finally entering Dáil Éireann.  With a now vibrant 
and seemingly sympathetic opposition and with the government facing into two elections in 
1927 the Federation tried once again to build up a single service voice.  The Federation 
proposed a service-wide dinner, including the IPCS (Ireland) and the POWU, as a launch for 
a new drive for co-operation on a conciliation council.  The Institution was wary.  In 
February 1927 a hurriedly called conference between the Federation, the POWU and the 
IPCS (Ireland) reviewed the Civil Service Federation five-point programme that included 
demands for; 
(1) Provision for departmental councils or committees to deal with departmental matters. 
(2) The chairman of both local and central councils should not have the right to decide 
what matters should be placed on the agenda for discussion. 
(3) The councils should have the power to come to decisions. 
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(4) Provision should be made for the attendance at council meetings of the full-time 
officers of associations. 
(5) An appeal body should be set up to which matters on which disagreement had been 
reached might be referred. 
The IPCS (Ireland) replied that the first four points had already been included in the earlier 
demands that had been put to the Minister for Finance and had been rejected by him and that 
the fifth point was not practicable.  The POWU proved equally dismissive.  In truth the IPCS 
(Ireland) was not interested in joining what was clearly a sinking ship. In September the Civil 
Service Clerical Association seceded from both the Civil Service Federation and the 
Representative Council and so therefore, as the Federation was breaking up, the so-called 
‘Representative Council’ now represented a minority of civil servants.35   
 The IPCS (Ireland) continued to co-operate with the POWU on specific issues, in 
particular the question of the way in which the cost-of-living was calculated and on which 
the amount of the “bonus” depended.  It also worked with the new Civil Service Clerical 
Association and the POWU in continuing to press the demand for proper conciliation 
machinery and their attempts to make it a political issue.  The POWU, the Civil Service 
Clerical Union, and the smaller unions of the Custom and Excise Federation and the 
Association of Inspectors of Taxes formed an umbrella organisation, the Civil Service Joint 
Committee to form a united front in negotiation with the government, however the IPCS 
(Ireland) remained aloof.  The Institution horizon was never limited to the civil service and it 
also continued to maintain contact with secular professional bodies in order to defend the 
status and integrity of the professional civil service.36  It has to be admitted that the efforts of 
the various civil service associations and unions to unite and defend the interests of those 
civil servants that choose to remain in the civil service of the Irish Free State bore little fruit.  
However, in defending the interests of those civil servants that choose to retire under Article 
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10 of the Treaty, the IPCS (Ireland) and other unions built and maintained a great cross-
service unity and achieved a defeat of the government that re-opened the whole Treaty debate 
and brought into question national sovereignty.  This was the Wigg and Cochrane case.37 
  
 
The Wigg and Cochrane Case 
Article 10 of the Treaty guaranteed that all of the 21,000 civil servants transferred form the 
British administration had a right to “fair” compensation, no less favourable than that offered 
in the 1920 Government of Ireland, if they choose to resign due to the change of government 
or if they were dismissed.  Under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act a transferred civil 
servant had three main rights; the right to retire within a transitional period of two years; the 
right to special compensation if a post was abolished; and the right to seek permission to 
retire with special compensation from a statutory committee if it could be proved that 
conditions of service had worsened.  The transfer of the civil servants began on 6 April 1922 
and although it promised to be in any event a complicated task it was thrown into complete 
disarray by the outbreak of civil war.  By September 1922 the staff not yet transferred 
included the Inland Revenue and Custom and Excise, the Land Commission, the Registry of 
Deeds, Quit Rent office and the Office of Clerk of Crown and Hanaper.  Many of these staffs 
though working on Irish departmental business were in effect still working for the British 
government.  The transfer of staff was further complicated by the absence of any knowledge 
within the Provisional Government of the intricacies of the inner workings of the 
administrative machine it was taking over.  This, as in the case of the Land Commission, 
made the Provisional Government constantly suspicious that it might be buying a decrepit 
and run down apparatus.38  The final transfer of staff occurred on the first day of April 1923.  
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From that day on the entire civil service faced the choices of an uncertain future in the Free 
State, or voluntary retirement, or dismissal, with compensation. 
  
The Wylie committee 
The Provisional Government decided that a quasi-judicial committee would most fairly 
address the question of compensation for civil servants dismissed or choosing to retire. This 
would also help divert an otherwise certain pressure from applicants on individual TDs, 
Senators and Ministers.39  Mr Justice Wylie, a respected judicial figure who had acted as 
defence counsel at the courts-martial of the 1916 leaders, chaired the committee, which 
began its sittings on 4 October 1922.  On the official side were Gregg and Gilbert of the 
Department of Finance.  On the staff side were Smyth, MacGiobuin and Smidic from the 
Civil Service Federation and, when appropriate, a representative from other, smaller 
associations or unions.  In strict law the committee was purely advisory, but as the 
government seemed set to accept without question the advice offered it seemed that the 
resolution of the fate of those civil servants who opted to retire, or who were dismissed, 
would be determined without too much rancour or difficulty.  The Wylie committee, in 
assessing compensation and pensions, indicated that it intended simply to apply the 
regulations on superannuation of civil servants as inherited from the British administration, 
as if the applicants were redundant or retiring due to ill-health.  The Wylie committee was 
already a significant retreat from the 1920 Act, which provided for a statutory “civil service 
committee” empowered to finally and conclusively determine compensation.  Due to the 
refusal of the Dublin civil servants to co-operate with the Civil Service Committee in late 
1921, it had never in fact assembled but it would without doubt have been a more powerful 
and representative committee than that assembled by the Provisional Government.40   
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The Wylie committee circulated the ‘form of application for compensation’ to be 
returned in duplicate.  The day appointed by the government as being the day on which the 
changeover of the civil service actually occurred was 1 April 1922, the day after the British 
parliament approved the Treaty and gave it the force of law.  It was also made clear that it 
was expected that where a retiring officer made an application there was an onus on him or 
her to support the statement that retirement was “due to the change of government” and that 
the Official side would demand the right to interrogate any such claim.  Again, this was a 
significant departure from the 1920 Act committee, a departure the Staff side was determined 
to resist.41 By the end of March 1923 the committee had quietly and efficiently dealt with 
upwards of six hundred claims under Article 10 of the Treaty.  Most of the civil servants who 
opted to retire were senior officials with long years of service and therefore represented a 
loss of experience.  But for the civil servants who choose to stay on, whilst these retirements 
meant increased work in the short term, in the long term it also represented an opportunity to 
introduce new blood and to compete for hitherto unavailable promotions.42  The Civil Service 
Federation was certainly sanguine in the early months of the committee.43  But the IPCS 
(Ireland) was soon to put a spanner in the works of the Wylie committee. 
 
The IPCS and the Wylie Committee 
The IPCS (Ireland) was less happy about the composition of the committee and 
defensive about its right to represent members during its deliberations. As the application 
form for retirement under Article 10 was circulated the Institution instructed its members to 
clearly state that they belonged to and wished to be represented by the IPCS (Ireland) and not 
the Federation.44  By years end, unhappy at many rulings of the committee, the IPCS council 
was looking for legal advice on challenging it in the courts.  Whilst the minutes of the IPCS 
council are frustratingly brief and opaque (‘agreed that legal advice be sought on aspects of 
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committee’s decisions’ or “Counsels opinion upon the four points submitted discussed’) it is 
clear that initially the main bone of contention centred on how the “bonus” was being 
included when calculating the pension.45  Originally, thinking that the wartime inflation was 
a temporary difficulty only, the British Treasury in introducing the bonus in 1916 explicitly 
stated that it would not count for pension or gratuity under the Superannuation Acts.  As the 
war bonus became in fact a regular part of the pay of civil servants pensions emerged as 
anomalous and unfair.  In April 1919 this was temporarily addressed in a memorandum of 
agreement between the Treasury and the civil service associations.  Under this agreement 
subsequent pension awards would include a war bonus related supplementary pension.  In the 
post-war period as the bonus, though temporary and fluctuating, had become in reality part of 
the pay of civil servants the Whitley Council for the civil service turned its attention to the 
continuing problem of pensions.  The Whitley Council agreed that in addition to the normal 
calculation of pension there would be added three quarters of the bonus paid at the time of 
retirement and also, in calculating the lump sum gratuity the bonus would be added on. The 
Treasury then, without agreement or legislation, decided that the part of a pension of retiring 
civil servants that was based on the bonus would be, just like the bonus itself, subject to 
periodic quarterly adjustment based on the cost of living calculation, and would be subject to 
an over-riding maximum. A ‘Treasury Minute’ of March 1922 introduced a notional 
maximum for the bonus element that would allow the bonus to fluctuate downward but 
prevent it fluctuating upwards beyond a certain percentage.  The notion of a ‘maximum’ was 
introduced to prevent the total annual sum payable in pensions exceeding the statutory 
proportion of the total salary on which civil servants pensions were calculated because, it was 
conceivable, the bonus element of the pension might in time rise to exceed the actual basic 
salary paid to a civil servant on retirement.  These changes were effected by a Treasury 
Minute dated 20 March 1922, that is in the period between the Provisional Government 
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taking over Dublin Castle on 16th January, when Collins forbade any alterations in personnel 
or conditions, and the 1st April 1922 when the civil service in Ireland was formally 
transferred to the Provisional Government.  Justice Wylie, at the first sitting of the 
Compensation Committee, indicated that he intended to allow this Treasury Minute to govern 
the compensation payable under the Treaty.46   
 
Wigg and Cochrane 
By early January 1923 the IPCS council decided to fight the Wylie committee in the 
courts and instructed the member associations to forward to the council a list of the cases past 
and pending in the Wylie committee.  These were then carefully monitored.47  Meanwhile a 
“Treaty Pensioners Association” was formed to act as the organisation of the civil servants 
affected. This Association, funded in part by the IPCS, travelled to London to lobby the 
British government on the issue of the compensation and pensions.48   By the autumn two 
cases had emerged as promising vehicles to challenge the compensation committee; that of 
John Howard Wigg and that of Robert Oliver Cochrane.  Wigg was assistant architect in the 
OPW in Dublin on a salary of £430 plus bonus of £232.3.0, which, by his date of retirement, 
had reduced to £119 giving him a salary of £549 on retirement.  Wigg had, on 1 April 1922, 
seventeen years of service.  The pension awarded to Wigg was £200 on his basic salary plus 
a supplementary bonus of £103.0.9 subject to a maximum of £88.6.5.  This gave him a 
pension of £288.6.5.  Cochrane was a chief executive officer in the OPW on £415 plus bonus 
of £194.5.6 with twenty-six years service on 1 April 1922 giving him a final salary of 
£609.5.6.  Cochrane was awarded £206.5.0 basic pension plus a supplementary bonus 
£106.5.2 subject to maximum of £91.1.7 giving him a final pension of £297.6.7.  In both 
cases the pensions were calculated in the normal manner, taking account of years of service 
and added years.  However, following the Treasury Minute of March 1922, the awards 
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carried the conditions that the supplemental pension would be subject to quarterly 
reassessment based on the cost-of-living figure and that at no time would the supplemental 
pension exceed its prescribed amount at the date of retirement, the “over-riding maximum”.  
Had the terms of the 1920 Better Government of Ireland Act been applied the basic salary 
and bonus would have been considered together as “pay”, the pension would have had no 
periodic reassessment and the over-riding maximum would not have applied.   
On 15 November 1923 Wigg and Cochrane issued a writ in the High Court.  In their 
writ Wigg and Cochrane asked that the High Court declare that the compensation awarded 
them was not “fair compensation” inasmuch as part of the compensation was put on a sliding 
scale, the quarterly cost-of-living reassessment, which would not have been the case under 
the 1920 Act.  The central argument hung on the words of Article 10 of the Treaty, ‘the 
government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair compensation on terms not less 
favourable than those accorded by the Act of 1920…to public servants who are discharged 
by it or who retire in consequence of the change of government’.  Wigg and Cochrane argued 
that terms less favourable than those accorded by the 1920 Act were in fact being imposed by 
the government because in 1920 there was no “maximum” and no adjustment of the bonus 
element of the pension.  What they wanted was that the courts should declare that the bonus 
was part of the salary formerly enjoyed and that in calculating the superannuation allowance 
a fixed award should be made, and that no part of such allowance should be put on a sliding 
scale.49  They also asked for a declaration that the relevant date for reference for calculating 
superannuation and bonus was not the actual date of transfer, 1 April 1922, but December 
1920 when the 1920 Act came into law, when there was no over-riding maximum and 
pensions were a fixed sum calculated on full salary and three-quarters of bonus. 
The government defence was that the Department of Finance of the Irish Free State 
had inherited the authority of the former British Treasury.  Under that authority civil servants 
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were employed at pleasure and had no legal right to a pension.  The decision as to the 
amount of any pension that lay formerly with the Treasury lay now with the Minster for 
Finance.  Therefore the action of Wigg and Cochrane was not sustainable and ought to be 
dismissed.  In the High Court however the judgement, delivered on 18 July 1924 by Mr 
Justice Meredith, found not only that the pensions of Wigg and Cochrane ought to be 
calculated, as they had argued, under the 1920 Act, with a sliding scale but no over-riding 
maximum but also that their pensions and by implication that of all transferred civil servants 
established or temporary, were guaranteed by the Constitution’s incorporation of the Treaty.  
Rights that were secured in the Constitution could not be governed or qualified by a Treasury 
Minute, or a decision of the Minister for Finance, or even an Act of the Oireachtas.  The 
pensions of dismissed or retiring transferred officers were not a gift of the Minister of 
Finance but a constitutional right and therefore enforceable in the courts whose task it was to 
defend the constitution. 
 The state immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.  Meanwhile Wylie, 
once his authority was questioned, resigned from the committee.  Initially the government 
was not unhappy at these developments and may well have welcomed them, confident that 
their interpretation of the rights of the transferred civil servants would stand.  The decision to 
abolish the Whitley Councils and the stubborn refusal to establish any replacement 
arbitration scheme made civil servants uneasy and more willing to take the money on offer 
and resign.  In July 1924, just before the High Court delivered its judgement, Blythe revealed 
that 864 civil servants had resigned ‘in consequence of the change of government’ costing a 
lump sum of £208,870 and an annual pension of £124,666, and there were still many 
applications in the pipeline.  These payments were being made against the background of 
cuts in old age pensions and teacher salaries.50  The government also discharged 454 civil 
servants, mainly in the court system and in the non-denominational Marlborough Street 
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Teacher Training College, at even higher costs.  By the end of 1925 the cost of compensation 
under Article 10 was running at £254,785 per annum in payments to 1,851 former civil 
servants, Dublin Metropolitan Police and judicial officers with a further 2,139 still pending.51  
Even before the High Court case Blythe described Article 10 as the worst section in the 
Treaty.52  The High Court decision and the resignation of Wylie allowed the government to 
suspend all the pending cases and halt the flow of resignations.53   
Certainly in the case of the IPCS (Ireland) and in all likelihood the other civil service 
associations and unions, the purpose of the Wigg and Cochrane case was to try and force the 
government to reinstate some form of Whitley Council to determine pensions in the first 
instance, but also to re-establish it as a permanent part of civil service industrial relations.  
The IPCS had devoted considerable time and money to preparing the cases of Wigg and 
Cochrane.54  The initial hope was that with the High Court decision in their favour the 
government would not appeal but would look to establishing what was the true objective of 
the litigation, a properly constituted statutory arbitration scheme.  When the government did 
decide to appeal the decision of Meredith to the Supreme Court, and the case made its slow 
progress toward that appeal, the IPCS noted with anxiety that the government was not 
bothering to replace Wylie and was refusing to name a date for the reconstitution of the 
compensation committee.55  The financial implications of a further appeal were a worry, but 
unavoidable once the government decided to go to the Supreme Court.56   
 
Transferred Officers’ Protection Association 
Early in 1925, as it became clear that the government was going to pursue the case of 
Wigg and Cochrane all the way to the Supreme Court, the IPCS (Ireland) combined forces 
with the Post Office Workers’ Union, the Civil Service Federation and the Irish Treaty 
Pensioner’s Association to form the Transferred Officers’ Protection Association (TOPA).57  
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The object of the TOPA was to ‘safeguard the rights of members under article 77 and 78 of 
the Constitution of Saorstát Éireann and article 10 of the Treaty’.58  The driving force behind 
TOPA was William Norton of the POWU.  It was Norton drew up the initial memorandum 
detailing the decline in service conditions under the Free State government and inviting the 
other associations to join forces.  James Irvine of the IPCS (Ireland) was the first honorary 
secretary of TOPA and a dominant figure as the case developed over the next five years.  The 
twelve-member executive of the TOPA was made up of four appointed by the POWU, four 
by the Civil Service Federation and four by the Institution. 59  Thus the TOPA was a much 
more collegiate organisation of the civil service than the Federation and, as virtually all civil 
servants in the Free State were “transferred officers”, might well have proved a base to build 
cross-service unity but in fact it never became other than an organisation to fight the Wigg 
and Cochrane case.  Nevertheless, as such, it was an undoubted success.  It is therefore ironic 
that the civil service unions and associations that had failed to build a unified platform to 
negotiate on behalf of those civil servants staying in the Free State came together to fight and 
win the cause of those who were retiring.   
Civil servants who were going to stay in the civil service of the Free State, or recently 
recruited civil servants, were understandably reluctant to finance a court case that would 
benefit those who were retiring and create hostility to those who remained.  It was alleged 
that TOPA was solely concerned with those civil servants who intended to retire under clause 
10 but had not got a chance to go because the Wylie committee was hamstrung since the 
resignation of the chairman.  It was also alleged that TOPA was being run by people whose 
sympathies were British rather than Irish and who were in fact ex-British Army officers; a 
reference to Major Brunicardi of the IPCS (Ireland); and that TOPA was motivated by a 
desire amongst ‘the usual garland of Poppies sustained by Freemason wires’ (meaning 
Protestants) to humiliate the native government.60  
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In the Supreme Court the government won and so it might have seemed that that was 
the end of the case.  The decision of the majority of the court was that, bluntly, a civil servant 
under the Treaty had no pension rights as such which are enforceable by law and that the 
Minister of Finance was the sole authority to determine matters between the State and the 
civil service.  But, in a dissenting judgement, one of the three judges raised the question as to 
the status of the Treaty and the other legislation establishing the new government.  Whilst the 
other two judges, O’Connor and Fitzgibbon (a former leading Dublin Unionist) accepted the 
government argument for continuity of authority, and therefore superannuation and 
compensation powers, the third, Justice Johnston, dissented arguing that the Treaty had 
completely displaced the Act of 1920 and had ‘brought to an end the whole existing 
administrative, executive and judicial machinery of the country and made suitable provision 
for the substitution of something different’.61  In his view the case of Wigg and Cochrane 
was not about the power to determine superannuation but about fundamental constitutional 
rights as guaranteed by the Treaty agreed with Great Britain and the Constitution as enacted 
by Dáil Éireann.  If the government, he argued, could disregard article 10 of the Treaty then 
it could equally disregard any other article of the Treaty, the Constitution and the Orders 
transferring authority to the Free State, making them no more than so much waste paper.  In a 
paradoxical reversal therefore the government of the Free State was now arguing that what 
had taken place was not a revolution whereas the departing civil servants were arguing that it 
was.  Breaking through the question of pension rights now was the status of the Treaty itself. 
 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
Even before the High Court judgement the IPCS had discussed the possibility of 
invoking a controversial and contentious avenue of appeal if the decision went against Wigg 
and Cochrane.  This was an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the 
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British House of Lords.62  The appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not 
mentioned in the Treaty, but had been included in the Irish Free State Constitution (article 
66) at the insistence of the British government.  The British government viewed the appeal to 
the Privy Council as a vital expression of Commonwealth unity and British judicial 
supremacy within the Dominions.  It derived from the Judicial Committee Act of 1844, 
which gave statutory validity to the right of the Crown to hear appeals from any colonial 
court.63  The British government wanted the Privy Council to be seen, and act, as the 
supreme court of the empire and dominions.  At the 1926 Imperial Conference it came under 
fire from both Canada and the Free State.64  The existence of such an appeal, and its exercise, 
was considered an insult to the Irish Supreme Court and the competency of the Irish 
judiciary.  By appealing the Supreme Court decision to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council the IPCS, through TOPA and Messrs Wigg and Cochrane, was asking a British court 
to overturn the Irish Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 10 of the Treaty and therefore 
undermining the Irish Supreme Court and Irish national sovereignty.   
 Having decided to take the appeal to the Privy Council the main problem facing the 
IPCS was that of financing it.  TOPA acted as the co-ordinating organisation and the main 
fund-raiser.  The IPCS itself raised £130 of the £400 lodgement by TOPA with the courts for 
security on costs, the balance being made up by the Irish Treaty Pensioner’s Association, the 
POWU and the Civil Service Federation.  IPCS Members were urged to join TOPA and 
consideration was given to asking each individual member to give guarantees on meeting the 
legal costs if the appeal was unsuccessful.65  The appeal to the Privy Council went even 
better than it could have been imagined.  The Privy Council decision, delivered 3rd May 
1927, overturned the Supreme Court decision and gave Wigg and Cochrane the 
compensation and pensions they had demanded by agreeing that the rights of the transferred 
officers were constitutional rights.  This judgement sent shock waves through the 
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governments in Dublin and in London.  Under the British administration civil servants were 
by law employed “at the pleasure of His Majesty” and status and pensions were by gift rather 
by right.  It was also the British view that the Irish Free State was not the creation of 
revolution but was a devolved government, created by Westminster legislation, continuous 
with the former administration.  The Privy Council decision implied that the Irish Free State 
was in fact a break with the former British administration.  Far more seriously, from a 
financial point of view, the Privy Council decision also meant there was now a group of civil 
servants within the British and Irish system whose status and security were far superior to 
their colleagues and were in fact under-pinned by constitutional guarantees.  The Law Lords 
of the Privy Council had determined that transferred civil servants now enjoyed a status far 
better than any they would have enjoyed had there never been a Treaty and were now entitled 
to more favourable treatment than they would have enjoyed had they remained under the 
British administration or had they been recently recruited in the civil service of the Free 
State.    
For the Dublin government the decision of the Privy Council was the last straw.  The 
Wigg and Cochrane decision was now far more than a dispute about pensions.  In fact most 
of the civil servants that had applied to retire under Article 10 had accepted the decision of 
the committee and there were only about four hundred cases outstanding.66  The right to 
resign as a consequence of the change of government had a seven-year limit and would run 
out in December 1929.  There was a reasonable fear that the civil service might now see a 
rapid collapse over the next year as officials seized upon the Wigg and Cochrane decision to 
retire when they could on what were extraordinarily favourable terms.  But the main 
objection to the Wigg and Cochrane decision was on constitutional grounds.  The Irish 
government had already objected at the Commonwealth conferences to the claims of the 
Privy Council to act as an imperial supreme court.  By the Wigg and Cochrane decision the 
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Privy Council, dominated by the most reactionary of the Tory legal establishment, now 
claimed an authority to interpret the Treaty itself.  The government’s argument that the 
Treaty, in the words of Michael Collins, gave the “freedom to achieve freedom” now rang 
hollow.  Even before the decision of the Judicial Committee Blythe announced that the 
government had no intention of complying with the decisions of a ‘bad, useless and 
unnecessary court’ whilst other deputies attacked the ‘disloyal, unpatriotic and rapacious 
civil servants’.67   
 However, constitutionally eccentric as the decision may have been, neither the British 
nor the Irish governments could simply ignore it.  Blythe’s response was uncharacteristically 
terse, ‘The judgement in the Wigg and Cochrane appeal raises not merely financial but 
constitutional questions, and I think a quick decision is not to be looked for’.68  Whilst the 
Irish government was primarily engaged on the constitutional aspects of the decision the 
British government was itself quite alarmed at the Privy Council decision that some civil 
servants would be better treated and have definite rights as a result of the Treaty. Clearly it 
was to the advantage of both governments to come to an understanding on the way of retreat 
from the decision of the Privy Council.  The government might insist that the civil servants 
were not going to get a farthing more than they were entitled to under the Supreme Court 
decision but clearly the pension entitlements of transferred officers need to be taken out of 
the courts and dealt with by legislation.  Any legislation would have to be agreed between the 
Irish government, the British government (because any new law on Article 10 would be a 
renegotiation of the Treaty) and the transferred Irish civil servants (to persuade them to 
abandon further litigation).  Finally, reluctantly and with bad grace the Irish government sat 
down to negotiate with, rather than bully, the civil service.69  Complex negotiations began 
between the Irish government and the Transferred Officers Protection Association and the 
Irish government and the British government.  The IPCS was closely involved in these 
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negotiations as part of the TOPA delegation and members were kept informed on progress.70  
The result of these negotiations was the Civil Service (Transferred Officers) Compensation 
Act 1929.  This act was, in constitutional terms, a re-negotiation of Article 10 of the Treaty 
by the British and Irish governments by which the Irish government conceded the better 
terms won by the Wigg and Cochrane case and the British government agreed to repay to the 
Irish government the additional moneys involved.71   
Under the Act a statutory committee of a judge, representatives of the Department of 
Finance and representatives of the transferred officers, was established with sole jurisdiction 
to determine compensation under Article 10.  Written into the Act were the retirement 
conditions of the 1920 Act, thus securing the better terms of the 1920 Act for civil servants.  
Picking up the cost of these higher awards was the British government who agreed to 
compensate the Irish government for the “excess” in the pension bill.72  Thus honour was 
saved and the Irish, if not the British, public purse left no lighter after nearly ten years of 
litigation and frustration.  Finally a definite resolution had emerged to the whole vexed issue 
of civil service pensions under the Treaty but it left a residue of hostility to the civil service 
within the Dáil and public opinion.   
  
The Davitt compensation panel 
The compensation panel finally assembled in early January 1930 under Judge Cahir 
Davitt, the son of the Land League founder and a judge in the revolutionary courts of the 
1919-22 period.  The tribunal expected to deal with about 1,600 cases, many of them of civil 
servants who had retired but whose compensation and pensions had been delayed by the 
Wigg and Cochrane case.  Blythe appointed Messrs Boland, Doolin, Redmond and Leydon to 
represent the Department of Finance.  A panel of twenty-five nominees represented the civil 
service trade unions with James Irvine from the IPCS representing the professional civil 
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servants.73  In dealing with any case the court was limited to five members, two each for the 
department and the civil service along with Davitt the Chairman.  Irvine was a frequent 
attendee at the court, far more frequent than his status as IPCS nominee would warrant, 
which suggests that his able defence made him the preferred choice for many non-
professional claimants.  The very first case was the high profile Drennan, the Secretary of the 
Land Commission.  Judge Davitt treated his case with great courtesy and care. However, as 
the months dragged on and the cases of the lower ranks of the civil service were being dealt 
with, the tone of Judge Davitt became more caustic.  As he was a government appointee there 
is no reason to doubt that in doing this he was faithfully reflecting the official mind.74  Lowly 
postmen and junior civil servants, many of them women, had to endure sarcasm from Judge 
Davitt.  He rubbished the logical argument that as the Fianna Fáil party were committed to 
destroying the Treaty, and as they were likely to form the next government, it was reasonable 
to assume that the guarantees contained in Article 10 would not long survive such a change 
of government.75  Davitt was particularly sneering when dealing with the stock claim made 
by nearly all applicants (who echoed mantra-like the phrase of Article 10) that their wish to 
retire was “due to the change of government”.  The national and provincial press picked up 
and echoed his hostility.  The Clare Champion editorialised against the ‘British-backed civil 
servants’ as ‘lickspittle professions’ offering gratuitous insults to the elected representatives 
of the ‘unfortunate people who will have to pay out to them money that has not been 
earned’.76  It was true most of the applicants simply wanted to seize an opportunity that few 
would let pass, to retire early and enjoy a life of leisure.  However there was also a general 
feeling that the service had become degraded, supervision stricter (if not bullying), hours 
longer and pay shorter under the Free State with every sign that the future under Fianna Fáil 
would be worse.  As one inarticulate woman telegraphist, who simply wanted out, put it ‘it is 
atmospheric conditions’.77  Davitt was ruthless in interpreting the terms under which 
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retirement was claimed and the civil service unions, who had bought in, could not opt out.  
By the end of March the court had heard 461 cases and allowed only 250, rejecting 160 with 
51 withdrawn.  Thus nearly one half of all cases ended up either withdrawn or rejected.78 
The complaints of the civil servants at the Davitt court reflect the transformation of 
the Irish civil service from an informal, casual and poorly supervised collection of Boards to 
a centralised and ruthlessly-driven state-machine.  The nostalgia that many felt for the old 
days of the British regime was however misplaced for those days had long passed in Britain 
as well as Ireland.  For the professional grades in Britain the expected benefits of the 1920s 
Reorganisation, the Whitley Councils and the Civil Service Arbitration Board had all had 
proved illusory.  An attempt by the British IPCS to force a re-grading of the professional 
classes was resisted by the Official Side with irrelevant and evasive arguments or simply 
blank refusals.  The final report on re-grading the professional classes of the British civil 
service, delivered in 1925 after one hundred and fifty-seven meetings, offered meagre 
improvements.79  The Whitley Councils were far less successful than the Irish civil service 
liked to imagine.  Meetings were either chilly gatherings of the mute or red hot rows due to 
Official Side resistance to the whole concept of negotiation.80 nnNor was the gain of a Civil 
Service Arbitration Board any more useful than the Whitley Councils.  In 1922 the “Geddes 
Axe” that aimed to secure cuts in government costs simply and unilaterally abolished the 
Arbitration Board.  It was finally restored in 1925 but without Official Side approbation 
proved ineffective.81  
 
After Wigg and Cochrane 
The time and effort of the Wigg and Cochrane case had the effect of identifying the 
IPCS with those civil servants who were retiring and therefore being of little relevance to the 
vast majority that were staying on.  The 1925 to 1928 AGMs of the IPCS were dominated by 
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reports of the case, which explains the poor attendance of members, as few as twenty-three at 
the 1925 meeting.82  Where issues that might be even vaguely relevant to Article 10 turned 
up, rather than dealing with them the council simply referred them to TOPA for 
consideration.83  Late in the day Brunicardi protested to TOPA that the point of the litigation 
was to protect the future of officers who were to continue in the service rather than to place a 
premium on retirement.84  This was disingenuous.  The argument that by fighting the cause 
of those civil service who were retiring the rights of those who remain were being defended 
was unconvincing.85  The IPCS had in fact become little more than a branch of the TOPA, 
directed wholly at fighting and winning the Wigg and Cochrane case.  Civil servants had lost 
sight of the original object of the struggle, which was to secure a restoration of the Whitley 
councils or an equivalent arbitration body.  As soon as the case was won the pillar upon 
which civil service unity had been built collapsed, undermined by the extent of its success.  
The Privy Council awarded the civil servants all of the costs incurred in fighting the case.  
The Irish Treaty Pensioners Association that had initiated and first put up funding for the 
struggle accused the IPCS and TOPA of pocketing the award of costs and allowing the 
Pensioners Association share to ‘go west’.86  The IPCS in turn described the Pensioners 
Association as a bankrupt organisation dependent on the “serving service” to find the money 
to establish its right to retire on pension.87    
With the passing of the final 1929 Act and the resolution of the pensions issue the 
IPCS struggled to survive.  The time between meetings of the council grew longer and many 
of these meetings had to be abandoned because of the lack of a quorum.88  With Brunicardi in 
the chair the 1930 10th AGM, which ought to have been a celebration, became a searching 
inquiry into the future direction of the IPCS.  The AGM approved a resolution by Brunicardi 
that a special meeting be called of delegates to amend the constitution so as to secure the 
future interest of professional civil servants.  The implication of the resolution was a 
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broadening of membership so as to maximise the Institution’s appeal.89  Such was the inertia 
in the IPCS that the special meeting was never called.  There was some vague and pointless 
discussion which decided against revising the constitution and one year later the poorly 
attended 11th AGM heard little new in the annual report.90  The issues that dominated the 
meeting, the calculation of the cost-of-living and the plight of the widows of civil servants 
who died in service, simply underlined the key failure to secure an effective arbitration 
tribunal.  The serving civil service needed the same legislative bulwark for their conditions as 
the retiring Article 10 officers had secured in the Transferred Officers Protection 
Association.  This could only be a conciliation and arbitration system similar to the Whitley 
Councils.  
With the continuing decline in membership Brunicardi called a special meeting to 
approve the appointment of an organising secretary for the IPCS.  The organiser, it was 
hoped, would also be able to not only increase membership but also draw up a case to meet 
the growing hostility to the civil service in the country.91  James Irvine, who had shown his 
ability at the compensation panel, was appointed as chairman of a new organising committee 
with council members Kenny, Chaloner-Smith, Shortall and Dawson.92  The IPCS was still 
determined to maintain its distinctive professional and technical membership and rejected 
overtures from the newly formed Civil Service Clerical Association for a joint campaign on 
the demand for arbitration.93  The Civil Service Clerical Association (CSCA) was the most 
militant of the civil service trade unions.  Its journal An Peann was unapologetically virulent 
in its attacks on the mean pay levels of the clerical grades, poor promotion prospects and on 
the persistent of what it termed “Union Jack” attitudes in the upper echelons of the service.  
The CSCA brought the issue of civil service pay to the Trade Union Congress and led the 
campaign for an arbitration scheme. 
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By the spring of 1932 the new organisation committee led by Irvine had effected a 
turn-around and the IPCS could record an increase in twenty-two in its membership.  
However the increase in membership might also be ascribed to the February 1932 general 
election that had brought Fianna Fáil to power with a programme for government that 
included a promise to consider an arbitration tribunal for civil servants.94 
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The IPCS (Ireland) and Fianna Fáil: 1932-48 
 
 
Introduction 
The transfer of power to Fianna Fáil proved to be more than a change in the ruling 
party, it was also a change of ideas on the future political, economic and social 
development of the Irish state.  The history of the early Fianna Fáil governments is 
dominated by the big events of the 1932-8 ‘Economic War’ the 1937 Constitution and 
the Emergency.  But too great a concentration on the big events can distract attention 
away from the less spectacular but still historically significant fundamental change in 
the role of the state and the civil service under Fianna Fáil.  Fianna Fáil  used a 
populist rhetoric to project itself as the party of tradition whilst acting as a dynamic 
and modernising force in Irish society.  This dual stance enabled the party to 
consolidate and tighten its hold on power in the four general elections between 1932 
and 1938.   
 
New roles for the civil service 
Despite de Valera’s often cited ideal of a rural Ireland of self-sacrifice and 
frugal comfort Fianna Fáil governments drove industrial development, an increase in 
urbanisation and a dramatic expansion and centralisation of the state.  An invigorated 
welfarism saw increases in old-age pensions, large-scale slum clearance especially in 
Dublin and major improvements in unemployment benefits.  The expansion of the 
 66 
socially protectionist state saw the provision of workmen’s compensation and widows 
and orphans pensions along with protective legislation in the Conditions of 
Employment Act of 1936 and the Shops Act 1938 along the creation of the Wages 
Board.   The lack of initiative by the native entrepreneurial classes led, by default, to 
the state assuming a leading role in the drive to industrialise and modernise Ireland 
through a state-sponsored industrial sector secured behind a wall of protectionist 
tariffs.1   Whilst Fianna Fáil had been ‘for’ national development through 
protectionism in the election campaign, what exactly that would mean in policy terms 
was never clear.  Economic policy would have to be worked out after, and not before, 
taking office.2  In working out that policy tensions emerged early between the 
Department of Finance and the spending departments, especially the Department of 
Industry and Commerce under Seán Lemass.  The creation of a detailed economic 
policy had also to take account of the Economic War.  This dispute began with de 
Valera’s refusal to hand over the land annuities and the British retaliated by imposing 
special duties on Irish cattle and dairy produce.  As it escalated the imposition of tariff 
and counter-tariff gave a veneer of national sovereignty to Fianna Fáil’ protectionist 
policies.  
In April, just weeks after taking office, the government appointed an economic 
policy committee comprised of de Valera (though he had little interest in economics) 
James Ryan, Minister for Agriculture; Senator Joseph Connolly, Minister for Posts 
and Telegraphs; and Seán Lemass.   The initial exclusion of Seán MacEntee, Minister 
for Finance, and his later inclusion in September, may reflect the beginning of the 
struggle between MacEntee and Lemass on control of economic policy which was to 
shape the Fianna Fáil governments of de Valera.  In May the Department of Industry 
and Commerce established an Industrial Development branch.  New ideas on the role 
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of the state in Irish economy and society opened up new fields of activism to the civil 
service that was now expected to provide the expertise and leadership for 
development.  However this growth in the state happened with little if any advice or 
direction from the expertise that was in fact already available to the government.  The 
CSO collected statistics on, for instance, employment patterns but it was never cited 
or used.  Nor had the government any economists to advise on a state-led 
industrialisation.3  Instead civil servants found themselves having to display expertise 
in economic management, whether they had such expertise or not.  Some, such as 
John Leydon, had a natural penchant for detailed planning and analysis.  Dr J.H. 
Hinchcliff of the Department of Agriculture and a member of the IPCS (Ireland), was 
appointed chairman of the Sugar Company.  R.J. Browne, a senior tax inspector was 
appointed to the ESB.  However, the professional civil servants were not as successful 
as the general service grades in securing senior positions in this new area of civil 
service activity.4 
 Boland, Secretary in the Establishment division of the Department of Finance, 
initially was willing to concede that persons of the calibre required to run these state 
enterprises were as likely to be found inside the civil service as outside it, grew 
increasingly alarmed at the surge in numbers and the disruption to established grades 
and salaries these posts created.5   In November 1936 McElligott, General Secretary 
in Finance, wrote a memorandum to Moynihan, Secretary to the government, 
expressing his departments alarm at the growth in civil service numbers and 
identifying Industry and Commerce as the chief culprit.  ‘A fair number of civil 
servants seem to feel that they are justifying their own existence and incidentally their 
own importance, by suggesting new measures’ he sneered.6   Finance was now 
finding itself in direct conflict with government policy because, as Boland pointed 
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out, ‘it is illusory to expect any reduction in staff without reduction in services’.7  
These new posts also threw the existing pay scales into confusion.  Dr Hinchcliff’s 
salary rose from £950 to £2000 on his appointment as Chairman of the beet sugar 
manufacture, though he remained a civil servant.  P.J. Dempsey was on £313 as a 
Junior Executive Officer.  When he was seconded to become secretary to the ESB his 
salary rose to £750.  R.J. Browne, who as a senior tax inspector had a salary of £850, 
was on a salary of £1700 as chairman of the ESB.  Boland minuted Leydon that these 
appointments were causing chaos in the higher grade remuneration and asked that ‘the 
practice of placing civil servants on the directorate of these outside bodies should be 
discouraged and if possible prevented’.  However it should be noted that Doolin, 
another assistant secretary in Finance, was hugely amused at Boland’s ‘railing against 
fate’.8   The civil service was receiving a status and opportunity never previously 
enjoyed.  Rather than curbing the expansion in opportunity, departments were 
instructed not to block mobility and to allow civil servants move to ‘whatever posts 
their services are most likely to be of the highest value to the state’.9     
 
 
Renewing the struggle for arbitration. 
In October 1934 the cabinet agreed on the outlines of an arbitration scheme for the 
civil service based on the Interim Report of the Brennan Commission published in 
July (a report which the civil service unions had immediately rejected) and directed 
the Department of Finance to flesh it out.  The Interim Report of the Brennan 
Commission accepted the Department of Finance argument that the executive was 
prevented by the constitution from binding itself to accepting a decision by an 
 69 
arbitrator.  The Heads of Agreement for an arbitration scheme issued by the 
Department of Finance were: 
(A) The Minister for Finance to prescribe the kind of dispute which would be 
appropriate for reference to arbitration. 
(B) Reference of a particular matter to the arbitration board to be made only with 
the concurrence of the Minister for Finance. 
(C) Reports of the Arbitration Board to be in the form of a recommendation to the 
Executive Council. 
(D) The Chairman of the Arbitration Board to be appointed by agreement between 
the Minister for Finance and the Chairman of the Staff Side of the Civil 
Service Representative Council; in the absence of agreement the Chairman to 
be selected by the Minister for Industry and Commerce. 
(E) Civil Servants or officials of Civil Service Associations are not eligible for 
appointment as Chairman. 
(F) Ordinary members of the Arbitration Board to be selected by the Minister for 
Industry and Commerce from two panels nominated by him to represent  
      (i) the Minister for Finance and consisting of persons acceptable to him 
(ii)Staff Side of representative council and consisting of persons acceptable to 
that body. 
(G) Panel not to include civil servants, members of the Oireachtas or officials of 
staff associations. 
Finance was also instructed to prepare a memorandum to confine membership of 
the Civil Service Representative Council to serving civil servants.10  In Finance 
Boland directed that a memorandum for circulation to the staff associations should 
present the proposed arbitration scheme by reference to what was excluded from 
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discussion and, in a separate memo, to refer to the exclusion of ‘outsiders’ from 
being present in the arbitration process.11 
 The Association of Officers of the Executive and Higher Grades (the former 
AEO), the Civil Service Federation, the Civil Service Clerical Association, the 
Post Office Workers’ Union and the Custom and Excise Officers Association all 
immediately rejected the scheme.12  Their reasons for their united and unequivocal 
rejection of the scheme were that the prior consent of the minister was required 
before a claim could be referred to the Arbitration Board;  ministerial approval of 
the terms of reference were required; the minister nominated the chairman of the 
Board; the representatives of the civil servants had to be themselves serving civil 
servants; the government could adopt or reject any award made by the Board; and 
the findings of the arbitrator could not be published except by direction of the 
government.  What was on offer was clearly not arbitration as usually understood, 
in fact it was merely consultation by grace and favour of the Minister.  
The  government decision to press on what was clearly an unacceptable 
arbitration scheme may have been prompted by evidence of division within the 
civil service associations.  It came to light in the public and bitter row between 
Norton of the POWU and Hughes of the Executive Officers Association and the 
Civil Service Federation.  Hughes suggested that Norton was failing to use the 
political pressure that was at his command to force the government to establish an 
acceptable arbitration scheme.  Norton retaliated by accusing Hughes and the 
Federation of splitting the civil service organisations by attending the Civil 
Service Representative Council when all the other associations had recognised 
that it was a useless body.  He described the Federation as the ‘best friend’ of the 
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Department of Finance and the representative council as the ‘official muzzle’ on 
civil service associations.13 
 The Department of Finance issued the draft scheme to the civil service 
associations in June 1935.  An interesting last minute alteration was inserted by 
the cabinet instructing that the requirement that at least one member of each of the 
two panels should be a women should be omitted.14  The Department of Finance 
also asked that the associations provide written responses to the Minister.  A 
speedy and unambiguous response was clearly what seemed to be required.  The 
IPCS (Ireland)  however began a laborious and lengthy consultation with the 
constituent associations, inviting them to read the proposed scheme carefully and 
to bring to the IPCS (Ireland) council an itemised criticism.  Exactly one year later 
when the final report of the Brennan Commission was published in June 1936, the 
IPCS (Ireland) council was still having long discussions on how to respond.  
MacEntee, when questioned in the Dáil  on the almost universal rejection of the 
scheme was able to state that whilst many of the associations had indeed rejected 
the scheme, some of them in the most intemperate language, he had not yet got a 
written response from all associations.15  Clearly MacEntee took the view that 
silence implied consent.  It would seem that once again the federal structure of the 
Institution and the absence of a strong unified identity as civil servants neutralised 
the IPCS (Ireland) council and prevented it giving the immediate and sharp 
response required.16  
 In the opposition to the government scheme divisions within the civil service 
that weakened and hampered a co-ordinated campaign were identified as a 
fundamental problem.17   At the 1936 IPCS (Ireland) agm Brunicardi warned the 
members that the Institution would need to fight the case for a proper arbitration 
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board.  The treasurer, M.J. Kenny, emphasises the need for a strong fighting fund 
for the coming struggle.18  The recognised need for a single unified civil service 
response to break the deadlock led to a new initiative in June 1936.  A joint letter 
to the Minister, signed by almost all the civil service organisations, offered to 
open negotiations on an arbitration scheme that contained as essential features; 
1. The Chairman of the Board to be appointed by agreement between the 
Government and the staff associations. 
2. Each party to be free to select its representatives on the Board and its 
advocates before the Board. 
3. Each party to have the right to bring before the Board any claim within a 
previously agreed category, without veto by the other party, the Board 
alone having power to decide whether a particular claim falls within the 
agreed category. 
4. The Government to give effect to the awards of the Board subject to the 
authority of Parliament. 
5. In the event of a dispute as to the meaning of an award, the Board to 
determine its own findings.19 
When the IPCS (Ireland) was invited to sign the letter and join in the combined 
campaign Brunicardi advised the secretary not to wait for a full meeting of the 
Institution’s council but to act immediately with the permission of the general 
purposes committee.  The general purposes committee consisted of the secretary, the 
president Huggard and Brunicardi himself.20  By taking the initiative Brunicardi gave 
much needed impetus to the IPCS (Ireland) and asserted the authority of the general 
purposes committee.  Boland, on behalf of the minister, reminded the associations that 
he was still waiting a written response to the draft scheme.  Any discussions would 
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have to be on the basis of those written responses, based on the government scheme.  
No progress therefore on arbitration, but some progress on civil service unity had 
been achieved.   
In order to increase the pressure on the Department of Finance a further joint 
letter from the civil service associations was sent to de Valera reminding him of his 
promise in the 1932 election campaign to grant arbitration to the civil service and 
asking him to intervene with his Minister for Finance.21  This letter was clearly meant 
to embarrass the president.   
 
The 1937 Constitution 
De Valera was in fact fully occupied in drafting a new constitution which he brought 
to the Dáil  in May 1937.  The civil service associations were afraid that their rights 
under the Treaty and under the Saorstát Éireann constitution would be abolished in 
the new constitution.  This led to a test case brought by Peter Hegarty, an assistant 
inspector of National Health Insurance, through the still functioning Transferred 
Officers Protection Association (TOPA). His claim was that the constitution of 
Ireland/Éire discharged him from the service of Saorstát Éireann and that he was 
entitled to compensation under his retained rights.  At the hearing John A. Costello, 
representing Hegarty, argued that the constitution was a revolution in as much as it 
ended one state and initiated another. The government found itself having to argue 
that the constitution introduced no innovation and that Hegarty had the same 
employer before and after the passing of the constitution.  On 17 August the civil 
service compensation board found that though Hegarty was not discharged by the 
National Health Insurance Board, he was discharged by the government of Saorstát 
Éireann and therefore was entitled to his compensation claim.22  The judgement of the 
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board suggested that the entire civil service of Saorstát Éireann had been discharged 
and therefore the 6,000 transferred civil servants still in the service of the state might 
be entitled to compensation.  The Department of Finance immediately issued a 
circular to all civil servants stating that the government would not pay compensation 
and would introduce legislation to remedy the situation.23   
The decision to go to the courts in the Hegarty case was controversial within 
the civil service associations.  The IPCS (Ireland) objected to TOPA undertaking what 
might prove a costly claim without fully consulting the membership, as had 
happened.24  On the other hand the Cork engineering branch of the POWU, which was 
losing members, was very enthusiastic after the successful hearing and urged Norton 
to use it to full effect in Dáil debates.25  TOPA was in fact quite in the dark on the 
Hegarty case.  Although it had been usual for the executive of the association, made 
up of representatives of the CSF, POWU and IPCS (Ireland), to be kept updated on 
the progress of cases the Hegarty hearings had been kept confidential.  When, on the 
insistence of the IPCS (Ireland), a meeting was held Hughes, who represented the 
CSF on the staff side of the compensation board, refused to attend or to divulge the 
progress of the Hegarty hearing.  This was despite the momentous impact it would 
have on the transferred officers.  It was when the Hegarty reward was announced that 
the reason for Hughes’s reticence became apparent.  Before the Hegarty case Hughes 
had made an application to the compensation board himself for permissive retirement 
terms.  When the likely result of the Hegarty decision became apparent, with the 
permission of the board and the Minister for Finance, he withdrew his application for 
permissive retirement and re-applied for retirement on the same grounds as Hegarty, 
that is the more generous dismissal terms.  He had been a civil servant since 1913.  He 
went out with twenty-five years service and ten years added, giving him a pension 
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based on thirty-five years service plus a lump sum.  What seems clear is that Hughes 
kept the rest of the civil service in the dark on the outcome of the hearing and in 
return was allowed by the Minister for Finance resubmit his own application.26  
Hughes had in fact applied for and been appointed to the post of general secretary of 
the British Institution of Professional Civil Servants, worth £750-900 a year.  He left 
the Irish service with a generous pension and moved to London to take up his new 
post in October 1938.  It ought to be recorded that he was not a success in the new 
post and his contract was terminated in 1943.27   Hughes may well have been 
prompted to take the opportunity presented by the Hegarty case by the failure of new 
Civil Service Alliance to secure arbitration despite mounting a well-organised 
campaign in support of the demand.  
 
The Civil Service Alliance 
In the absence of any success with MacEntee the civil service campaign for 
arbitration became public and highly political.  In January 1937 the civil service 
organisations agreed to combine in a new organisation, the Civil Service Alliance.  
The Alliance, formed to ‘deal with all matters of common concern to the affiliated 
bodies or to significant sections of such bodies’ was understood to be in fact the 
organisational vehicle for a united campaign on arbitration.   The Alliance represented 
sixteen associations organising ninety per cent of civil servants.  Its president and the 
initial sponsor was Hughes of the Executive and Higher Officers’ Association.  The 
secretary was Archie Heron of the clerical officers association and the treasurer was 
Cairns of the POWU.28  The Alliance was also a response to an ultimatum from the 
Department of Finance saying that unless the civil service associations accepted the 
government scheme and indicated clearly their willingness to work it the scheme 
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offered would be withdrawn in its entirety.  In March Norton brought a  motion to the 
Dáil in favour of arbitration, supported by Deputy Costello of Fine Gael.  MacEntee 
did not even bother answering in the debate, simply dismissing the well-argued points 
of Norton and Costello.29    
The IPCS (Ireland) council referred the question of whether the Institution 
should join the Alliance to a referendum of the membership.  Following a 75 per cent 
approval the secretary applied to affiliate to the Alliance ‘on the assumption that the 
policy of the Alliance was the same as that of the Institution namely; (a) unswerving 
loyalty to the State (b) strict legality in the prosecution of any movements or 
agitations for the betterment of the service’.30  The nervousness within the Institution 
reflects a fear that the IPCS (Ireland) might get drawn into an agitation led by the 
more militant and relatively numerous clerical grades.  However the IPCS (Ireland) 
was soon complaining at the lack of action by the Alliance which seemed unable to go 
beyond urging all the civil service organisations to pass resolutions against the 
government proposals on arbitration.31   
  
The 1937 and 1938 General Elections. 
De Valera published the new constitution on 1 May 1937.  It was widely anticipated 
that the referendum on the constitution would be accompanied by a general election.  
On 14 June he dissolved the Dáil, setting 1 July as polling day.  Contrary to Fianna 
Fáil expectations the new constitution received little enthusiasm, approved by only 57 
per cent of the voters.  Both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael lost seats. The Labour Party 
made significant gains, doubling its vote and winning 13 seats in the new Dáil.32  
Amongst the new Labour TDs was Archie Heron, returned for Dublin North-West.  
Heron, along with Norton, meant that the civil service had a powerful presence in the 
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Labour Party.  The raucous celebrations by civil servants within government buildings 
as the results came in brought a stern rebuke from Boland in Finance.33  Labour was 
not going to support Fine Gael, but Norton made it clear that the minority Fianna Fáil 
government could not assume the support of his party.  Amongst the key issues for 
Labour would be civil service arbitration.34  
 The debate on a motion by Deputy Costello directing the government to 
immediately establish arbitration for the civil service began on 30 March 1938 and 
continued to May.  Costello made a good job of demolishing the argument that the 
constitution’s requirement that the government could not assign responsibility for 
public spending to an arbitrator.  Heron spoke on the psychological effect on both 
sides of the presence of an arbitrator, arguing his presence would mean each side 
striving to reach agreement.  Norton, in his usual pugnacious style, attacked 
MacEntee relentlessly.  MacEntee, forced to reply, said that the civil service 
associations had adopted an attitude toward the government that caused him great 
regret and he attacked Heron in particular for politicising the civil service through his 
work as general secretary of the clerical officers.  He did offer an olive branch to the 
civil service associations by suggesting that if they accepted the basic principles of the 
government scheme he would be prepared to amend it on lines they might suggest.  In 
the vote, taken on 25 May 1938, the government to their own and everyone else’s 
surprise were defeated by one vote.  It was generally expected that Fianna Fáil would 
try to get around the defeat by calling for a confidence motion.  Instead de Valera 
dissolved the Dáil on 27 May and set 10 June as polling day.35       
 De Valera contested the election on his success in the negotiations which had 
concluded the Economic War with Britain.  The negotiations had begun in January 
and concluded on 25 April.  The Partition question remained without agreement, 
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which was not unexpected.  But on the land annuities the claim for £100 million was 
settled for a final payment of £10 million.  The Treaty ports were returned and end to 
all restrictions on Irish agricultural produce to the British market was agreed.      
Although Fianna Fáil campaigned mainly on the successful negotiations with 
the British government and on the need for stable majority government, the question 
of arbitration in the civil service was pursued by MacEntee.  Deeply conservative as 
he was, MacEntee did see valid constitutional difficulties in the manner that the civil 
service had run the campaign for arbitration.  In 1932 the civil service had been 
circularised by the Department of Finance on the proper attitude of civil servants in 
regards to political matters.  The circular stated that civil servants were expected to 
show a reserve in politics and ought not do anything that would ‘give colour to any 
suggestion that his official actions are in any way influenced, or capable of being 
influenced, by party motives’.  Specifically, civil servants were forbidden ‘to be a 
member of an association or serve on a committee having for its object the promotion 
of the interests of a political party or the promotion or prevention of the return of a 
particular candidate to the Dáil’; nor were officials to publicly support or oppose any 
Dáil  candidate; nor make statements to the newspapers or comment publicly on any 
matter of current political interest.36  The civil service associations had breached each 
of these regulations in the campaign leading up to the Dáil  defeat.  T.J. Hughes, on 
behalf of the Civil Service Alliance, had appealed to each TD to vote in favour of the 
opposition motion.  Eamon Bolger, Honorary Secretary of the Rathmine’s branch of 
the POWU had written to MacEntee pointedly reminding him that many of his 
constituents who were members of the POWU were taking a keen interest in the 
debate and Archie Heron had written to each civil service association in the Alliance 
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urging members to approach the TDs in their constituencies asking them to vote for 
the motion.37     
MacEntee urged de Valera to use the defeat in the Dáil to take decisive action 
by announcing that in future ‘no civil service organisation will be recognised that 
employs an official who is not himself a civil servant and that no representations from 
it would be received or entertained by the government’.38    It would have to be 
admitted that even an entrenched conservative such as MacEntee could have a valid 
point.  In his view, if he entered negotiations with Norton and Heron he could never 
be sure whether he was in negotiation with the secretaries of civil service 
organisations or with Labour Party TDs and activists.  They could use the Dáil  
chamber as a second forum for negotiation in which to win concessions denied in 
formal processes.  Given the choice of believing that either the civil service had 
captured the Labour Party or that the Labour Party had captured the civil service, he 
choose to believe the latter.  The journals of the civil service organisations do, as 
MacEntee alleged, sometimes read more like Labour Party organs.  In the campaign 
leading up to the vote these journals had urged TDs to vote for an opposition motion 
knowing that, if successful, it would lead to the defeat of the government.  His press 
statement allege that ‘the real purpose behind the agitation of Deputy Norton and his 
associates was to take control of the Civil Service out of the hands of the 
government…he doubted whether the majority of the unfortunate civil servants who 
were being used as stalking horses by these politicians even knew what was in the 
government’s scheme’.39   
 In the election campaign Fine Gael was bankrupt in terms of policy and 
Labour dusted down the same policy document as the previous year.  Fianna Fáil won 
52 per cent of the popular vote, the first party in the history of independent Ireland to 
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win a popular majority.  Labour lost five seats, Archie Heron’s included.40  Fianna 
Fáil was able to form a stable single-party government and the civil service, that had 
so publicly nailed its colours to the Labour masthead, now had to learn to live with 
that fact.  The Department of Finance, in the persons of Boland and McElligott, was 
hostile to any attempt by civil servants to better their lot.  Civil service organisation 
was seen as a challenge to the dominance of their department.  In private 
correspondence with Joseph Brennan, then Chairman of the Currency Commission 
but who had been secretary of the Department of Finance under the Cumann na 
nGaedheal governments, Boland had let slip the bullying attitude which informed his 
role as Establishment officer.  He wrote ‘the position that our department occupies in 
the mind of the service generally and the respect they show for our minister’s 
authority must obviously  be very largely affected by the feeling that ours is the 
minister and the department who in so large a sense can control and determine the 
fortunes of individual civil servants.  I need not enlarge on this point’.41  Efficiency 
was not the point at issue in negotiations with the civil service associations so far as 
Boland was concerned, it was power.  Arbitration would be a concession of that 
power.   
 The IPCS (Ireland) provided the presidency of the Civil Service Alliance for 
the year 1938-9.  Bowing to the inevitable the Alliance met with MacEntee, now 
reinstalled as Minister for Finance, to discuss how his arbitration scheme might work.  
Having conceded the victory to the minister the staff side were given a very good 
reception and MacEntee seemed to be open to their suggestions.42  The question of 
non-civil service representatives remained contentious, but with the resignation of 
Archie Heron from the CSCA to take up the post of secretary to the Irish Local 
Government Officers’ Union and his replacement by a serving civil servant, the 
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question was in fact conceded.  The IPCS (Ireland) lost the leadership of Major 
Brunicardi early in 1939 as a result of his promotion to a higher post in the Valuation 
Survey.  Brunicardi had moulded the Institution and had played the key role in 
securing the prestige and status the IPCS (Ireland) enjoyed, despite being a small and 
scattered association.  He was hugely popular amongst the membership whilst being 
recognised as an extremely able and subtle negotiator.43   
The framework of an arbitration scheme began to take shape.  Departmental 
Councils would provide a conciliation service, with a General Council for general 
service matters.  An Arbitration Board would be established under a Chairman 
acceptable to both sides, though still appointed by the Minister.  Arbitration would 
cover classes whose normal pay did not exceed £500 per annum, that is up to 
Administrative Officer level.  Then, with the outbreak of war in Europe and the 
declaration of a State of Emergency, the discussions and the process of drafting 
legislation were immediately suspended.44   
 
The IPCS (Ireland) and the Emergency  
 
In 1939 it would not have been unreasonable to expect that Ireland would fail to 
maintain its declared neutrality in the developing European war, not because of 
British or German actions but because neutrality would be economically 
unsustainable.  Faced with the collapse of its economy and the threat of mass 
starvation Ireland would be forced to surrender its sovereignty in return for aid.45  
That neutrality was successfully maintained through the World War was due to the 
success of the policy of national self-sufficiency allied with a powerful and 
centralised control of the economic and social resources of the state.  Previously an 
ideological stance, self-sufficiency became an absolute necessity for national survival.  
The ability of the civil service to undertake successfully the complex task of 
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controlling the limited resources available and to ensure their relatively fair 
distribution was unexpected.  Also unexpected was the peaceful acceptance of state 
control by Irish society.  From a state viewpoint therefore the main threat to neutrality 
was not an external enemy but rather internal forces that would undermine the ability 
of Irish society to survive of its own resources.  The labour and trade union movement 
and its fight to maintain living standards was identified as one of those internal forces.  
Although a State of Emergency was declared no national government was formed and 
Fianna Fáil continued as the single party of government.  Such shifts in government 
policy as did occur reflected cabinet reshuffles.   The outbreak of war saw the creation 
of two new government departments; the Department of Supplies and the Department 
for the Co-Ordination of Defence Measures.  Lemass was put in charge of the 
Department of Supplies.  MacEntee was moved from Finance and into Industry and 
Commerce to replace Lemass.  Sean T. O’Kelly moved from Local Government to 
Finance, his place in Local Government being taken by P.J. Ruttledge.  Frank Aiken 
took responsibility for the new Department of the Co-Ordination of Defence 
Measures.  In August 1941 Ruttledge resigned due to ill-health.  This created an 
opportunity for another reshuffle.  Lemass had Industry and Commerce returned to his 
control whilst retaining the Department of Supplies.  MacEntee was moved to Local 
Government and Health.  After the August 1941 reshuffle Lemass therefore had 
virtually complete control over industrial policy.  In order to ensure the efficient 
management and control of the purchase and distribution of food, fuel and other 
essentials the Department of Supplies created several private companies staffed by the 
civil service.  These included Grain Importers Ltd., Animal Feeding Stuffs Ltd., 
Timber Importers Ltd., Fuel Importers Ltd., Tea Importers Ltd and Irish Shipping 
Ltd.46  These commercial state companies were a creative response to the needs of the 
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Emergency and also a recognition that the best managerial and professional talent in 
the state resided in the civil service. The tension between a conservative MacEntee 
and Department of Finance that shared the view that the state had no place in business 
and a dynamic Lemass in Supplies proved more significant in shaping government 
policy than any political or trade union opposition to the controls that were now 
imposed on the Irish economy and workforce.    
 
Prices and Wages 
In a speech at Queen’s University Belfast in October 1938 on ‘War Finance’ 
MacEntee, Minister for Finance, elaborated the lessons of 1914 and their implications 
for national governments in any future war.  He anticipated that the full power of the 
state would be available in defence of the national economy and that governments 
would not hesitate in using that power.  Increased taxation would be accompanied by 
a drastic curtailment of expenditure not essential to the war effort.  This would mean 
an immediate halt to ‘long-term schemes of social and economic amelioration’.  The 
Department of Finance was busy at that time preparing a report, the contents of which 
were shaped by McElligott, detailing the cuts in unemployment benefits and in social 
reform which would be required to maintain a balanced budget in the event of 
European war.  This report, presented to government in early September 1939, ran 
into the sands as the cabinet baulked at the political implications of Fianna Fáil-
sponsored compulsory poverty.47  
The actual outbreak of war led not only to the cabinet shuffle but also a 
rethink of priorities.  Whereas MacEntee was more concerned at maintaining a 
conservative fiscal policy, Lemass focussed on maintaining employment and 
economic activity.   After Dunkirk and the collapse of France the British government 
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continued to hope that the Irish government would abandon neutrality and come to its 
aid.  As it became apparent that the Irish government was not going to budge, the 
British began to apply pressure through cutbacks in exports of raw materials and by 
curtailing space allocations on British ships.  The maintenance of supplies and 
services would depend entirely on the Irish government, subject to the goodwill of the 
British.  That goodwill was secured by secret military co-operation, intelligence 
sharing and facilities for Irish labour migration to the British war factories.  But the 
inescapable fact remained that the survival of the Irish state and society depended on 
Irish resources alone.  The government of independent Ireland, as a small neutral 
economy with few choices available, could only react to events as they unfolded.     
The IPCS (Ireland) council, in its annual report for 1939-40, despite its prolix 
and sometimes confused prose, reflects an acute consciousness of the devastation of 
the war and the demands that would be placed on the civil service.  It deserves to be 
quoted at length; 
Your council regrets that its Report is this year presented to you under 
the overshadowing influences of a major emergency, the all-pervading tragedy 
of a most devastating war, which the resources of Statesmanship have failed to 
avert and the calamitous effect and extent of which the wisest and most 
benevolent-intentioned of human beings appear to be powerless to limit or 
even to envisage.   It will not, therefore, surprise you to learn that your 
Council’s programme for the past year has of necessity suffered orientation 
from a considered plan in order to align itself with an entirely new set of 
circumstances necessitated by the totally altered conditions.  In times of great 
emergency, both Council and members in common with all citizens, first look 
to the Government for guidance and instruction.  The latter proceeds to 
readjust its whole economic system, rearrange Departments and for some time 
all plans are upset and normal proceedings are somewhat chaotic.  All this 
sudden upheaval from settled conditions impresses a realization on the minds 
of the more responsible Civil Servants of the fact that our Government is at 
once our protector and employer, and for some time places us in an invidious 
position.  We must face, nay undertake, responsibilities not visualized before, 
must co-operate for national safety and must willingly offer of our best in the 
national interest.  This course of action involves a sacrifice of immediate self-
interest which reacts unfavourably as on former occasions on the normal 
organised efforts of collective bargaining.  No sooner have matters been 
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adjusted to the requirements of the moment than we find the Government in 
possession of the initiative and our ranks once more on the defensive….48 
  
 The government’s planning for war in 1939 was made in the shadow of the 
war of 1914-18.  Most people had clear memories of the inflation caused by the 1914-
18 war that had proved so intractable, long-lived and socially corrosive.  Although 
Lemass and the Department of Supplies now dominated government planning Finance 
was still the major influence on wages policy.  The government was determined to 
suppress any inflationary tendencies that emerged, but  through a wage freeze rather 
than price controls.  In November 1939 Sean T. O’Kelly, now Minister for Finance, 
used a supplementary budget to lay down his views on wage increases.  Admitting 
that the shortages in essential goods was already forcing prices upward he made it 
clear that the government was ‘determined to set its face against the efforts of any 
class to obtain compensation for the rise in prices at the expense of the community’.  
He warned that action was already being planned by the government to control the 
salaries of all civil and public servants and if necessary controls would find a wider 
application.49  The government wanted a voluntary wage restraint “in the national 
interest” but was preparing for compulsory wages policy for the public service.  In 
February 1940 a strike by the IMETU that brought Dublin city services to a standstill 
provided the opportunity for the government to enforce its wages policy for the public 
services.  The City Corporation was on the verge of conceding to demands for an 
eight shillings  a week wage increase in compensation for the rising cost of living 
when the government intervened.  The City Manager was instructed to grant an 
increase of two shillings only, one quarter of the demand, and was assured that the 
government would assist in defeating the strike.  The dispute ended in failure for the 
IMETU.50  This strengthened the hand of the government as it met with the civil 
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service representatives in early April in the context of the continuing rise in the cost 
of living. 
 
An informal arbitration 
The immediate impact of the Emergency on the civil service was not a growth in 
numbers, as happened in 1914-18, but rather a major redeployment.  Departments 
were instructed to facilitate staff movements into the departments which were 
considered vital to national survival.  These included the Department of Defence, the 
Department of Industry and Commerce and the Department of Agriculture.  
Professional staff were redeployed from the Land Commission to oversee compulsory 
tillage and to occupy the new Emergency Scientific Research Bureau.51   Any 
promotions that occurred were on an acting basis only, whilst all civil servants were 
required to work an extra half hour a day without overtime payments.52  The 
temporary staff were warned that the emergency may require that they would be 
dispensed with.  Unlike World War One, when the war created opportunity, the civil 
service felt under pressure from the beginning of the Emergency.  In July 1940 An 
Inter-Departmental Committee on Emergency Measures was assembled from the 
Departments of Supply, Industry and Commerce and Local Government and Public 
Health.  The exclusion of Finance reflected its loss of primacy where the main task 
facing government was the survival of the state itself.  
 The IPCS (Ireland) was mainly concerned with the status of the temporary 
professional civil servants, many of whom were approaching retirement age with 
many years of service but no pensionable status, and also with travelling expenses 
which rose considerably in the Emergency.  The IPCS (Ireland) council also ensured 
that the increased hours of attendance imposed on the clerical grades did not apply to 
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the professional staffs, many of whom were outdoor and ought to be trusted to deliver 
all that was required of them in a day’s work.53  Initially the Institution was content to 
act from within the Civil Service Alliance.  The Alliance campaign had failed to 
secure an arbitration scheme but the Alliance was remained as a useful umbrella 
organisation to maintain the struggle.  In meetings with the Department of Finance the 
Alliance offered mixed signals.  On the declaration of war it had offered full co-
operation with the government during the Emergency including working extra hours 
without overtime payment.  The reason that the Alliance made this generous offer was 
that it held to the belief that full co-operation implied full consultation in whatever 
measures were thought necessary.54  This was not an uncommon assumption by the 
public service unions; the ILGOU also hoped that its offer of closer co-operation with 
the government would lead to future recognition of the union for negotiations on 
conditions of service.55 Comhaltas Cána, the organisation of the Customs and Excise 
officers not only offered unconditional loyalty but also offered £500 by way of an 
interest-free loan to the exchequer.56  In early November there was an informal 
meeting between the Alliance and the senior civil servants of the Department of 
Finance.  Whilst the Alliance delegates insisted that the demand for a conciliation and 
arbitration board would be maintained, despite the emergency, they did agree to 
informal consultation with representatives of Finance from time to time.  The Finance 
side however made it conditional that no pay claims could be discussed at these 
meetings.  The attraction for the Alliance was that the official side accepted that ‘it is 
desirable to have a clearing house for proposals which the staff wish to discuss, and it 
was agreed that the Civil Service Alliance would prove a suitable medium for this 
purpose’.57  The Alliance represented a wide span of organisations across the civil 
service grades but it was dominated by the Association of Officers of the Executive 
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and Higher Grades and the Clerical Officers’ Association.  At the November meeting 
the Alliance was represented by John Kelly of the CSCA, Michael Meade of the 
Executive Officers’, and Colm O’Sullivan of the IPCS (Ireland) who acted as 
President of the Alliance.  Colm O’Sullivan was emerging as a key figure in the IPCS 
(Ireland) at this time.  A scientist within the Department of Industry and Commerce 
he acted as one of the honorary assistant secretaries of the IPCS (Ireland) for many 
years from the 1940s to the 1960s and was as significant influence on the postwar 
Institute as Brunicardi had been in its formative years..  An incisive and analytic 
intelligence he retained a formidable memory for structures and regulations within the 
professional civil service that were to prove invaluable in negotiations.    
It may have hoped that the Alliance would act as a cohesive and co-ordinating 
organisation in the  struggle for conciliation and arbitration that would be resumed 
after the emergency.  Discussions, however informal, would in any case establish the 
Alliance as the voice of the civil service.  The discussions that did occur between the 
Alliance and the senior civil servants of the Department of Finance, especially with 
John Moynihan with whom the civil service found they could talk frankly, were 
useful in establishing good personal relations with the senior civil servants if not with 
the minister.58    
 
The Stabilisation of Bonus Regulation, May 1940 
The cost of living began to rise rapidly and the index that was 75 at the declaration of 
the State of Emergency had risen to 85 by the end of the year.  By June 1940 the 
figure had risen further to 105.  The Alliance met with the officials of the Department 
of Finance in April 1940.  McElligott told the staff side that the government had 
decided to do its duty to halt the increase in wages generally by stabilising the bonus 
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at the January 1940 figure of 85.  There would be no further increase regardless how 
high the cost of living rose.  Colm O’Sullivan of the IPCS (Ireland), in putting 
forward the objections of the Alliance, reminded MacElligott that the sliding scale 
had been introduced on the First World War as a partial compensation for the rise in 
the cost of living.  It had been consistently applied to force down civil service salaries 
and had bred discontent on the service which would now grow even stronger.  The 
Alliance then withdrew from meetings with the official side.59  The IPCS (Ireland) 
joined with the other Alliance members in a court challenge to the stabilisation of the 
bonus, which was effectively a unilateral abolition of the sliding scale.  When the 
court case proved unsuccessful the Alliance turned to mass protest meetings and 
publicity.  By now the POWU was pursuing its own agitation under the leadership of 
Norton in the Dáil.   In June 1942 and again in January 1943 the government 
conceded small increases to the lowest paid civil servants though offering very little 
to the higher grades, including the professionals.60   
 
The Wages Standstill Order, 1941. 
The standstill on wage rates for civil service was in fact just the first stage in a longer 
term strategy led by MacEntee.  MacEntee brought into the Department of Industry 
and Commerce a Finance department view of Irish wage levels which held it as 
axiomatic that Irish wages should be equal to, or less than, those in Great Britain.  In 
fact, according to the Department of Industry and Commerce, which had the 
responsibility for industrial policy, Irish wage rates had increased beyond those in 
Britain.  The Emergency was therefore an historic opportunity that was not to be 
missed to force Irish wage rates down.  Finance was not going to let the global crisis 
go to waste.  The problem was that the employers were too disorganised to check the 
 90 
trade unions and therefore the task would have to be taken up by the government.61  
The breaking of the IMETU strike in Dublin city was followed by the Standstill Order 
on civil service salaries.  MacEntee then took to the cabinet his proposals for a general 
wage freeze.  The State would take the initiative in confronting the trade unions.  In 
cabinet MacEntee argued with his colleagues through 1940 on the need to use the 
emergency powers to freeze wages.  The result was the Emergency Powers (no.83) 
Order, 1941 which prohibited any wage increase over and above that prevailing on 7 
April 1941.  At the same time MacEntee followed the logic of the incomes policy by 
bringing to cabinet a proposal to so regulate the right to strike as to make it a legal or 
financial impossibility through penal anti-strike legislation.  This was too much for 
his Fianna Fáil colleagues and MacEntee was forced to scale back his Bill.  The 1941 
Trade Union legislation, published on 30 April 1941, just as the wage freeze was 
taking effect,  proposed to control trade unions rather than strikes.  Trade unions 
would be required to take out a negotiating licence at considerable expense but in 
return would win exclusive rights to represent workers in an industry where the union 
organised the majority.  The Bill, though introduced by MacEntee, had the hallmark 
of William O’Brien of the ITGWU and his vendetta against Jim Larkin and the 
British-based amalgamated unions.  It was in fact an attack on the right of workers to 
form and join trade unions of their choice. These two measures created a groundswell 
of opposition led by Jim Larkin and the Dublin Trades Council that grew into the 
greatest show of strength by the labour movement since the foundation of the State.62   
MacEntee, through his uncompromising hostility to trade unions and his aggressive 
and confrontational style in addressing workers, had succeeded in precipitating a 
crisis between Fianna Fáil and labour and brought government and trade union 
relations to a dangerous pitch.  Clearly he had to go.  In August Lemass regained 
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control of Industry and Commerce and MacEntee was moved to Local Government 
and Health.  Lemass quickly began to rebuild contacts with the trade union movement 
and, in consultation mainly with William O’Brien, produced the amended 1942 Trade 
Union Act which was generally acceptable to the trade unions.  He also abandoned 
the policy of wage freezes by initiating a process of regulated and moderate increases.  
Trade unions began to actively participate in the government’s wages policy through 
the complex wage negotiation machinery.63  It also had the additional benefit, for the 
government, of widening the spilt between O’Brien, Larkin and the amalgamated 
unions, a split which finally reached into the Labour Party.  The Labour Party had 
enjoyed a major surge in support in the June 1943 general election, mainly at the 
expense of Fianna Fáil which continued in office but now as a minority government.  
Exploiting the divisions in the labour movement de Valera called a snap election in 
May 1944 and regained all that had been lost.64  With a weak and divided labour 
movement Fianna Fáil could again dominate the industrial and political field.  Of the 
7,303 orders made by the government under Emergency powers 5,330 were Wages 
Standstill Orders.65 
 
Seceding from the Alliance 
In Great Britain rationing was introduced to cope with the main problem facing the 
government, which was the supply of food.  In Ireland the tillage drive ensured that 
food was available, the main problem therefore was not food supply but its price.  
Between 1940, when the pay freeze was imposed, and the Spring of 1944 the cost of 
living rose from an index figure of 185 to 292.  The civil service had therefore seen a 
considerable decline in living standards.  The arbitration system introduced by 
Lemass allowed most workers to at least apply for wage increases to meet the 
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increased cost of food.  However the civil service demand for access to arbitration on 
the same basis as all other workers continued to face a blank refusal.  An attempt to 
make conciliation and arbitration for the civil service an issue in the 1943 general 
election was unsuccessful as even the Labour Party studiously avoided any reference 
to the issue.66 
 In November 1944 the government finally conceded an increase that based the 
cost of living on a figure of 110 instead of the figure of 85 which had been established 
in 1940.  More importantly for the professional civil servants the ceiling at which the 
increase was applied was lifted.  For the higher paid professional civil servants on 
salaries of £500-700 it gave an increase of between fifty and sixty pounds. It also 
encouraged the formation of the Association of Higher Civil Servants to organise 
those grades.  The IPCS (Ireland) regarded the AHCS as an additional platform and 
encouraged its constituent associations to participate.67  The IPCS (Ireland) had 
withdrawn from the Civil Service Alliance in January 1943.  This was not due to any 
disagreement on issues or strategy but rather to the sense that the clerical and 
executive officers on the Alliance regarded the IPCS (Ireland) as a small body of little 
significance.  The IPCS (Ireland) delegates were not kept informed on discussions and 
decisions were being made that, though they affected the professional grades, they 
were not in on the discussions.  There was also a suspicion that the professional civil 
servants were being pushed aside by the clerical and administrative divisions as 
regards promotion.  The AHCS therefore provided a more comfortable forum.68  
However the Department of Finance, finding it much easier to deal with the single 
organisation, continued to pretend that the Alliance represented the IPCS (Ireland) 
and ignored the calls from the Institution for a meeting.69  The IPCS (Ireland) was 
usually satisfied to work through the Alliance on questions affecting the general 
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service and to also work with the AHCS on issues that affected all the higher grades.  
However, whilst the Alliance represented those civil servants on the lower half of the 
salary scales and the AHCS represented those on the upper half the IPCS (Ireland) 
represented professional and technical civil servants at all points of the scales.   What 
the Institution wanted was access to the Department of Finance on those problems 
which it was believed were peculiar to the professional grades; pension entitlements 
where recruitment to the professional posts tended to be later in life; the high 
proportion of professional civil servants with temporary rather than established status; 
the failure to increase the number of higher professional posts as compared to the 
increase in higher administrative staff and the encroachment by these same 
administrative staff into areas proper to the professional grades.70 
 
Looking ahead 
By the summer of 1942, with the USA and the USSR now allied with Britain, the 
defeat of Germany was a matter of time.  Attention began to turn to planning for the 
post-war world.  Governments in the post-1918 era attempted to reconstruct the world 
before the war, a period which now became enveloped in a nostalgic glow.  In 
contrast, those who began to plan for after World War Two fixed their thoughts 
unwaveringly on the future.  This was not only because the allies faced a continent 
that war and occupation had turned into a blank slate but also because there was a 
popular appetite for a transforming vision which would make the sacrifices of war 
meaningful and worthwhile.  People expected a new world, not the reconstruction of 
the old.  William Beveridge’s 1942 report on ‘Social Insurance and Allied Services’ 
set out a vision of a ‘warfare state’ being transformed into a ‘welfare state’.  His 
report laid the foundation of the post-war welfare state in Britain.  There was 
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considerable thinking given to the future civil service structures that the welfare state 
would require, including the foundation of a training college for civil servants.  The 
British professional civil service grew from being between 8,000 to 9,000 before the 
war to between 70,000 and 80,000 at the height of the war.  Science and the 
professions were mobilised to meet the problems of total war and would be ready to 
meet the scientific challenges of the welfare state.  The technical and professional 
divisions enjoyed new status, higher pay and greater opportunity.  The British IPCS in 
response reshaped its constitution.  The myriad old associations were transformed into 
branches of the new centralised IPCS and an annual delegate conference replaced the 
old AGM.  New blood flowed into the institution and the pre-war leadership was 
replaced by a new and more radical generation.71     
In Ireland however the war had not had that radicalising impact.  Compared to 
the horrors of Nazi occupation and the devastation of air and ground combat, 
independent Ireland had had an easy war.  But that also meant that there was no 
recognition of the need to rethink former certainties. The Irish state survived the 
world war with its sovereignty intact, but Irish society did not escape the social and 
economic consequences of the war.  Independent Ireland emerged out of the war 
poorer and less healthy.  Nor was the civil service immune to the worsening 
conditions.  The Department of Finance noted the increased incidence of TB amongst 
civil servants in the war period, though the department saw this as an loss of 
efficiency rather than as a health issue.72  Lemass, who alone of the Fianna Fáil 
cabinet understood the need to plan for the future, suggested in September 1942 the 
establishment of an Economic Planning Committee made up of the secretaries of the 
departments most involved.  That he put his faith in the senior civil servants rather 
than his cabinet colleagues is a significant indicator of the extent to which he had 
 95 
come to appreciate their calibre.  The civil service was in fact the only native 
intelligentsia that was capable of making a significant rather than platitudinous 
contribution to the debate on the future direction for Irish society and economy.  De 
Valera, having recovered the status of national rather than a mere party leader, which 
he had lost in the Civil War, preferred a political committee.  The committee, which 
comprised de Valera himself, Lemass and Sean T O’Kelly, wasted considerable time 
on the most trivial of issues.  De Valera did not see the point of planning but was not 
going to deny his best minister.73 
The IPCS (Ireland) also began to plan for the future through an examination of 
organisation, recruitment and administration of the institution.  A recruitment drive 
began and the constitution came under scrutiny.74  In 1946 the AGM agreed to change 
the name to the Institute of Professional Civil Servants, dropping ‘Ireland’ from the 
title and changing ‘Institution’ to ‘Institute’.  This was a minimal change which 
followed the rejection of the suggestion that it be called an ‘Association’.  The 
proposal to coin an Irish language version of the name was also rejected.75  The 
British IPCS agreed to a request from the council to keep them informed on the new 
technical-administrative divisions in the British service.76   A professional secretarial 
service was contracted in to run the office whilst the council began to work on a 
further re-drafting of the constitution to meet the challenges of the post-Emergency 
service.77   
Despite an invitation from the Alliance and pressure from the Department of 
Finance the Institute decided not to re-affiliate with the Alliance.  The Department 
had no problem with the IPCS, they checked with the Institute when the Civil Service 
Draughtsman Association sought recognition.  It was simply that the Department 
preferred to deal with one organisation rather than several organisations where an 
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issue which was common across the service, such as travelling allowances, came up 
for discussion.    The simplest way for the Department to maintain pressure on the 
IPCS was to ignore any issue that did not come through the Alliance.78 
 The IPCS council, aware that organisation would be the key to progress in the 
post-war period, pressed ahead with a recruitment drive.  A sub-committee canvassed 
in the different departments where there were technical and professional division 
including the OPW, the Department of Education, the State Laboratories, and the 
Department of Posts and Telegraphs.  The message the sub-committee brought was on 
the need for the scientific, professional and technical grades to organise in the face of 
the success of the clerical and administrative grades in securing their positions and 
prospects.  The Professional and Technical Staff Association, Office of Public Works 
affiliated in 1946.  Membership rose, especially where individuals could join even 
where there was no departmental associations.79   Generally however professional and 
technical civil servants were encouraged to form an association and then affiliate to 
the IPCS through that association, even where staff numbers were small.  In the case 
of the air traffic control officers this mean that of the seven air traffic controllers in 
the state, the five that wished to join the IPCS had to form an Air Traffic Control 
Officers’ Association and then vote to affiliate to the IPCS.80  The National Museum 
officers, who applied to join the IPCS were instructed to form the Association of 
Technical Officers, National Museum first.81  The logic of this policy on membership 
is clear; the local associations would deal with the particular problems of the many 
professional, technical and scientific specialists in the different departments whilst the 
IPCS would deal with the overall terms and conditions of the scientific, professional 
and technical grades with the Department of Finance.  The council of the IPCS could 
not be expected to deal with complex questions of, for instance, the rostering of air 
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traffic controllers.  However by sticking to an essentially federal structure the IPCS 
would have to prove its usefulness continually to a membership that was encouraged 
to identify with sometimes very small, if not tiny, professional niches.   The danger 
was also that professional and technical associations with few members would 
proliferate as new positions and new forms of expertise were created in the 
government departments.  With only a handful of members the work of maintaining 
such an organisation would inevitably suffer.  
  
The end of the Emergency. 
In June 1945 Sean T. O’Kelly was elected president of Ireland, narrowly 
defeating the challenge of the Fine Gael candidate General Sean MacEoin and the 
independent republican Patrick MacCartan.  Frank Aiken succeeded him as Minister 
for Finance.  Aiken was attracted to ideas of social credit and was intrigued by the 
ability of the belligerent states to finance a long and hugely costly war and by the 
British chancellors efforts to force down interest rates and therefore the cost of 
reconstruction.82  A young Principal Officer of twenty-eight years of age, Ken 
Whitaker was assigned by McElligott to brief the Minister on monetary theory.  
Whitaker and his colleague Patrick Lynch were already exploring the implications of 
moving finance policy away from the embedded laissez faire conservatism towards 
planned and directed state intervention in the Irish economy to drive development.  It 
was their view that unemployment was a greater social threat then inflation and that 
the state should use its budgetary policy to expand employment.  It was to be another 
decade however before the potential of the expertise that the civil service embodied 
was recognised and exploited for the betterment of Irish society.  A hopeless 
weariness continued to dominate finance thinking.  The war had been a long one and 
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the Irish economy had suffered a severe dislocation.  Industrial production had fallen 
during the war by almost a third with employment falling by fifteen per cent.  The 
expected return from Britain of the Irish workers and demobilised soldiers threatened 
to create an overwhelming social and economic crisis.  The severe winter of 1946-7 
and the poor harvest meant that wartime conditions continued into the peace.83  The 
dollar crisis of 1947 led to a global flight from sterling which exacerbated the 
difficulties of Ireland’s transition from the isolation of the emergency to the wider 
modern world.  Ireland faced a financial crisis to which the Department of Finance 
responded with the usual pessimism, calling for major reductions in government 
expenditure and in personal taxation.  This was in an era when Keynesian thinking 
was encouraging governments across Europe to borrow to stimulate demand and drive 
economic development.84   In fact however, instead of a return of Irish from Britain a 
sustained flow developed in the other direction as the British economy responded to 
government stimulus and created new job opportunities.  The only major initiative by 
the government was the creation of the Department of Health and Social Welfare in 
January 1947 with Dr James Ryan as minister.  Assisted by a group of dynamic and 
far-sighted civil servants, especially Dr James Deeny, Ryan had a Health Bill ready 
for the government by the following August.  The Health Bill, a small dose of 
Beveridgeism, proposed to tackle two key areas of public health, infectious diseases 
and mother and child welfare, through state action. 
 
The end of wage controls 
The trade union movement and the government had been both planning for the 
end of wage controls.  Trade unions looked to the return of free collective bargaining 
and the opportunity to retrieve the losses in real income of the war years.  Lemass, 
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appointed tánaiste and clearly the heir to de Valera, emerged from the Emergency 
period with his authority enhanced.    The fear of a wages free-for-all led him to 
propose a wages policy based on discussions between labour and employers rather 
than on government dictation.  The cabinet approved his initiative in December 1944, 
despite the opposition of the Department of Finance that took the usual view that 
negotiation always forced wages upwards.  The foundation of the proposal was the 
Labour Court, established by the Industrial Relations Act 1946, as a permanent 
industrial relations body of trade union and employer representatives which would 
arbitrate on all issues between labour and employers and reach voluntary agreements 
without the disruption of strikes.  This was an historic challenge to the dominance of 
the Department of Finance in wages policy.  The Labour Court, was however an 
arbitration system for the private sector.  Civil servants were expressly excluded from 
its remit by section 4 of the 1946 Act.  Thus the Department of finance retained its 
control of civil service pay levels.85   
 For higher paid civil servants, which included most professional officers, 
government wages policy had also led to a flattening of scales with the difference 
between the lowest and the highest paid civil servants being significantly reduced, at 
the cost of the higher grades.  All civil servants now accepted that a conciliation and 
arbitration scheme alone would address the logjam of grievances that had built up.  
During the Emergency the Civil Service Alliance had been led to believe that though 
an arbitration scheme could not be introduced it during the Emergency, as soon as 
possible after the end of the war there would be such.  At a meeting in October 1945 
the staff associations were given the predictable news that the minister had decided 
that despite the end of the war he would not concede any conciliation and arbitration 
scheme for the civil service.86  
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The civil service seethed with anger at duplicity of the government that 
worked hard at promoting the virtues of arbitration to the private sector but denied 
them to their own employees.  The feeling was that the Emergency had been used to 
enforce a decline in civil service salaries and that loyalty to the State had been badly 
abused.  Civil servants had accepted additional duties and heavier responsibilities to 
ensure the survival of the State and in return had been used as an instrument to 
enforce a decline in wage levels.  The voluntary offer of an additional half an hour of 
work a day had been pocketed by the government and had in fact become normal as 
the Minister for Finance announced that normal hours would not apply for at least two 
years after the end of the Emergency.87    
The unsuccessful Dublin INTO strike for higher wages from March to October 
1946 revealed the depth of anger across the public service at the decline in earnings.  
The emergence of new political parties, Clann na Talmhan and Clann na Poblachta, 
also signalled a popular dissatisfaction with the government and a hunger for change.    
 
The IPCS and meeting the Minister 
The emergency standstill order of 1940 that had ‘stabilised’ the cost of living 
bonus for civil servants was expected to lapse in September 1946.  In anticipation the 
civil service associations began to campaign for its restoration, anticipating that the 
cost of living agreement would come into operation immediately after the lapsing of 
the emergency order.  It was reckoned that the cost of living had increased by about 
forty per cent during the emergency.  Though not acknowledged publicly, it was also 
generally accepted that the bonus mechanism had in reality been abolished and that 
the end of the emergency controls would lead to negotiations on new consolidated pay 
scales for the civil service.   
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 In April 1946 a meeting took place between O’Donovan (President) and Miss 
Cunningham (Honorary Secretary), both of the Land Commission, with Dr Lafferty of 
the Department of Agriculture, as representatives of the IPCS with Moynihan, 
Fitzgerald and O’Connell of the department of finance.  Two different records of the 
meeting have survived, one in the IPCS (Ireland) archives and one in the archives of 
the department of finance.88  The differences in the two accounts are illuminating.  
The department of finance records that the IPCS was dissatisfied with the Alliance 
because it had no interest in a small body such as the IPCS.  The Alliance had, for 
instance, excluded the Institute from discussions on travelling expenses with the 
department although this was an issue of vital interest to the members.  Accepting that 
the Alliance and the AHCS were satisfactory bodies to deal with general service 
questions the IPCS asked for recognition as an independent negotiation body for the 
professional and technical grades on issues ‘peculiar to themselves’ such as late 
recruitment resulting in full pensions being unattainable, the higher proportion of 
temporary staff in these grades, the failure to increase the number of higher 
professional posts and administrative grades making recommendations proper to 
technical grades.  The department denied that these problems were so peculiar to the 
professional grades that rights of representation were necessary.  In fact they argued 
the Alliance was already dealing with those issues.  Moynihan, speaking on behalf of 
the department was quite frank in explaining that it was their view that it was better to 
have a single representative body, such as the Alliance, to negotiate with as then the 
various associations of the civil service had themselves to work out a unified position 
to bring to the minister.  He urged the IPCS to rejoin the Alliance, with which the 
department had an exclusive agreement on negotiations, assuring them that he could 
ensure that when matters peculiar to the professional grades was under discussion the 
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IPCS would be invited to attend meetings with the minister.  When the IPCS 
delegation flatly rejected this suggestion Moynihan asked that they supply him with 
the number of members of the Institute on salaries above £900. 
According to the IPCS record, the delegates interpreted Moynihan’s pressure 
on them to re-join the Alliance as a crude attempt to split the Institute between the 
Alliance, which represented civil servants on pay scales up to £500, and the 
Association of Higher Civil Servants, which represented those above £500.  It also 
pointed out the department did not, as it maintained, deal only with the Alliance as it 
had dealt with the AHCS and had invited the POWU and its secretary Norton to 
negotiations.  The IPCS was in fact the only civil service association that the 
department had refused to meet despite the fact that the IPCS had, since its origins in 
1919, found that the diverse interests of the professional and technical grades could 
not be represented by general organisations.  
The position of the department of finance created a difficult situation for the 
Institute.  Its case for direct access to the minister was based on the claim that it, as  
federal institution, represented the professional and technical grades across many 
departments.  However those departmental associations joined the IPCS on the basis 
that it had access to direct negotiation with the minister.  If the IPCS was shown in 
fact not to have such access then there was little point in departmental associations 
paying affiliation fees and sending delegates to the annual general meeting.  They 
might as well join the Civil Service Alliance.       
 
Consolidation 
In the Autumn of 1946 the department of finance contacted the Civil Service Alliance, 
the Association of Higher Civil Servants and the POWU to discuss the restoration of 
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the bonus.  These discussion quickly turned to the question of the level at which a 
new wages policy that offered a consolidated pay scale and abandoned the periodic 
sliding bonus would be set.  The IPCS was excluded from these negotiations.89  The 
government offered consolidation at the 270, when its calculation suggested that a 
figure of 245 would have been a more accurate compensation for the rise in the cost 
of living.  This high figure was offered in order to secure a voluntary abandonment of 
the sliding scale system.  However, the government made it clear that the offer of 270 
was an inducement to existing staff only.  New entrants to the civil service would be 
on consolidated pay scales equivalent to a sliding scale figure of 255.90  For the civil 
service this figure of 270 represented a loss as, according to their calculations full 
compensation for the cost of living increase would have given a figure of 310.  The 
department of finance had succeeded in ensuring that consolidation had occurred at 
the lowest cost possible. 
Although the IPCS had been excluded from the negotiations on consolidation, 
it was decided to ballot the members on the new scales nevertheless.  Of the 550 
ballots issued 400 were returned with 305 voting in favour of the offer of 
consolidation at the cost of living figure of 270.91   
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A decade of failure: 1948-1958 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The 1950s was the decade in which the independent state  ran out of excuses for its 
economic failure.  In the immediate post-war period the policy of economic 
protectionism was maintained by the Irish government.  A brief recovery seemed to 
suggest that protectionism was doing no harm and might be doing good.  But, as the 
rest of Europe surged ahead in the 1950s, the failure of the Irish economy was starkly 
revealed.  The British were too long gone for Irish economic ills to be blamed on the 
former colonial rulers and as the rest of the world enjoyed a golden age of economic 
expansion, the international situation could not blamed either.  Inconsistent and 
confused responses by the government, especially by the Department of Finance, 
exacerbated the economic crisis.  The publication of the 1956 census report quantified 
the failure of the state as it revealed that the population, at 2,894,822, was the lowest 
ever recorded in the state and that emigration had grown to a level not seen since 1881 
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as 40,000 a year left the country, seeking a better life in Britain and America.  On the 
fortieth anniversary of the 1916 Rising the question as whether Ireland had a future 
and the possibility that national independence was a terrible and costly mistake was 
being voiced.1    
 
The governments and the economy, 1948-59 
On the 18th of February 1948 John A Costello was elected Taoiseach at the head of a 
coalition of five different parties; Fine Gael, Labour, National Labour (an ITGWU-led 
breakaway faction) Clann na Talmhan (a western small farmers party) and Clann na 
Poblachta (an apparently radical republican party).  The change in government after 
sixteen years of Fianna Fáil surprised everyone, including the successful coalition 
parties.  The hastily assembled and ideologically fractious government was united 
only by a determination to ‘put them out’.  It began a decade of political instability 
that saw four changes of government with Fianna Fáil governments of 1951 to 1954 
and 1957 to 1959 alternating with the inter-party governments of 1948 to1951 and 
1954 to 1957.  The 1948 election also established the pattern of ‘Fianna Fáil versus 
the rest’ that was to dominate electoral politics up to the 1990s.   
The 1950s also saw several changes in the person of the Minister of Finance.  
In February 1948 Patrick McGilligan was appointed Minister for Finance.  
McGilligan had served in the Cumann na nGeadheal governments of Cosgrave and 
was identified with the Ardnacrusha electricity generation station and the creation of 
the ESB, the most ambitious enterprise ever undertaken by the state in Ireland.  
McGilligan’s period as minister saw a decline in the dominance exerted by the 
Department of Finance over government policy.  Its advice was questioned and 
sometimes rejected.  The decline in influence over state policy formation was due in 
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part to the ideological complexion of the inter-party government but also due to the 
impact of new economic thinking conveyed by the European Recovery Programme 
and the arrival of Keynesian ideas into political discourse.2  However the Department 
of Finance remained fixated on the threat of inflation when unemployment and 
underemployment were more significant problems.   
Fianna Fáil interpreted its 1948 defeat as due to the opportunism of the other 
parties rather than to any failure of policy.  No new policies were elaborated.  The 
party machine got an overhaul as the Dáil  party waited for the coalition to fail.  
Reflecting the lack of a clear path out of economic misery the 1951 election was 
indecisive with the minority Fianna Fail government dependent on the support of 
independent TDs.  The return of MacEntee to the Ministry for Finance signalled a 
recrudescence of an uncompromising conservatism in finance policy.  The ‘Famine 
Budget’ of April 1952 saw unusually severe cuts in  food subsidies accompanied by 
increased taxes on consumption.  The budget was intended to reduce consumption and 
increase savings to stave off a balance of payments deficit.  The view in the 
Department of Finance was that the ‘pay round’ system, initiated by Lemass’s Labour 
Court as an orderly pay bargaining mechanism, was driving inflation.  Not 
unexpectedly the 1952 budget did prompt a new round of wage demands.  In March 
1953, McElligott retired as Secretary of the Department of Finance, a post he held 
from September 1927. He was essentially negative in his economic advice, readily 
explaining why something could not be done. Shaped by his experience of the 1920s, 
for him the Department of Finance was committed to an eternal struggle against 
inflation.  He was succeeded as Secretary by Owen Joseph Redmond who held the 
post for a brief three years, retiring in  1956 to be succeeded by Ken Whitaker. 
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Gerald Sweetman of Fine Gael, described as ‘one of the keenest minds of the 
nineteenth century’ and a dogmatic conservative, was appointed as Minister of 
Finance in the second coalition government of 1954-7.3  He immediately faced into a 
deeply pessimistic assessment by his officials of the public finances and the cost of 
the public services.  The budget was in deficit following a £0.9 million pay award to 
the public service.  The 1956 financial situation promised to be much worse than the 
most pessimistic assessment as the government attempted to deal with a deficit of £35 
million.  An emergency budget (first of three budgets in one year) introduced special 
import levies on a wide range of imported goods and extra taxes on domestic 
consumption. The balance of payment deficit was incorrectly blamed on consumer 
spending fuelled by the pay rounds.  Higher wages had been spent on imported goods 
as the Irish people attempted to maintain a standard of living equal to that enjoyed by 
the British.  As the value of sterling fell this had led to a decline in the value of 
exports accompanied by a rise in the value of imports.  This mistaken analysis led to a 
series of austerity budgets designed to cool the economy that was not in fact over-
heating.  Instead it exacerbated an already serious unemployment problem.4   
  Fianna Fail returned to power but as an uninspiring gerontocracy under the 
75-year old de Valera, his cabinet still dominated by his remaining 1916 comrades.  A 
rigor mortis seemed to have descended on the Irish body politic.  However the 
transfer of MacEntee and his replacement as Minister of Finance by James Ryan 
signalled a significant swing within the Fianna Fáil cabinet toward the more dynamic 
Lemass.  De Valera, almost blind and prone to delivering long monologues on the 
evils of partition at cabinet meetings, was persuaded to contest the 1959 presidential 
election.  His move to Aras an Uachtaráin saw Lemass succeed him as Taoiseach.   
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Arbitration and Conciliation 
Labour had two ministers in the coalition government of 1948,William Norton (who 
was also Tánaiste) in Social Welfare and T.J. Murphy in Local Government.  The 
young Brendan Corish was appointed parliamentary secretary to T.J. Murphy.5  For 
the civil service associations the presence of the Labour Party in government 
transformed the struggle for a conciliation and arbitration scheme.  Norton, as general 
secretary of the POWU, and as a TD and leader of the Labour Party, had been a 
leading voice in the demand for such a scheme since the foundation of the state.  With 
Norton now in the cabinet it was immediately delivered.  For the Department of 
Finance the decision in principle to negotiate an arbitration and conciliation scheme 
made the question of representation and recognition an immediate and central 
concern.6   In March the IPCS was informed by the Department of Finance that the 
minister would meet with representatives of the Institute when matters specifically 
affecting its members were being discussed.  The IPCS had finally secured the 
ministerial recognition which was vital to its status and future expansion.7   
 The Department of Finance, for obvious reasons, preferred to deal with as few 
associations as possible.  The tendency toward grade exclusiveness within the civil 
service militated against this.  In fact, once the principle of a scheme had been 
determined by the minister, the senior officials of the department, most especially 
Moynihan, moved quickly to bring it into being.  The fear was that after a scheme 
would be agreed an association would emerge that had not been represented in the 
negotiations and belatedly reject some aspect of the scheme.  Once the Department of 
Finance had accepted conciliation and arbitration in principle, the difficulty in 
arriving at a working scheme would arise from within the organisations representing 
the civil service.   
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In October 1948, having concluded that the higher grades in the Alliance were 
ignoring the clerical foot-soldiers in salary negotiations on a revision of the 1946 
consolidated scales, the Clerical Association seceded from the Civil Service Alliance.8  
The Clerical Association also immediately demanded separate representation on any 
conciliation and arbitrations scheme that would be negotiated.9  The IPCS was very 
cautious about admitting new members and tended to confine membership to 
associations of professional civil servants who were university graduates.  For 
instance, the status of the graduates of the state forestry school at Avondale led to 
much agonising within the IPCS council.  This exclusiveness was interpreted by other 
civil service grades as academic snobbery and the ‘professional’ claim was subject to 
resentment.10 
 As a preliminary to the scheme the Department of Finance asked the 
associations to supply a list of the constituent association for which they claimed 
representation.  The IPCS reply listed as constituents; 
• Cumann na Cigirí na Scoil Náisiúnta 
• State Foresters Association 
• Association of Professional Civil Servants, Department of Lands 
• Land Registry Technical Officers Association 
• Post Office Engineers Association 
• Association of professional Chemists, State Laboratory 
• Association of Professional Officers, National Museum 
• Association of Professional and Technical Officers, Department of Agriculture 
• Professional and Technical Staff Association, Office of Public Works 
• Professional Association, General Valuation Office 
• Association of Technical Officers, Department of Industry and Commerce 
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• Professional Association, Special Employment Schemes Office 
 
The largest single constituent association was the Professional and Technical Officers 
of the Department of Agriculture, underlying the continued high status of agriculture 
in the national economy.  The IPCS also listed two individual members; the Lands 
Officer in the Department of Defence and the Transport Inspector in the Department 
of Posts and Telegraphs.  Associations that had applied for affiliation, but had not yet 
been formally accepted into the IPCS, were Irish Civil Aviation Radio Officers’ 
Union, the Civil Service Draughtsman Association, the Professional Officers’ 
Department of Local Government, Ordnance Survey Staff Association, the Air Traffic 
Controllers Association and the Meteorological Officers Association.  These last three 
associations were in fact already affiliated to the Civil Service Alliance, but now 
wished to be represented by the IPCS.11   
  In November the Civil Service Alliance, Post Office Workers Union, the Civil 
Service Clerical Association and the IPCS agreed to form a temporary consultative 
council, clumsily known as the ‘Interbody’, to negotiate the scheme of conciliation 
and arbitration with the department.  The Interbody’s first meeting was dominated by 
suspicions that the Alliance was trying to regain dominance of civil service 
representation.  The IPCS representatives made it clear that there would not be any re-
affiliation with the Alliance, that the IPCS regarded the Interbody as a purely 
temporary arrangement that would deal only with the question of the scheme and that 
any agreement would have to be made by reference back to the IPCS council.12  The 
discussions within the Interbody were overshadowed by the lingering suspicion that 
the Department of Finance continued to prefer the Alliance as representing the whole 
service and was withholding information from the other associations.13  The 
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department anticipated that the Alliance would simply accept whatever scheme was 
offered and it would not have to do any meaningful negotiations.  If meetings with the 
officials of the Department of Finance were called to which any of the constituents of 
the Interbody were not invited it led to accusations of backroom deals and general 
skulduggery.14  As soon as the conciliation and arbitration scheme was agreed the 
IPCS moved the dissolution of the Interbody.15  The inability of the civil service of 
the time to escape the rigid mentality of the grading structures under which they 
worked is striking.  
  
The Scheme 
Despite these suspicions agreement on a conciliation and arbitration scheme was 
quickly reached, reflecting the long period during which the concept had been argued 
and also the model provided by the well-established British Whitley scheme.   The 
scheme, the first and foundation of all later civil service schemes, provided a 
conciliation system for negotiations on matters affecting conditions of service and an 
arbitration board to which the civil service associations and the Minister for Finance 
had access in the event of disagreement.  The conciliation stage consisted of a general 
council and departmental councils, each composed of representatives of the Minister 
(the official side) and an equal number of representatives of the staff (the staff side) 
with each side also providing a secretary.  The general council dealt with matters 
concerning the whole service or with matters concerning a class common to two or 
more departments.  These matters might include pay, promotion, or working 
conditions.  The departmental councils dealt with the heads of the department on 
purely departmental issues.  For the professional and technical staffs the practical 
consequences were that the departmental association of professional and technical 
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staff dealt with the departmental secretary on local matters affecting the conditions of 
the departmental professional and technical officers.  The IPCS dealt with the 
Department of Finance on the general conditions of the professional and technical 
classes.   The result of the general council discussions were brought to the minister 
who gave his decision on any agreed recommendations.  If the recommendation, or 
the decision of the minister, was considered unsatisfactory then the matter could be 
brought to arbitration.  The arbitration board consisted of an agreed chairman, two 
official side and two staff side representatives.  The findings of the arbitration board 
were submitted to the government who might accept them or ask the Dáil to reject or 
modify them.  There were therefore some important limitations to the scheme; only 
claims made on behalf of classes could be brought to conciliation, individual cases 
were not catered for.  The decision to allow conciliation where a class crossed at least 
two departments was in fact a concession to the IPCS that represented a ‘class’ that 
might have in fact have only one member in a department.  Also, the minister retained 
the power to reject any arbitration finding, with the permission of the Dáil.  What was 
on offer was therefore more correctly consultation and not conciliation, and an 
arbitration decision that was not binding on both sides could hardly be called 
arbitration in the true sense.  Finally, the scheme was only available to those classes 
and grades below £500 basic salary, the Higher Executive Officer scale, thus 
excluding many professionals. Nevertheless, an important advance empowering the 
civil service associations had been achieved.  The successful creation of the 
conciliation and arbitration scheme greatly enhanced the status and attractiveness of 
the associations, even amongst the professional and technical grades, many of whom 
retained a disdain for quasi-trade union association.   
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In July 1949 the IPCS called a meeting of the affiliated associations to give 
their assent to the proposed scheme.  Lonergan of the Civil Service Alliance also 
attended to give a short summary of the scheme from a point of view outside the 
professional classes.  T. O’Sullivan, honorary secretary of the IPCS, gave a summary 
history of the whole struggle for conciliation and arbitration and an honest assessment 
of its limitations.  Lonergan extolled the scheme and the whole concept of conciliation 
and arbitration for the civil service.  He argued that the civil service had been wrong 
in rejecting the earlier schemes of 1935 and 1940, but his most persuasive argument 
was the instability of the current government, which already apparent, and the 
prospect of a return of Fianna Fáil with MacEntee back in Finance.  The main 
objection from the floor, and the only vote against the scheme, came from the 
representative of the General Valuation Office who felt that the salary ceiling would 
have the effect of splitting the IPCS.16   Then, on 30 July 1949, at a public ceremony 
the scheme was signed into effect by McGilligan and representatives of the civil 
service associations.  
 
Forming the Staff Side Panel. 
Immediately following the signing of the scheme the civil service staff associations, at 
the prompting of the IPCS, agreed to form a temporary committee to draft rules and a 
constitution and to bring the staff side panel into existence.  This temporary 
committee had representatives of the POWU, the CSA, the CSCA, the Revenue 
Group of Associations, the Federation of Government Employees, the Post Office 
Engineering Union and the IPCS.  Each civil service association was entitled to one 
representative for each 500 members.  The IPCS, with a claimed membership of 1,000 
had two seats.  If it succeeded in recruiting all the potential 2,700 professional and 
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technical civil servants it would be entitled to four seats.  The Civil Service Alliance, 
mainly the Executive Officers, had four seats.  The Civil Service Clerical Association 
had four seats also.  The Federation of Government Employees, mainly the low-paid 
staff, had two seats as had the Post Office Engineers and the Revenue Associations 
Group.  The largest representation was with the Post Office Workers Union with six 
seats. The constitution and standing orders of the staff side panel reflected the fact 
that the representatives of the various civil service associations were strangers to each 
other, their experience was confined to their own class and grades.  Each approached 
the panel with suspicion and a determination that it would not be allowed develop into 
an authoritative body that might dilute the autonomy of the individual associations.17  
However, the decision to allocate seats on a numerical basis and to take decisions by 
majority vote did inevitably mean that the weight of numbers would lie with the lower 
and middle grades of the civil service and the higher paid professional and technical 
grades would have to struggle for a sympathetic hearing. 
  
Pay, Conciliation and Arbitration. 
The conciliation and arbitration scheme got off to a bad start as the Civil Service 
Clerical Association and the Staff Officer Association disputed which of them should 
be recognised by the Department of Finance for the staff officer grade.  In order to 
facilitate these associations reaching agreement the Department of Finance secretly 
agreed to delay implementation until a solution was found.  The other associations 
interpreted the unexplained delay as a manoeuvre by the department reluctant to 
accept a dilution of its authority over the civil service.  In the Civil Service Alliance 
the Revenue Group of Associations argued that as the Alliance was formed to win a 
conciliation and arbitration scheme, the time had come to dissolve the Alliance.  The 
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Alliance continued but the Revenue Group left anyway, determined to secure its own 
separate place at the scheme.    
Finally, on 1 June 1950 the council met and began to consider the agenda.  
Issues for discussion included, inevitably, pay scales and grading.  For the IPCS a 
bone of contention was the requirement for ability in the Irish language for scientific, 
professional and technical classes and the temporary status of many of their members 
despite their many years of service.  The operation of the scheme reflected the culture 
of the civil service and the decision to look to legal counsel for the arbitrator.  Cases 
were presented almost as legal briefs with carefully prepared and lengthy statements 
of claims argued out as if for a submission in a court of law.  For instance the IPCS 
case on the Irish language requirement was submitted as a memoranda on the 
irrelevance of the language within the professions.  The Department of Finance 
replied with a memorandum on the constitutional status of the Irish language and 
invited the IPCS to prepare a more detailed submission of their case for presentation 
to the minister.  The final, and obvious solution, was to give preference to Irish 
language proficiency only where all else was equal.18    
Of immediate concern to all the staff associations was pay levels.  Since the 
1948 agreement on consolidation, prices had continued to rise.  For the IPCS there 
was the added discontent of the lack of clear grades and structures for the professional 
grades, the long periods of temporary status and the poor prospects for promotion on 
offer to university graduates in the sciences compared to the Administrative Officers, 
who usually were university graduates in the arts.  The majority of the IPCS cases at 
both arbitration and conciliation were either salary claims or claims for 
establishment.19   
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The 1948 agreement that consolidated the basic and sliding scale salaries of 
the civil service had contained a commitment to a review after two years.  The general 
staff side panel, with T.O’Sullivan acting for the IPCS, now began to put forward a 
claim for a revised pay offer in light of the continuing rise in the cost of living.  The 
staff side case was that the offer of a consolidated figure of 270, 20 points below the 
actual cost of living figure, was based on government assurances that the cost of 
living would fall.  It was argued that the civil service, once that figure fell below 270, 
would therefore be making real gains.  In fact, the staff side argued, the cost of living 
had risen and therefore an increase was justified.  The official side then argued further 
that the 1948 agreement had committed to a review in two years but only in the light 
of then existing economic conditions, the exchequer position then obtaining and the 
trend of remuneration outside the civil service.  These three conditions were, it was 
argued, inextricably linked.  Therefore, as the cost of living had been stable for the 
two years and as the exchequer figures and the general economic situation were 
generally unfavourable, only a modest increase, if any, was warranted.  A long series 
of meetings beginning in November 1950 argued the issue back and forth.  At one 
point Dr Roy Geary of the Central Statistics Office (and a member of the IPCS) was 
cross-examined by the staff side on the manner in which the cost of living was 
calculated.  Finally, in February 1951, disagreement was recorded.  The question now 
moved to the arbitrator.   
The arbitrator appointed by the government and approved by the staff side was 
Frederick Charles King, a barrister-at-law.  King was educated at Clongowes Wood 
and TCD.  He had served in the Indian Civil Service from 1911 to 1941.  He was 
editor of Public Administration in Ireland which for many years was the standard text 
on the subject.  At arbitration the official side made a final offer of six per cent on 
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salaries up to £200, four per cent on salaries over £200 up to £500 and two per cent on 
salaries over £500.  The staff side, when pressed to make a counter-proposal 
suggested fifteen per cent on salaries up to £200, ten per cent on £200 to £500 and 
four per cent over £500.  This counter-proposal was completely unacceptable to the 
Civil Service Alliance and to the IPCS as it simply reproduced the government 
compression in salaries inflicted on the higher scales which would carry the cost of 
the higher awards to the lower levels.  The bias within the staff side panel toward the 
lower grades and the mistake of substituting a majority opinion for an agreed opinion 
was revealed.  The staff side counter-proposal had been pushed through the panel by a 
simple majority vote.  The Clerical Officers had maintained relentless pressure on the 
government during the negotiations by staging public meetings in favour of their case, 
meetings which the IPCS had refused to support as ‘unnecessary and undesirable’ and 
which had infuriated the minister.20   
The CSA and the IPCS immediately distanced themselves from the staff side 
proposal and demanded a separate arbitration panel for their members.21  That, of 
course, was not on offer.  Colm O’Sullivan, in an argument on behalf of the IPCS that 
reveals prevailing mentalities, emphasised the status of the professional classes within 
society and the need for a salary that is commensurate with that status.  The 
arbitrator’s decision, reported to the minister on 24 May, simply modified the staff 
side proposal; fifteen per cent on the first £200 of salary and ten per cent thereafter.  
The increases were to be back-dated to take effect from 15 January 1951.  Both the  
IPCS and the Clerical Officers had to accept that they had participated in the process 
and would therefore have to accept the result.22   The government had dissolved the 
Dáil  on 3 May and were in the midst of a the campaign for the election on 30 May.  
The arbitration was immediately accepted by the government as were outstanding 
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claims including several by the IPCS for the establishment of officers over 50 years of 
age, for a new salary scale for the Land Commission Inspectors and a similar scale for 
the forestry inspectors.   
 
 
MacEntee and the conciliation and arbitration scheme. 
On 14 June the new Dáil  assembled and Fianna Fáil returned to power with 
MacEntee once again Minister for Finance.  One week later, on 20 June, MacEntee 
announced that the recent arbitration award and its follow-on awards to the Gardaí 
and defence forces had added about £2.4 million to the demands being made on the 
exchequer.  The conciliation and arbitration scheme had written into its terms a 
review after one year of operation.  He further announced that he had therefore 
suspended the conciliation and arbitration scheme and would begin a review of its 
operation. 23  The 1951 general election campaign has been long recognised as a 
watershed in the emergence of modern Ireland.  It was the first campaign dominated 
by the language and theories of monetary and economic issues and it was also the first 
to offer a clear choice on economic policy between an expansionary state or 
retrenchment.  In rhetoric that was Gladstonian in its commitment to sound money 
and balanced budgets MacEntee epitomised retrenchment.  His return to Finance 
worried not only the civil service but also the Lemass coterie in Fianna Fail.  His 
budget of 1952 is now recognised as deeply flawed in its analysis and damaging to the 
Irish economy.  Heavily informed by the orthodoxies of the Central Bank, which a 
later generation would recognise as monetarist, it undermined Fianna Fail’s standing, 
opening the way to the second coalition of 1954-7, and marked the end of MacEntee’s 
influence in the party.  It was also the last budget under J.J. McElligott as secretary of 
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the department.  McElligott had grown more reactionary and contemptuous of 
politicians in general.  Succeeded by Ken Whitaker as secretary of the department, he 
followed his predecessor Brennan into the governorship of the Central Bank where he 
continued the tradition of issuing jeremiads on an annual basis.24 
 The fear within the civil service organisations was that the suspension of 
conciliation and arbitration was a prelude to its abolition.  The suspension of the 
scheme brought an immediate halt to the many conciliation talks across the 
government departments which could reasonably be expected to be resolved locally. 
MacEntee used his quasi-budget statement of July 1951 to complain that the civil 
service had ‘made a good thing’ of the previous government’s land reclamation policy 
having secured 75 per cent of the budget in salaries.25  MacEntee did admit, when 
questioned by McGilligan in the Dáil, that he always regarded arbitration with a great 
deal of apprehension as it tended to remove the control of civil service pay from the 
control of government.  However, as it had been conceded by the previous 
government the Fianna Fáil government would honour the scheme.  Revealing what 
may perhaps have been a deeper objection, he attacked the linkages between the civil 
service and the trade union movement and the political agitation that it had mounted 
through the Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress.26  On his hostility to 
political affiliation MacEntee had the full support of the IPCS.  The 1952 Annual 
Delegate Conference passed a motion affirming that ‘no organisation of Civil 
Servants should be in affiliation with a political body’.27 
 As the staff side began to co-ordinate an approach to the negotiations on the 
amended scheme the IPCS found itself isolated.  The AHCS would not join with the 
Institution in a joint approach for officers on salaries above the limit of the arbitration 
scheme.28  The IPCS wanted essentially to have separate conciliation and arbitration 
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scheme for the professional and technical grades.  Accepting that was improbable, the 
second line of negotiations for the IPCS was to include in the revised schemes as 
many revisions as possible that reflected their particular concerns.  The rest of the 
staff side panel simply dismissed these revisions, anxious as they were to get to direct 
negotiations with the minister with as few items for discussion as possible.  The other 
civil service organisations wanted to bring forward the minimum of changes in order 
to deny the department an excuse to procrastinate.  With hindsight it is apparent that 
both sides had a reasonable point of view, however it also possible that the readiness 
of the IPCS to agree with MacEntee’s demand that the civil servants should adopt a 
self-denying ordinance not to affiliate to any ‘outside organisation to make 
representations’ in any campaign (which meant the ITUC) soured relations with the 
rest of the staff side.29      
By March 1952, as negotiations between the staff panel and the minister made 
progress, the IPCS, finding its situation intolerable as its amendments were dismissed 
one after another, began to search for way to break with the other organisations whilst 
retaining the goodwill of the minister.  By June the Department of Finance, with most 
of the staff panel organisations in agreement, was putting pressure on the IPCS and on 
the CSCA that was also resisting the rush to a new scheme, to sign up.  The main 
difficulty for the IPCS was the ceiling of £600 salary for grades that could avail of the 
scheme as many of the professional officers were on pay scales in excess of that 
figure.   There was also the refusal of the minister to allow the IPCS organise the 
second and third secretaries of the Department of External Affairs (who had 
approached the Institute) as, in his view, they were not classed as ‘professional’ and it 
would therefore be inappropriate for the IPCS to represent them.  Finally, in June 
 123 
1952, the council agreed that they had taken it as far as they could and signed on for 
the new conciliation and arbitration scheme.30    
  
The revised conciliation and arbitration scheme 
The main amendments from the official side related to recognition of associations for 
negotiation.  Under the original scheme different organisations had claimed to 
represent the same grades and classes.  Under the revised scheme the associations 
would apply for recognition to the minister.  On securing recognition only the 
recognised association would have access to the scheme for the grades and classes it 
represented.  To meet the case of the IPCS, which represented officers both inside and 
outside the scheme at all salary levels, the minister would grant dual recognition to 
enable the organisation act on behalf of its members separately at departmental level 
and at ministerial level.31  The other issue that the minister included in the 
amendments was that of political affiliation.  Article Three of the scheme explicitly 
denied recognition to any association that affiliated to any political organisation after 
1 April 1949 or that collected funds or subscriptions to a political organisation.  This 
was aimed at the Labour Party and, whilst accepting the special relationship enjoyed 
by the POWU through its general secretary Norton, aimed to prevent any further 
extension of Labour Party influence in the civil service.  The scheme also explicitly 
forbad any ‘public agitation as a means of furthering claims or seeking redress for 
grievances’.  None of this was not seen as contentious by the IPCS which, as we have 
seen, looked askance at any political or public demonstrations by civil servants.  The 
IPCS had complained that the six POWU members of the staff panel had exercised 
undue influence on the workings of the scheme, which was of course another 
argument for a separate scheme for the scientific, technical and professional classes.  
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The often technical and detailed nature of the IPCS claims seemed obscure and of 
little interest to the rest of the staff side.32  MacEntee took the view that that was a 
problem for the staff side to sort out and would not concede a separate scheme, but 
the revised scheme did make several explicit references to the professional, scientific 
and technical grades and recognised the peculiar position of these classes in the civil 
service, which was a significant gain for the IPCS.  A special concession for the IPCS 
was the inclusion of professional and technical civil servants that might be on a salary 
above the ceiling so long as they were not the principal officer in their department or 
office and so liable to act on the official side in departmental conciliation hearings.  
Finally, in June 1952, the new conciliation and arbitration scheme was agreed. 
  
The 1953 arbitration award. 
Immediately the scheme was approved the staff side submitted a new pay claim for 20 
per cent increase in compensation of the rise in the cost of living which followed the 
ending of food subsidies in the 1952 budget. By August, having exhausted the 
conciliation stage, disagreement was recorded and the claim was passed to arbitration.  
The new chairman of the arbitration panel was the retired chief of staff of the defence 
forces General Daniel McKenna.   He passed his report to the government in 
November.  When MacEntee then told the Dáil  that as he was not obliged to respond 
until three months had elapsed, and that he was going to wait for those three months, 
it was reasonable to suppose that the arbitration was favourable to the staff side.33  In 
February MacEntee presented the details of the arbitration award to the Dáil.  The 
arbitrator had revisited the 1951 award and had topped it up by an average of seven 
per cent; the 15 per cent of the 1951 award was increased to 27.5 per cent and the 10 
per cent to 15 per cent, backdated to November 1952.  However, in order to avoid a 
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supplementary estimate for the civil service in what was the worst budgetary situation 
since the Emergency, MacEntee announced that he was now seeking the approval of 
the Dáil to defer the final decision until the next budget year, that is until after April.  
What he had therefore decided, and was now asking for the agreement of the Dáil as 
required by the conciliation and arbitration scheme, was to impose a freeze on civil 
service pay from November 1952 (the date on which the arbitration award would have 
taken effect) to the day of the budget in April 1953, with the possibility that the freeze 
might be extended beyond that date.34 
 The civil service organisations then responded with precisely the sort of action 
guaranteed to infuriate MacEntee.  A major public protest was staged in Dublin on 
Sunday 15th March by the staff side panel led by O’Coigligh of the Alliance, with a  
march of civil servants from Stephen’s Green to the GPO.  The march and protest 
received support from both the trade union congresses and, with between eight and 
ten thousand participants, was a major public embarrassment to the government.  
Speakers, quoting Cardinal D’Alton and other Catholic social thought authorities on 
the sacredness of arbitration, included Mary Doherty of the Alliance, Griffith of the 
INTO and Norton of the POWU.  Messages of support came from the Higher 
Officers’ Association, the Workers’ Union of Ireland, the Bank Officials’ 
Association, the Irish Women Workers’ Union and the Dublin Trades Council.  The 
widespread support for the civil service reflected the wider trade union fear that 
MacEntee was introducing another hated Wages Standstill Order by the back door.  
The response of the government was petty as it ordered that government buildings 
were no longer to be made available for meetings of civil service associations.35 
 Alone of the civil service organisations the IPCS remained aloof from the 
public agitation.  A motion by Miss Litster of the Department of Health that the IPCS 
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should show solidarity with the lower grades and show a united front with the rest of 
the civil service was voted down at the council.  Details of the debate at the council 
were leaked to the Sunday Press, possibly by Miss Litster herself.  The tone of the 
debate at council and the defeat of the call for solidarity deeply embarrassed the IPCS 
in its relations with the rest of the staff associations.  The Alliance representative on 
the staff side threatened to oppose all future claims by the IPCS at departmental 
meetings and generally to make life difficult for the Institute.  The IPCS found itself 
excluded from the staff aide on the arbitration board by the votes of the other 
organisations, even where it had submitted the case.36   
 The minister used the non-participation of the IPCS to make a strategic retreat.  
Warning the staff side panel organisations that he regarded public agitation as a 
breach of the scheme and a provocation, but mindful that not all the staff panel 
organisations had supported the public campaign, he had decided to refrain from 
action.  The staff side panel, at least in public, ignored the non-action of the IPCS and 
extolled the unprecedented unity of the civil service and the support of the wider 
world of labour.37 The agitation did ensure that MacEntee did not continue the freeze 
and that the budget of April did award the arbitration increase.  However the increase 
was not backdated but applied from 1st April.  The loss of six months of the increase, 
about £400,000 in all, became itself an issue that was finally resolved by the change 
of government in June 1954 when Gerard Sweetman as Minister for Finance paid the 
money owed.   
In 1955 the scheme was further revised.  In January 1957, facing a difficult 
financial situation, whilst assuring the staff side that he was anxious not to disrupt the 
scheme Sweetman, in a frank discussion with the staff side, successfully appealed to 
the staff side to co-operate by not submitting pay claims that would embarrass the 
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government and especially not to generate publicity on pay increases that would have 
a ‘bad psychological effect on the public mind and create difficulties for the 
government’.38   By the end of the second coalition government in March 1957 
conciliation and arbitration was an established and accepted procedure for the 
negotiation and settlement of pay and conditions in the civil service regardless of any 
nostalgia that the Department of Finance, or a minister, might have for the old ways.  
The new Fianna Fail government, with James Ryan as Minister for Finance, 
acknowledged that though the scheme did limit the ability of the government to set 
salary levels in the civil service the advantages of the scheme outweighed the 
disadvantages and arbitration had become the accepted mode of dealing with the civil 
service.   
Within the IPCS experience was to show that it was usually better to settle for 
the best deal possible at the conciliation stage rather than push for arbitration.  This 
involved considerable give and take on both sides and tended to create a culture that 
valued reasonable concessions.  The professional civil service were a comparatively 
small group within the civil service as a whole, recruited to perform a variety of 
specialist tasks and to meet ad hoc departmental needs.  As a result the professional 
and technical civil service did not enjoy any coherent structure with common grades, 
rates of pay or conditions of service.  The slow process of conciliation on a wide field, 
with an official side for whom the general civil service classes of clerical, executive 
and administrative grades were familiar, was used to create a rational, graded 
technical service with common conditions of service. In June 1958, after a decade of 
conciliation and arbitration  the IPCS could record 170 pay grade improvements for 
its membership won with a reduction of the twenty-three professional and technical 
grades in the Department of Agriculture to a manageable eight grades.39 
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Constitutional and Other Changes in the IPCS 
Winning the conciliation and arbitration scheme transformed the civil service 
organisations.  The formality of the process made it possible to win substantial gains 
without having to establish a militant posture.  It undermined the formerly absolute 
authority of the Department of Finance and encouraged an acceptance of civil service 
trade unionism.  It removed the temptation for ministers to court popularity by 
denying pay increases to civil servants.  Also, by conferring recognition for 
negotiation purposes, the conciliation and arbitration scheme gave civil servants an 
incentive to join their associations.  The conciliation process, by encouraging 
agreement, also tended to standardise salary scales which was of great significance to 
the professional and technical grades.  However, by granting recognition to even the 
smallest organisation, if it could show that it organised the majority of its claimed 
grade, the scheme halted any tendency toward the consolidation of civil service 
organisation and inhibited a trade union consciousness.  Also, the formality of the 
procedures and the necessity to construct what were often very complex cases 
demanded a level of research, skill and energy that created an enormous demand on 
the time of honorary officers.  Employing a fulltime secretary became an urgent  
necessity for all civil service organisations. 
 
A New Constitution 
The conciliation and arbitration scheme signalled a change in the attitude of the 
Minister for Finance and the department that encouraged an influx of new members 
into the IPCS.  The  Department of Agriculture was identified as having the largest 
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number of non-affiliated professional and technical officers associations.  These were 
officers who spent most of the their time in the field, the ‘outdoor officers’.  A 
recruitment drive by the IPCS brought in the Farm Improvement Supervisors, the 
Assistant Agricultural Overseers and the Cow Testing Inspector.40  Further new 
members joined from the Central Statistics Office and the Air Traffic Controllers 
Association, diversifying the range of expertise represented by the IPCS.  New 
branches were formed in the National College of Art and Design and in the Radio 
Éireann Orchestras, bringing artists and performers into the Institute. 
The council re-organised its work by creating five sub-committees dealing 
with arbitration, remuneration, superannuation, “temporary” appointments and 
mileage and subsistence allowances.  New standing orders streamlined discussion at 
the council meetings and facilitated the chairman in ‘preventing long discussion on 
trivial matters’.41  The influx of new associations was not matched by a higher level of 
commitment within the associations to making the IPCS work.  The sub-committees, 
if they were to work effectively, needed a constant stream of information on, for 
instance, the number of temporary professional officers or on superannuation in each 
of the constituent associations.  When this information was lacking the conciliation 
process was weakened and the high reputation of the IPCS was diminished by poor 
submissions.42   
 An unexpected disadvantage of the victory on conciliation and arbitration was 
that, although they remained eligible, the professional and technical officers on pay 
scales above that of the scheme saw little point in joining the Institute.  Clearly, the 
federal structure that had been adopted by the IPCS at its foundation no longer 
answered to the new situation.  The 1951 AGM and the 1952 Annual Delegate 
Conference amended and approved a new constitution that transforming the structure 
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of the IPCS from a federation of professional and technical associations to a unified 
corporate association with branches in each government department.43  The new 
constitution stated that the objects of the Institute were 
1. The maintenance and improvement of the position and status of Civil Servants 
who are engaged in the professional, scientific or technical work. 
2. The protection, assertion and defence of the status, rights and interests of such 
Civil Servants. 
3. The advancement of efficiency in the Civil Service. 
4. The promotion of scientific knowledge and the interchange of views thereon. 
5. The creation and maintenance of standards for professional, scientific and 
technical work within the State Service. 
6. The representation of the Institute by properly appointed persons on any body 
formed in pursuance of the objects contained therein. 
The most important revision in the constitution was in the organisation and 
administration of the Institute.  Formerly each professional and technical class in a 
department constituted themselves as an association and affiliated to the IPCS.  These 
associations therefore varied greatly in membership, the State Laboratory association 
had as few as four members.  Under the older constitution the governing council of 
the IPCS was made up of the representatives of the constituent associations; one 
representative for each association  with less than twenty members, two for 
associations with more than twenty but less than seventy five and three for those with 
seventy five or more members.  It was quite conceivable that a constituent association 
might leave the IPCS and decide to go it alone or affiliate to the Civil Service 
Alliance, the other main federal organisation.   
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Under the new constitution the constituent associations became members of 
local branches based in each government department.  The organisational basis 
therefore shifted from the particular professional or technical grade to the government 
department.  This change had the blessing of the Department of Finance who 
preferred to deal with a few strong organisations rather than a multitude of weak 
sectoral associations.44   
 The Council consisted of the honorary officers and one representative of each 
branch.  The Council arranged and supervised the affairs of the Institute, enforced the 
Constitution, incurred expenses, and appointed sub-committees.  The day to day 
business of the Institute was carried out by a ‘standing committee’ of the honorary 
officers.  Honorary officers; the chairman, vie-chairman, secretary and treasurer and 
the editor of the IPCS journal; were elected by the Annual Delegate Conference, the 
supreme authority of the IPCS.  The delegates to the Annual Delegate Conference 
were appointed by the branches on the basis of two delegates for each branch of less 
than twenty members, three delegates for each branch of more than twenty and less 
than fifty members, four delegates for each branch of more than fifty and less than 
one hundred members, five delegates for each branch of more than one hundred and 
les than two hundred members and six members of more than two hundred members.  
The Annual General Meeting approved the annual report, financial statement and the 
report of the Annual Delegate Conference.     
The new branch structure worked well as it was flexible, but it did tend in time 
to facilitate a proliferation of smaller branches within the government departmental 
structure.  Many of the professional associations preferred to affiliate directly with the 
IPCS rather than through the departmental branch.  At the 1955 ADC the inspectors in 
the Department of Education retained separate branches for the different school 
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levels, primary and vocational, whilst the forestry inspectors were spread across the 
department of lands and the department of agriculture.45  In 1959 the Institute had 
forty branches.  The branches were expected to deal with local issues and take part in 
conciliation talks, with a member of the Council in attendance to ensure co-ordination 
across the whole of the Institute.  The IPCS dealt with the Department of Finance and 
at arbitration.  Generally this division worked, although there were some difficulties 
when the OPW branch rejected a pay offer recommended by the IPCS council and 
demanded direct access to the Minister of Finance.46  In 1955 the Institute added the 
Irish form of its name to its official title; Institiúid Na Stat-Sheirbhíseach Gairmiúla; a 
late concession to the first national language and perhaps an initiative of the school 
inspectors branch.  Having been adopted it seems never to have been used.  At the 
1959 annual delegate conference a chain of office was used for the first time.  
 
Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the IPCS 
In order to the address the fear that the IPCS might not attract the loyalty of those 
professional and technical civil servants on the higher scales, and recognising that the 
prestige of the Institute would depend to  large extent on the number of senior 
professional civil servants in its membership, the IPCS retained as an honorary post  
the office of President and Vice-Presidents.47  These purely honorific positions were 
offered to eminent scientific and professional civil servants.  The first president of the 
IPCS was Dr H. Lafferty of the Department of Agriculture.  From Co Tyrone, An 
eminent scientist and member of the Royal Irish Academy, Lafferty was head of the 
Seed Testing and Economic Botany Division of the Department of Agriculture.  He 
was succeeded by J.A.K. Meldrum, Director of Forestry in the Department of Lands.  
Meldrum was born in Carlisle and studied forestry in Vancouver in Canada.  He was 
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in the forestry profession in Canada, England before coming to Ireland where he was 
appointed as Chief Forestry Inspector in 1946.  Later Presidents included Dr Roy 
Geary of the Central Statistics Office, first Director of the Economic and Social 
Research Institute and the most eminent Irish statistician of the twentieth-century and 
Dr Joseph Raferty, a native of Dublin and graduate of Marburg Universitat, an 
archaeologist, Keeper of Irish Antiquities in the National Museum and Member of the 
Royal Irish Academy.  The first Vice-Presidents included Richard J. Hayes, Director 
of the National Library, and Dr James Deeny, Chief Medical Advisor to the 
Department of Health.  These senior scientific and professional civil servants gave 
added prestige to the IPCS and enhanced its standing amongst the professional and 
technical classes and across the whole service.  A formal annual dinner with the 
Presidents and Vice-Presidents, journalists and politicians attending with guest 
speakers added to the prestige of the Institute.  In later years the position of president 
and vice-president was filled by members with long service to the Institute.48 
 
The Officers of the IPCS 
The postwar years mark the transition within the leadership of the IPCS from the 
founding generation to a new generation that had developed within a native civil 
service.   Foremost amongst these was Thomas O’Sullivan from Co Kerry, a Land 
Commission Inspector and honorary secretary of the Institute.  O’Sullivan was one of 
the most able negotiators on the Staff Side Panel of the conciliation and arbitration 
scheme.  The Chairmen of the IPCS council in the early 1950s included J.J. Kelly 
from Limerick, an engineer in the OPW and specialist in hydrology; Dr A.E.J. Went, 
a Londoner with a degree in Zooology, who joined the Department of Agriculture in 
1936 and became Inspector of Fisheries and Scientific Adviser to the minister; and 
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Niall O Brolchain of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs.  Other notable 
members of the Officer Board would include Miss Litster of the Department of 
Health, Miss I.A. Cummins from Cork who, unusually for a woman of that era, was a 
graduate in engineering and a Surveyor with the Land Commission and the long-
serving Colm O’Sullivan. 
 
The General Secretary 
With the successful establishment of the staff side panel it was recognised that the 
volume of work that the conciliation and arbitration scheme entailed would require a 
permanent secretary.49   The main obstacle to employing a permanent secretary was 
the cost and the reluctance of the members to pay the extra affiliation fee that it would 
demand.  Therefore, though it as agreed that it was a good idea, it was some years 
before it made any progress.  In September 1952 Mr P. Duffy was appointed as 
‘registrar’ of the IPCS on £250 p.a. rising to £300 after six months of satisfactory 
service.  Duffy did not last long and within six months had his contract terminated.50  
Instead the IPCS used a professional office service provider that offered the use of a 
premises for meetings and record keeping and a secretary-typists to maintain minutes 
and accounts.  To cope with the workload the Institute appointed up to ten honorary 
deputy secretaries to assist the honorary secretary.  These deputy secretaries were 
drawn from representative groups of the membership.  Able to attend the Dublin 
weekly meetings, it was expected that the deputy secretaries would have considerable 
experience of the workings of the Institute and its council, with good judgement but 
‘able to compromise on procedure and not on principle’.51  The failure to appoint and 
finance a fulltime secretary created a heavy load of work for the few faithful stalwarts 
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that were prepared to dedicate many of their free hours to long meetings and the 
danger of ‘burnout’ and simple exhaustion was always a present threat. 
 
Scientific Service 
The civil service had a long tradition of association journals.  The earliest of these was 
the Civil Service Gazette established in 1853.  Many of the Irish civil service 
associations had their own journal such as the Clerical Association’s An Peann, the 
postal workers journal An Post Gaedhealach and the Executive Officers Iris an Stat-
Seirbhíse.  These journals kept members informed on issues, created a forum for 
discussion, maintained the identity of the association and acted as an advertisement to 
attract new members.  In April 1949 the IPCS annual general meeting agreed in 
principle to publish a journal.  Dr Raftery of the National Museum agreed to act as 
editor and to chair a sub-committee.  The initial concept seems to have been nothing 
more ambitious than a quarterly bulletin that would report on arbitration cases, 
mileage and subsistence rates and notes from the various constituent branches.52 The 
practical difficulties of financing, printing and distributing the journal were ably 
handled by the sub-committee with the first issue of the new journal ‘Scientific 
Service’ (which had the imprimatur of the Department of Finance) ready by early 
1950.53  The title ‘Scientific Service’ in Gothic script was set above  a masthead 
designed by Dr Lysaght of the Genealogical Office.  It featured a circular seal 
consisting of a flaming torch of light above a laurel wreath with the name of the 
Institute and the (incorrect) founding date of 1919, with a banner saying Science and 
Art.  The circular seal was set between sketches of the façade of the Royal College of 
Science (now the Department of the Taoiseach) and the National Library, the whole 
linked by a streaming banner across the bottom saying ‘Journal of the Institute of 
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Professional Civil Servants’.54  Scientific Service was a quality publication, with 
articles on the IPCS branches, detailed reports on conciliation and arbitration 
hearings, photographs and short biographies of the officers, reports on key events, and 
with contributions from members from within their own field.  The first issue 
included an article on ‘Patentable Inventions’ by Colm O’Sulivan, explaining how the 
law of patents worked and how something was deemed “an invention”.  Future 
editions included articles on Irish forestry, dating the past (by Joseph Raftery) and 
microfilming the historical records of Ireland by Dr R.J. Hayes of the National 
Library. 
 Scientific Service came out in two fifty-page editions in the Spring and Winter 
of 1950, one edition in the Winter of 1951 and one edition in 1952.  It then ceased 
publication until 1955.  The problems were obvious, the voluntary officers of the 
Institute found the work of preparing copy, supervising production and securing 
advertising too onerous and time-consuming.  A more commercial basis for the 
production, arrived at with the Engineers Institute, allowed its revival in 1955 as a 
twice yearly publication.   
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‘Revolution From Above’: 1958-1972 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Ireland in the 1960s experienced a ‘revolution from above’ as the government, 
accepting the failure of protectionism, opened the Irish economy to international free 
trade.  In a speech of July 1959 Lemass signalled the leading role of the State in this 
transformation; ‘It is necessary that the state as such should participate in 
development activities…both as promoter of industrial ventures, in spheres where 
private enterprise has as yet shown no interest, and as organiser of projects which, 
while not directly commercial, will contribute to the overall expansion of the 
country’s economy…’.1  The revolution from above aimed to offer as good a life in 
Ireland as was available elsewhere.  These years were dominated by the Fianna Fáil 
party.  First under the leadership of Seán Lemass and then Jack Lynch, Fianna Fáil 
governments jettisoned economic, social and cultural isolationism and opened the 
country to outside influences.  The Fine Gael and the Labour Parties also saw changes 
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in leadership and direction as James Dillon allowed the ‘Young Tigers’ around 
Declan Costello to lead the party in a social-democratic direction and Brendan Corish, 
influenced by an influx of middle-class intellectuals, began to mention socialism in 
the context of the Labour Party.  However, even more important than political 
leadership in ushering Ireland into modernity was the developing capacity within the 
public service to formulate and realise the policy of development.  However the State-
led modernisation of Irish society was confined to the economy.  Large areas of 
policy in education, health and social care were left under the control of the churches, 
principally the Catholic church.  Nonetheless Ireland was transformed as economic 
growth soared and emigration slowed and then stopped.  RTE began broadcasting in 
the early 1960s with a novel mixture of American and British popular programmes 
and home-grown current affairs and investigative programming of considerable power 
and influence.  Censorship of publications and films was relaxed. The commercial 
dance halls and the show bands catered for the new phenomenon of a pleasure-
seeking youth culture.  By the early 1970s Irish society was better-off, better 
educated, better informed on issues, more aware of international trends, with higher 
expectations of the State and public service.  Therefore, as Irish society changed in 
response to the revolution from above, so the State itself and the expertise it 
commanded in the civil service had to re-think their role within the new Irish society 
that was emerging.  
        
Developments in the IPCS 
In 1950 the IPCS had less than one thousand members in fourteen constituent 
associations run on an ad hoc and informal basis. In 1970 it was professionally run 
with 3,600 members in forty-two branches and was universally accepted as the 
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representative organisation for the scientific, professional and technical civil service 
across two hundred different grades.  During the 1960s it built up and consolidated 
this commanding position, professionalised its organisation and adopted a new 
attitude of solidarity toward the rest of the civil service that brought it into the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions.   
The Institute continued to nominate senior figures of rank and prestige in the 
professional civil service as President through the 1960s; such as Mr J. McNichol 
B.E., of the General Valuation Office and H.A. De Lap, M.I.C.E.I., of the Office of 
Public Works.  They presided over the conference dinner and could be expected to 
make a speech extolling the professional service whilst the Chairman of the Institute 
did the day to day running of the Institute and chaired the conference.  The Chairmen 
of the Institute through the 1960s were Mr T. O’Cuilleanain 1963-5,  Mr R. Walsh, 
1966-8 and Dr Thomas F. Shine 1969-71.  
From 1954 to 1966 the honorary general secretary of the Institute was Colm 
O’Sullivan of the Land Commission, one of the founding associations.  As early as 
1960 it was recognised that the Institute needed to modernise by employing a fulltime 
general secretary and finding its own premises, rather than relying on office service 
providers.2  Despite pleas to the members not to contact him at his office or collar him 
in the corridors Colm O’Sullivan, who prepared cases for the conciliation and 
arbitration hearings and had an encyclopaedic knowledge of precedents, was finding 
the volume of work overwhelming.   Unfortunately O’Sullivan was too good an 
honorary general secretary and his organisational ability, phenomenal memory for 
regulation and skill in negotiation meant that the need for a fulltime official was 
forgotten.3  The Department of Finance agreed to allow O’Sullivan twenty five days 
special leave annually for his activities as general secretary, the cost to be refunded by 
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the IPCS.4  Then, in 1966, after eleven years as honorary general secretary Colm 
O’Sullivan reached retirement age and the Institute had to re-open the question of a 
fulltime general secretary.  
 In July 1967 Mr Ralph (Rafe) Pares, formerly secretary of the ESB Officers’ 
Association, was appointed general secretary of the IPCS.  His appointment marks a 
new level of professionalism and combativeness in the Institute.  At the same time 
new premises were acquired, initially at 64 Adelaide Road and then larger offices at 
31 Fitzwilliam Place.  In 1970 an assistant general secretary, Michael (Mick) Downes 
was appointed.  Downes joined the civil service as a clerical officer in the Department 
of Defence in 1943.  He soon became active in the Civil Service Clerical Association 
and in 1962 he was appointed a full-time assistant general secretary to that 
association.  On his appointment as assistant general secretary to the IPCS he brought 
his long experience of the conciliation and arbitration scheme and a deep conviction 
on the need for the civil service organisations to present a united front on behalf of all 
of their members.  He served as assistant general secretary and deputy general 
secretary until his retirement in 1984.   Along with three clerical/typists the 
appointment of Pares and Downes brought the fulltime staff of the Institute to five.  
The finances of the Institute were consolidated by the introduction of the deduction at 
source for members subscriptions.5    
In October 1970 the IPCS celebrated its Golden Jubilee with a symposium on 
‘The role of the Professional in the Civil Service for the next 50 years’.  Speakers at 
the symposium included J. Brennan, Minister for Labour; Mr Folke Gustafsson of the 
Swedish Federation of Civil Servants; Mr Cyril Cooper, deputy general secretary of 
the British IPCS; Mr Ralph Pares, general secretary of the Institute; and George 
Colley, Minister for Finance, who was probably pre-occupied with the ‘Arms Trial’ 
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of, amongst others, his colleague and former Minister for Finance, Charles Haughey, 
which had just opened in the High Court.  The symposium report shows a keen 
awareness of the importance of events in Europe and in Britain and an anxiety to 
extract as much comparative information as possible on the status of the professional 
civil service in other countries.6   
The Journal Scientific Service continued to be issued quarterly until the end of 
1971 when it was replaced by a monthly newssheet IPCS NEWS.  The first issue of 
IPCS NEWS in November 1971 announced that its object was ‘to inform the general 
membership fully and promptly of the progress of Institute business’.  Its first editor 
was P.J. McGarrigle, M.Sc., Ph.D., M.I.C.E.I.  IPCS NEWS, a tabloid news-sheet, was 
a less glossy production than Scientific Service.  Articles on the more arcane corners 
of the scientific service were dropped to be replaced by reports on the progress of 
issues, especially at conciliation and arbitration, reflecting less anxiety about status 
and a greater urgency to inform members in a rapidly changing world.  The issues that 
were now beginning to dominate the Institute were the impact of growing inflation on 
the value of salaries and the re-structuring in the civil service that seemed imminent 
after the publication of the Devlin Report.   
The most significant development in the IPCS was the decision to affiliate to 
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, taken at the 1968 annual general meeting.  
Congress had a lively civil service presence since the foundation of the State through 
the POWU and the CSCA.  Both these Unions had regularly proposed motions on 
issues of concern to the civil service, such as the long-standing demand for 
arbitration, poor levels of pay in the public service and the lack of promotion.  
Congress had debated these motions with interest and sympathy and the civil service 
usually received a sympathetic hearing from the general unions.7  The IPCS had been 
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a member of the Irish Conference of Professional and Service Associations (ICPSA) 
since 1959.8  The ICPSA had been formed in 1946 by groups of white collar workers 
at the lead of the ESB Salaried Staff Association.  It was essentially a pressure group 
of salaried, middle class professionals reluctant to be identified with trade unionism 
but recognising the need for some organisation to speak for the white-collar 
employee.  It included in its affiliate organisations the Irish National Teachers’ 
Organisation, the Vocational Teachers’ Organisation, the Irish Local Government 
Officers Union, the Civil Service Alliance, Comhaltas Cana, Dublin Port and Docks 
Board Officers’ Association the Irish Bank Officials Association, the Assurance 
Representatives Association, the Transport Salaried Staffs Association and many 
other organisations of the white-collar sector.9  It had the right to nominate candidates 
to the Senate elections on the Labour Panel.  The decision to seek affiliation with 
Congress represents therefore a decisive change of identity for the IPCS. This move 
toward Congress was driven by Pares but it is notable that the decision to affiliate 
with the rest of the public service and the general unions was not contentious.  It 
reflects a general recognition that the future of the Institute, despite its professional 
status, lay with its developing as a trade union in alliance with the broader labour 
movement and the rest of the public service.  Membership of Congress also exercised 
a profound change in the way salary increases were negotiated.10  As the IPCS 
Chairman Dr Thomas .F. Shine told the 1969 AGM, ‘ 
We must examine our relationship with our other colleagues in the Trade 
Unions; the type of co-operation we can offer our sister unions-moral support, 
financial support or, above all, even more direct support.  No member of ours 
must impede this.  We must consider our attitude to the picket line, to the class 
struggle in the whole community and the struggle within the various social 
strata.  Examination of these problems will give us a clearer picture of 
ourselves, our place in this  society, our relationships with the whole 
community and with the establishments that evolve and those that are self-
perpetuating.  If our Arbitration Scheme is found threatening, a conforming 
middle class past must see the lights go out.11 
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Enhancing the State’s policy-making capacity  
The iconic role of T.K.Whitaker’s 1958 paper Economic Development and the 
associated Programme For Economic Development in the modernisation of Ireland 
has been long conceded but it has also overshadowed other modernising forces at 
work in the late 1950s in Ireland.  The programme, with a vision for the next five to 
ten years, reconfigured the budget as an instrument of economic development rather 
than a process akin to the annual stocktaking in a corner shop.  Ireland would make an 
about-turn from industrialisation through import-substitution to export-led 
industrialisation via foreign direct investment.  In order to overcome resistance from 
the MacEntee-Aiken axis the programme was, uniquely, published under the name of 
a civil servant, T.K. Whitaker.  This presented the programme as the result of high-
level economic expertise rather than the policy of a mere minister, or Taoiseach.  
Strangely enough it was never discussed in detail either in Fianna Fáil or in the Dáil, 
as if economic policy was an arcane science best left to the experts.   
Though the State was deficient in policy-making centres, the Statistical and 
Social Inquiry Society of Ireland had been the only ‘think-tank’, the green shoots of 
new evidence-informed policy-making were beginning to show.  In 1959 the Irish 
National Productivity Centre, a joint employer and ICTU body, was formed to 
identify factors impeding the growth of productivity and to take steps to improve 
productivity to the benefit of Irish society as a whole.  The formation of the INPC 
reflects the growing impact of the American-influenced Organisation for European 
Economic Co-Operation (OEEC).  The OEEC emerged out of the Marshall Plan for 
European economic recovery.  Its function was to promote economic co-operation and 
integration in post-war Europe.  It encouraged liberal-democratic governments to 
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overcome social conflict in Europe through successfully managing a transition from 
economic scarcity to economic abundance.    Technocratic efficiency and not political 
struggle was the key to a better future.12  The Economic Research Institute, from 1963 
the Economic and Social Research Institute, (ESRI) was founded in 1960 by T.K. 
Whitaker with a grant from the New York-based Ford Foundation.  The ESRI was 
established as an independent research centre providing up-to-date analysis of social 
and economic data on Ireland to inform government policy-making.  The Institute of 
Public Administration (IPA) was formed in 1957 as an initiative of the Association of 
Higher Civil Servants (AHCS) along with other civil service and local government 
officers.  The IPA journal Administration, which was not for public sale, became the 
main platform for debating the role of the public service in the modernisation of the 
Irish State and society.13   The IPCS was an early and enthusiastic supporter of the 
IPA.  The high corporate membership fee entitled the Institute to a seat on the board 
of the IPA and members to a reduced fee for the courses.14    
For the scientific, professional and technical civil servants the rise of the 
technocratic State promised new vistas of responsibility and status.  Agencies such as 
An Foras Talúntais, the agricultural research centre; An Foras Forbartha, the institute 
for physical planning and construction;  Córas Tráchtála, the industrial export board 
and An Foras Tionscail, the management training institute; applied expert analysis to 
Irish problems and developed solutions that, it was expected, the State would then 
apply to Irish society.    Members of the IPCS were urged to take on the courses in 
administration so that the professional civil servants would not lose out in the 
opportunities in administrative posts that were opening up.15  It was worrying that the 
trend in civil service development seemed to be enhancing the prospects for the 
administrative at the expense of the professional officer as decision-making authority 
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continued to be concentrated in the administrative grades in what was referred to as 
the ‘Dual Structure’ of separate administrative and professional higher civil servants.  
In 1960 the Department of Finance proposed to meet a shortage in expertise in 
statistics and economics at Administrative Officer level by funding university degree 
courses for Executive Officers who would, on graduation, be promoted to AO level.  
The IPCS, not unreasonably, saw no reason why professional graduates could not be 
recruited to these administrative level posts but the Department refused to concede the 
justice of the Institute position.16   
In 1963 the Convocation of the NUI convened a symposium on ‘The Graduate 
in the Public Service’.  The IPCS was represented by the honorary secretary Colm 
O’Sullivan.  O’Sullivan delivered a gloomy report on the status and prospects of a 
graduate in engineering and science in the civil service faced with the tenacious 
conservatism of the administrative grades on promotional posts.  Mr Seán Ó h-
Éigeartaigh, of the Department of Finance, in a sharp response stated quite bluntly 
that the role of the professional civil service was to give advice and it was ‘proper that 
decisions on policy should be taken by the administrative class, whose function was 
management’.17   The dual structure of a separate professional and administrative civil 
service was deeply entrenched and was to persist in spite of its limitations and the fact 
that the standards of management within the higher civil service administrative grades 
were actually often poor.  Recognition of the reality that the changes that were 
happening in the Irish economy and society required changes in the workings of the 
public services led to the establishment of the Devlin review. 
 
The Devlin Report 
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The civil service had served the State well since independence but, while it had 
grown, it had not changed. By the 1960s the need for a more dynamic and policy-
oriented service was clearly apparent.  The persistence of departmental fragmentation 
and outmoded modes of operation in an Ireland that was fast changing gave the 
impetus to the Public Services Organisation Review Group, established in 1966.18  
The mandate of the Review Group was ‘Having regard to the growing responsibilities 
of Government, to examine and report on the organisation of the Departments of State 
at the higher levels, including the appropriate distribution of functions as between 
both Departments themselves and Departments and other bodies’.  The Review 
Group, usually referred to by the name of its chairman Liam Devlin, the chairman of 
the B&I Steamship Company, included Lieutenant-General Sir Geoffrey Thompson 
of Arthur Guinness and Co.; P. Leahy, Professor of Mechanical Engineering at UCD; 
T.J. Barrington, Director of the IPA; Dr. J.F. Dempsey, former Manager of Aer 
Lingus; Dr Thekla Beere, former secretary of the Department of Transport and Power 
and L.M. Fitzgerald, former assistant secretary of the Department of Finance.19 
 The Devlin Report, published in September 1969, recommended radical 
changes in way the government distributed its responsibilities amongst the 
departments, how policy was shaped within each department and how the higher civil 
service were recruited.  Government departmental changes that were suggested 
included combining the Departments of Lands and of Agriculture, Health with Social 
Welfare, Transport with Posts and Telegraphs to create a new Department of 
Transport and Communication, a new Department of National Culture to include the 
former Department of An Gaeltacht, and the Department of Local Government to 
devolve many of its local functions to local authorities and become a Department of 
Regional Development.  The most radical departmental change recommended was to 
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split the Department of Finance and establish a new Department of the Public Service 
with responsibility for the entire public and civil service.  Each department, it was 
recommended, should have separate staff units for planning, finance, organisation and 
personnel with frequent inter-departmental contacts at unit level. Each department 
should also have a policy-making core, termed An Airecht, composed of the minister, 
the secretary and the assistant secretaries which should be largely free of day-to-day 
execution of policy to concentrate on planning, direction and control.  The higher 
ranks of the civil service, Principal Officer and above, were to be opened up to all 
staff in an integrated system of promotion open not only to administrative but also to 
professional civil servants. 
 The immediate reaction of the IPCS to the establishment of the Review Group 
was disappointment in that the only professional in the group was Professor Leahy 
and he had no civil service experience.  Otherwise the panel was drawn from a 
managerial and administrative background.  The IPCS wrote to Jack Lynch, minister 
for finance, suggesting that the review group should be broadened by the inclusion of 
professional or technical personnel from a civil service background and urging that 
‘the role of the professional officer in the direction and management of Departments 
and the better integration of administrative and professional skills in the service of the 
State must surely be matters of major consideration for a body such as the 
Government has in mind’.20  Needless to say, the suggestion was rejected. 
The IPCS submission to the review group, delivered in October 1967, was a 
synthesis of the various branch responses.  Detailed and thorough, the submission 
concluded that ‘professional officers are being prevented from making their full 
contribution either in their own disciplines or as Civil Servants [due to] the dual 
structure of Departments in which the professional officer occupies a sub-ordinate or, 
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at best, purely advisory role to the administrative hierarchy’.  The view of the 
professional civil service, according to the IPCS submission, was that ‘the 
professional officer was more interested in getting the job done while the 
administrator appears to be more interested in getting the paperwork right’.21    
 In its oral submission the IPCS was mainly concerned to ensure that 
the career chances of the professional, technical and scientific university graduates in 
the civil service were at least as good as those of graduates in the arts and humanities.  
To achieve this objective the IPCS suggested that; 
• ‘Improved career prospects should be created by devolving more of the 
supervisory and management responsibilities in section to technical 
officers. 
• Facilities should be made available to technical officers either by 
scholarship, or by fulltime release, or apprenticeship type training to 
acquire the professional qualifications deemed essential for higher 
posts. 
• Where technical training or qualifications are essential for entry to a 
technical grade these standards must be maintained not watered down, 
and no deviation by way of ad hoc equivalents permitted’.22 
With the publication of the Devlin Report the IPCS Council appointed a sub-
committee to draft a response.  The main criticism aimed at Devlin was that the report 
offered no argument for its recommendations.  Nor did it publish the evidence 
justifying its conclusions.  This made it difficult to respond in other than a general 
reaction, but the IPCS response, whilst generally positive, showed a determination to 
defend promotional possibilities for the membership.  The response generally 
supported the suggested separation of policy-making from policy execution, provided 
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that professional and technical expertise had a presence in the formation of policy at 
the Aireacht level.  The Institution welcomed the suggested establishment of four staff 
units in each department, but expected that all officers appointed to these units would 
have professional qualifications.  The main fear of the IPCS was that the Aireacht 
would perpetuate the dual structure with the professional civil service losing out to the 
administrative grades.       
 The tendency for the professional civil servant to lose out in status and 
opportunity to the ‘all-round’ administrative grades created considerable frustration 
within the membership of the IPCS.  James Deeny, the foremost authority in what 
today would be termed ‘public health’ was appointed in 1944 as Chief Medical 
Adviser, to advise the medically-ignorant, administrative grade civil servants who in 
turn advised the minister.  In fact there was a general tendency in the Irish civil 
service to reduce experts to advisers in all fields, cutting them off from decision-
making.  The Fulton Report into the British civil service had commented on the same 
tendency and the IPCS had kept a close watch on the Fulton proceedings and 
maintained contact with the British Institution on developments in the pay and status 
of the British scientific, professional and technical officers.   
The long term damage of the policy of ‘generalist’ dominance became evident 
in the Department of Posts and Telegraphs that had responsibility for the phone 
system.  The department had plenty of engineers that saw the need for a modern 
system and could even identify what that system should be, but were powerless in the 
face of the senior administrative officers who actually ran the department.  The result, 
as any one who applied for a phone from the 1960s to the 1980s could attest, was a 
telecommunications shambles that held up economic development through the 
decades to the 1990s.  The national transport system also suffered due to the lack of 
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applied expertise in planning for future needs.  The unspoken assumption that in the 
future everyone would have a car, and therefore public transport would be for the 
poor, led to the dismantling of the railway network.    
T.J. Barrington, director of the IPA, in an article in the IPCS journal, urged the 
professional and technical officers to avail of the courses on offer in the IPA, 
anticipating that in the future the function of professional and administration would 
tend to fuse, but perhaps also recognising that the professional would have to move 
toward the administrator because movement in the reverse direction was not 
possible.23   The IPCS had given some thought to the problems that might be caused 
with promotion by merit.  Firstly, it would be difficult to define merit.  Then, if there 
was such an agreed definition there would have to be an agreed system of staff 
appraisal, definite and specified qualities required for the promotional post.  The main 
criteria for assessment would have to ‘suitability’ with due weight given to 
‘experience’, by which was meant seniority.  The Institute was not able to arrive at an 
agreed policy on the question as it began to be recognised that ‘promotion by merit’ 
was a double-edged sword.  With many technical officers now as qualified as 
professional officers promotion by merit alone may have required accepting that in 
some cases a technical officer would be promoted ahead of a professional officer or 
that a technical officer in one department could secure a promotional post in a 
different department over the heads of other similarly qualified technicians within the 
department.24  Just such a problem had developed in 1963 in the Lands Registry 
Office where a mapping draughtsman had been promoted to a post of examiner in the 
same department.  Mapping draughtsmen in other departments objected that the 
opportunity for promotion shoulsd have been opened up to those who were similarly 
qualified and who faced little or no opportunities in their own departments.25   
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The hoped breakthrough for the technocratic civil service that was embodied 
in the Devlin Report did not happen.  The government introduced an Aireacht in each 
of three departments on an experimental basis, Health, Industry and Commerce and 
Transport and Power.  However management continued to be dominated by the 
generalists and the fundamental concept of Devlin of transferring real powers from 
the minister to officials was never applied.  The IPCS sub-committee on the Devlin 
reform was scathing in its assessment of the application of the Aireacht to the 
Department of Health.  According to the Institute the logical approach would have 
been to define the objectives of the Department of Health, then set up the structures 
necessary to meet these and then solve such personnel problems as they arose, 
assuming that the numbers in the health service should fall and certainly not rise.  
Instead an additional personnel office had been created and administrastiuon had 
become an end in itself.  It was also assumed by the Institute that prevention of 
disease should be an objective of the department.  If it were, then doctors would be 
required at all levels, yet none were recruited.  The Chief Medical Officer, who 
should not be an administrative post, should carry the rank of a Deputy Secretary.  As 
it was the post of CMO would not attract a medical professional because it had no 
power nor influence and was purely advisory.26   
Few of Devlin’s recommendations were ever followed through, the 
Management Advisory Committees for each department, made up of the minister, 
secretary and assistant secretaries were created but as advisory only, and there was, 
briefly, a separate Department of the Public Services established in 1973.  However 
with little political backing and no enthusiasm within the civil service the Devlin 
Report gathered dust and public administration continued to be essentially an ad hoc 
‘fire brigade’ operation.  
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The Pay Rounds 
  The Labour Court had been created by Lemass to impose some discipline on wage 
negotiations as the Emergency controls came to an end and a wave of strikes was 
feared.  This brought all workers to the starting line for wage negotiation at the same 
time.  It also gave the Labour Court a central role in co-ordinating wage negotiations 
in which it was implicit that workers were entitled to compensation for increases in 
the cost of living..  This led to the emergence of a system of ‘wage rounds’ as the 
Labour Court brought the trade unions, the employers and associated organisations 
around the table to negotiate agreed increases year after year.  In the first series of 
wage rounds up to 1955 the trade union side looked for compensation for the increase 
in the cost of living since the previous round and so increases tended to be very 
similar across all wages and salaries.  Trade unions would wait for the lead to be set, 
usually by the skilled workers, and then follow on with a claim for similar increases.  
Thus the termination date of each round tended to extend by several months across 
industries and sectors.    
The 1960s were a period of rising expectations and increased confidence.  
Wage trends were set increasingly by the clerical and skilled workers, many of them 
in the public sector, who used strikes to force the rate upwards.  A feature of the 
1960s was the increasing militancy of white-collar workers in RTE, Aer Lingus, the 
ESB and in local government.27  In 1959 all workers won generally similar increases 
in the seventh round increase.  In 1960 groups of clerical workers, led in the main by 
the ESB officers and electricians in the public sector, negotiated a seventh round 
increase substantially in excess of the trend.  Added to this were general demands for 
a five-day week, a forty-hour week and additional fringe benefits.  In 1963, after the 
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failure to secure entry to the European Economic Community and with a widening 
gap between national income and expenditure, the government published a White 
Paper Closing the Gap.  The White Paper signalled that the government would no 
longer be playing a passive role in wage negotiation.  It proposed to limit future wage 
rises to increases in productivity and announced an immediate halt to all claims for 
increase in the public sector, which it was feared had become a trend setter in the 
wage rounds.  To meet the rising cost of the public service and to meet the alarming 
gap in government finances James Ryan, the Minister for Finance, introduced a 2.5 
per cent turnover tax on sales and services which of course added to the cost of living.   
In response to the level of opposition that came from ICTU, with which 
Fianna Fáil had been developing a close relationship, Lemass announced a shift to the 
left in national policy promising government intervention to convert economic 
progress into social progress.  Lemass was still hoping to ease the inflationary 
pressures that were developing in the economy but realistically could no longer hope 
to achieve a halt to wage increases.  Instead, in November 1962, he suggested a new 
system of national wage negotiation that would keep expectations within the limits of 
national production.  The new National Industrial and Economic Council (NIEC), on 
which trade unions and employers had representation, would report regularly on the 
national economy and provide objective assessments of the potential for wage 
increases.  In December 1963 after uneasy negotiations between ICTU and FUE 
delegations agreement was reached on a twelve per cent increase to run for two years 
from 1964 in the ninth round.  The twelve per cent was seen as a very high figure, but 
was accepted as the cost of a guarantee for industrial peace.   It was hoped that this, 
the first national wage recommendation, signalled that a new era of planned, rational 
wage negotiation on a national basis had arrived, in fact an agreed incomes policy. 
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An inflationary rise in prices developed between 1963 and 1965 which, it was 
alleged, was started by the unprecedented twelve per cent increase conceded in the 
ninth  round national recommendation. Workers were uneasy as inflation eroded the 
twelve per cent increase and the terms of the agreement prevented any return to 
negotiations until the  middle of 1966.  Building workers were also told that their 
demand for a forty-hour week would have to wait.  In 1964 a two-month strike by 
workers in the building sector in pursuit of the forty-hour week almost wrecked the 
national agreement.  Concessions were finally forced on the reluctant employers by 
Jack Lynch, Minister for Industry and Commerce.  Paddy Smith, Minister for 
Agriculture resigned, protesting that the government had capitulated to trade union 
dictatorship.28   
In 1965, against a background of strikes and threatened strikes, ICTU and 
employers failed to negotiate a new national agreement.  Instead an ICTU suggestion 
of a maximum increase of £1 was quickly endorsed by the Labour Court and became 
the minimum of the 1966 tenth round.  White-collar workers now began to set the 
pace as they showed an uncharacteristic militancy in pursuit of status, promotion and 
higher pay.  Industrial relations declined further as the bank officials went on a three 
month strike from May 1966 and a strike in the ESB threatened power supplies.  As 
economic growth slowed down the government abandoned the Second Programme for 
Economic Expansion and launched a less ambitious Third Programme to run from 
1968 to 1970.   
The 1968 eleventh round wage negotiation was a new model.  A two year 
comprehensive agreement covering 1967 and 1968 gave up to £2 increase per week in 
phases.  As the end date of the agreement approached new demands for future 
increases were prepared.  Strikes by electricians in November 1968 and maintenance 
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craftsmen in April 1969 gave a lead in the settlement terms which was followed by 
other unions and led to 1969-70 twelfth round increases in the order of £4 a week over 
eighteen months in two or three phases.  As a consequence of unions waiting for 
leading agreements to emerge before entering their own demands the start and finish 
date for the twelfth round stretched over the June to December 1971 period.  The 
twelfth round increases in the private sector were the largest since 1945 and were 
unlikely to be won by the civil service without struggle.  
By 1970 national production had dropped to 2 per cent and economic growth 
was grinding to a halt.  Inflation was running at 8 per cent, nullifying the gains being 
made in the pay rounds.  The Irish economy had been transformed but the provision 
of social services and housing had not kept pace.  Disenchantment with the whole 
concept of economic and social planning, which had fuelled an expanding public 
sector, set in.  The ‘rising tide’ that Lemass had predicted would lift all boats was 
going out and large sections of Irish society were left stranded.29 
 
The Pay Rounds and the IPCS 
The civil service had used the conciliation and arbitration scheme to maintain 
pace with the increases being won at the Labour Court.  This meant that the civil 
service organisations would wait until a trend had emerged at the Labour Court and 
then seek a similar rise.  In 1955 the minister accepted the civil service staff side 
panel request that the fifth round increase won by workers generally should be 
extended to the civil service.  In 1957 the staff side, again in response to the general 
claim being pursued by the trade unions, returned with a demand for a rise of 7.5 per 
cent with a minimum of 10/- for the civil service.30   The acceptance of the principle 
of compensatory pay increases in response to the rise in the cost of living allowed the 
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IPCS to concentrate on pursuing increases in salary scales attached to particular posts.  
In 1960, in addition to securing a general award for all civil servants, the IPCS 
secured substantial additional increases for the government statisticians and the 
meteorological officers in a revision of their pay scales.  These were then used to 
build a case for comparable increases in analogous posts.31   
In 1961 the civil service staff panel (on which the IPCS now had three seats 
out of twenty-five) secured increases that represented an advance in living standards 
and civil servants could feel that they were now not just retaining existing benefits in 
negotiations on pay, but participating in the improvements in the national economy.  
A notable feature of the 1961 round was that although all the civil service 
organisations negotiated separately for their members the start date for the increases 
would be the same for all, regardless of when agreement was reached.  These 
successes reflected the work put into the thirty-seven separate conciliation claims 
were pursued at the sixteen meetings between the Department of Finance and the 
General Staff Panel as well as the eleven claims pursued at the arbitration board.  As 
these claims were on behalf of grades that spanned women cleaners to the Resident 
Medical Officer at Mountjoy Prison the staff side negotiators could see advances in 
pay and conditions being won on many fronts.  From the mid-1960s claims were no 
longer being based on the increase in the cost of living but rather on status, 
comparability with analogous employment, or improved national productivity.  
Because each grade and profession had to pursue their own negotiations the IPCS 
officers had an increasing burden of work.  Their successes however enthused the 
members and attracted more into the Institute  32  
In 1964 success in winning the general increase of 12 per cent up to the 
Higher Executive Officer level was followed by a successful campaign to win similar 
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increases for the higher grades so as to avoid compression in salary levels.  The 
Institute also won a five-day week with Saturday work being treated as overtime.33  
These increases were won was in the aftermath of the failed first application to join 
the EEC and the government threat of a pay freeze implied in Closing the Gap.  The 
1964 national pay round agreement contained a clause permitting special 
circumstantial claims in excess of the national agreement.  In April 1965 the ESB 
clerical officers won a further ten per cent increase based on ‘status’ comparability.  
Clerical workers in the Port and Docks Board immediately followed the lead of the 
ESB.  In response the government established the Quinn Tribunal to investigate the 
work and pay levels of clerical workers across the public and civil service and 
establish an absolute level of pay for clerical workers.  Gerard Quinn was a Barrister-
at-Law and a lecturer in economics at UCD.  Others on the tribunal were Mr E.J. 
Grey, secretary to the Bank Staffs’ Relations Committee, Charles McCarthy of the 
Vocational Teachers’ Association, with Cathal O’Shannon and J.S. Quigley of the 
Labour Court.  The ultimate target of the government was not in fact the clerical 
officers pay claims but the conciliation and arbitration scheme which facilitated those 
claims.  In the Dáil  debate establishing the Quinn tribunal the Minister for Finance, 
Jack Lynch, referred to the leapfrogging of pay claims which was facilitated by the 
many different arbitration claims determining pay in the public and civil service all 
operating independently of each other with no co-ordination, consistency or finality.  
It was his wish to enlarge the Labour Court so as to bring the civil service arbitration 
board into its remit and make the Court responsible for all wage and salary claims.34  
Although it did not directly affect the members of the IPCS the questioning of the 
conciliation and arbitration scheme was worrying.35   
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In the 1968 ‘10th round’ the IPCS reluctantly accepted the ICTU suggestion of 
a flat increase of £1 a week as a general pay settlement.  There was a fear that by 
allowing an outside body negotiate an increase, the hard-won scheme of conciliation 
and arbitration was being emasculated.  Agreement did also mean that the IPCS did 
not have to pursue individual grade by grade claims, which was proving an exhausting 
process.36  In the 1969 ‘11th round’ negotiations the government for the first time 
introduced restrictive clauses into the civil service pay agreements which were 
designed to use the public service, in particular the clerical officers, as a brake rather 
than a pace setter on general pay levels.  This undermined the IPCS pay strategy 
which had always been to let the major industrial employers of professionals and the 
senior levels in the banks set the pace.  The Oireachtas also passed the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1969 [14/1969] which allowed that the Labour Court could appoint 
two of its members to arbitration board hearings in cases relating to the civil and 
public service.  It was expected that the two Labour Court members would agree with 
the official side in denying any claim that seemed to be mere “me too” leapfrogging.   
The twelfth round agreement saw an historic initiative within the public 
service negotiation strategy.  For the first time a small committee drawn from the 
Public Services Committee of Congress negotiated an agreement for the entire public 
service.  The committee was made up of the general secretaries of most of the civil 
service and public sector trade unions and associations, thus creating a forum in which 
these full-time officials could begin to develop a joint strategy and vision for the 
whole of the public service.  The concept of the public sector negotiating as a single 
unit had been raised at an ICTU seminar in November 1969, shortly after IPCS joined 
Congress.  The twelfth round agreement was negotiated between April and July 1970 
and agreed by the whole of the public service in August.   
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The National Wages Agreements 1970-1972 
In April 1970, just as the public service twelfth round negotiations began, the NIEC 
report no. 27 ‘An Incomes and Prices Policy’ offered a gloomy analysis of the 
national economy and the forces of inflation that were at work in it.  As the NIEC had 
representatives of both employers and trade unions it was assumed that there was an 
agreement that inflation in the economy was getting out of control.  The NIEC 
recommended that the employers, the trade unions and the government (as an 
employer) should use that measure of agreement to negotiate a single national 
agreement.  The government established the Employer-Labour Conference (ELC) as a 
national forum for the discussion and review of all major industrial relation problems, 
pay determination and related problems in the context of the current economic 
realities, with the government joining the ELC as an employer.  The main task of the 
conference was wage negotiation, and especially to stop the emerging practice of 
leap-frogging in wage rounds as early agreements were surpassed by later.  In the 
background to these negotiations was the banking strike that closed the Irish banks 
from April to November.  The failure of the ELC to agree a wages standstill led the 
Fianna Fáil government (then riven by the Arms Crisis) to introduce in October a 
Prices and Incomes Bill ‘to regulate, restrict or prohibit increases in wages, salaries, 
and other remuneration’.  The Bill set out a six per cent increase in all forms of 
earnings as maximum that would be allowed by the law.37  Debated through the 
month of November, its passing was the signal for renewed negotiation within the 
ELC leading to an agreement in mid-December.  With agreement at the ELC the 
government withdrew the Bill, largely because it has served its purpose as a big stick, 
and the carrot of an agreed national increase would be at least as successful as an 
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imposed ceiling.  The government had achieved an incomes policy by negotiation and 
not legislation.38   
 The 1971 ‘thirteenth round’ national wages agreement was negotiated within 
the ELC by ICTU and employers and approved by a Special Delegate Conference of 
Congress.  It provided for an eighteen month agreement with pay increases in two 
phases.  An initial phase of twelve months and second phase of six months.  The first 
phase in the public service gave an across-the-board increase of £2 with the second 
phase giving a four per cent increase for six months.  The second phase was linked to 
the rate of inflation and offered a 1 per cent increase for each percentage increase in 
the Consumer Price Index over 4 per cent.  The combination of lump sum increase 
followed by a percentage increase was an attempt to meet the problem of the lowly 
paid who tended to lose out in percentage deals.  The IPCS members, which had 
members from the lowest point to the highest point of civil service pay scales, saw 
this as particularly attractive.   The guarantee for compensation for inflation contained 
in the second phase was regarded as the most valuable provision in the agreement as it 
shifted pressure onto the employers and government to contain price increases below 
the four per cent level.  Any outstanding ‘12th round’ comparability and status claims 
were to be assessed by an independent authority and, if genuine, processed by the 
normal conciliation and arbitration process or by the Labour Court.  The 13th round 
also had, in clause six provision for the pursuit of ‘genuine anomalies’ in pay 
differentials which of course begged the question as to what might an anomaly that 
was not ‘genuine’ look like.   Industrial peace was guaranteed by Congress agreeing 
that the trade unions would not enter into a strike or other form of industrial action in 
support of claims for increases in excess of the agreed amounts.39          
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By early 1972, with the national agreement due to end on 30 June, the 
government began to open discussions on a new agreement.  These discussions took 
place against a background of power cuts in the ESB due to an authorised strike by 
the shift workers and a relativity claim by the teachers’ unions who were seeking 
parity with a recent 10 per cent award to Higher Executive Officers in the civil 
service.  A proposed agreement was negotiated with better provision for the lower 
paid and progress toward equal pay for women.  The IPCS joined in the ICTU 
discussions but argued against a new agreement unless it contained a clause that 
would facilitate special awards to the public service.40  The new agreement was 
rejected by Congress in May, but then a new pay pact with some revisions was agreed 
in July.  This, the second national wage agreement, gave a phased increase over 
seventeen months.  The IPCS was against both the April and July agreements because 
wage controls had not been applied to professional fees and the logical 
accompaniment to wage controls, price controls, had not been applied nor was there 
any real progress toward equal pay for equal work.41  But the IPCS was opposed 
mainly because it was now beginning to doubt the wisdom of  centralised bargaining.  
There was also the view that ICTU executive, when presented by a ‘take it or leave it’ 
offer by government and employers, was too quick to take it.42  The 1972 National 
Wages Agreement pushed the fixed date for its termination to the end of September 
1974.  This of itself was a disadvantage to the civil service but a further disadvantage 
was that it was coupled to an explicit clause which linked special claims on regradings 
or restructuring to productivity, which were very difficult for the professional and 
technical officer.43   
The 1972 ‘fourteenth round’ agreement built on the pattern established by the 
1970 agreement.  Ratified by Congress on 28 July 1972 it had once again a duration 
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of eighteen months with two phases of increases lasting twelve months and six 
months.  The first phase was 9 per cent on the first £30 of basic pay with guaranteed 
minimum increases, 7.5 per cent on the next £10 and 4 per cent on the remainder.44  
The fourteenth round reflected the general satisfaction with the concept of a national 
agreement.  For the government it provided stability in industrial relations.  For the 
employers it provided predictability in wage and salary levels along with industrial 
peace.  For the trade unions it centralised negotiations, cemented solidarity across the 
entire movement and enhanced the status of Congress in Irish society.  It also marks 
the emerging leading role being taken by the Public Services Committee of Congress 
in formulating pay strategy. 
 
The IPCS and the Association of Higher Civil Servants 
The process of conciliation and arbitration along with affiliation to Congress brought 
to a head rivalries between the Institute and the Association of Higher Civil Servants 
as to which organisation would represent the higher paid professional officers.  The 
AHCS was formed in 1943 in response to the Emergency Wages Standstill Order 
which imposed the ‘supercut’ on the higher levels of the civil service.  A circular 
letter on the need to organise a response was issued to all higher civil servants above 
the rank of Higher Executive Officer by R.H. White of the IPCS, M.F. Hogan of the 
Customs and Excise Controlling Grades Association, P.J. Murray of the Association 
of Inspectors of Taxes, and E.D Lenihan of the Customs and Excise Surveyors’ 
Association.  Out of that letter, and a meeting held on 30 April 1943, the AHCS was 
established to ‘safeguard the interests and promote the welfare of the members’.  
Membership was open to ‘all Grades in the General Service above the Higher 
Executive Grade and to corresponding Departmental Grades as determined by the 
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Council’.45  It was initially therefore a response of members of existing organisations 
to an injustice being foisted on their member who were in senior ranks of the higher 
civil service.  The AHCS, once established, continued as an organisation to fight for 
the restoration of the Emergency cuts. The IPCS was however unique in that it alone 
of the AHCS founders had membership both above and below the rank of HEO.        
 Because of the shared membership the conciliation and arbitration scheme 
complicated the relationship between the IPCS and the AHCS .  After the 
establishment of the1949 scheme the AHCS represented civil servants above the rank 
of Higher Executive Officer up to the level of Assistant Secretary who were excluded 
by the upper salary limit from the conciliation and arbitration scheme.  The AHCS 
secured facilities for access at the departmental level where problems arose for the 
higher civil servants that were of general service application.  The AHCS also had a 
right of access to the Minister for Finance personally where matters at issue were, in 
his opinion, of sufficient importance to warrant such a meeting.  The IPCS secured 
recognition as the organisation representing professional and technical  civil servants, 
although many of these were on salaries that were above the conciliation and 
arbitration scheme cut-off level.  Thus many professional, scientific and technical 
civil servants on a higher grade had dual representation as a member of both the 
AHCS and the IPCS.  The informal practice agreed between the AHCS and IPCS was 
that where a professional, scientific or technical civil servant on a senior grade had a 
problem that was considered of general application it was dealt with by the AHCS but 
where it was a problem peculiar to his or her grade then it was dealt with by the IPCS.    
In the 1952 revised scheme MacEntee insisted that only one staff association 
would be recognised for any particular grade of civil servant for the purposes of 
representation, whether or not the grade had access to the scheme.  The AHCS 
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application for recognition of the senior grades was rejected because some of the 
grades were already recognised by other associations, including the IPCS.  Waldron 
of the AHCS met with Went of the IPCS and they agreed informally to suggest to 
their respective organisations and to the Department of Finance that dual recognition 
should be offered whereby the AHCS would represent the general service interests of 
the higher professional officers whilst the IPCS would represent their departmental 
and professional interests.  This was rejected by the IPCS council who feared that the 
Department of Finance would refuse to discuss professional salaries with them as a 
general service question.  This question was also being raised by the Association of 
Surveyors of Customs and Excise and by the Association of Inspectors of Taxes.  The 
Department of Finance refused to get involved in the discussions.  A compromise was 
eventually agreed whereby the IPCS had a member co-opted onto the council of the 
AHCS, the AHCS sought recognition for the purposes of representation on all matters 
affecting higher civil servants generally, and ‘generally’ was defined by the 
associations as any matter affecting equally all classes of higher civil servant but not 
covering professional pay or departmental scales.46   
 The AHCS was generally successful in having the ‘supercut’ restored in the 
course of the 1950s and in having the terms of the pay rounds applied as a matter of 
course to the higher levels of the civil service.  Significant progress was also made on 
a widows and orphans scheme for the higher civil service.  The AHCS made a 
submission to the Devlin Review Group on behalf of the higher civil service.  In all 
these discussion the IPCS had a representative on the AHCS negotiating team.  This 
working relationship began to breakdown in the 1960s due mainly to competition for 
the senior positions that were beginning to open up in the expanding public service.  
The conflict of interests was brought to a head by the opening up to an inter-
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departmental competition of the vacant position of Deputy Controller of Stores, 
Department of Posts and Telegraphs.  This post was considered equivalent to an 
assistant principal in the Department of Finance.  The AHCS protested that the 
position had traditionally been filled by promotion within the Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs.  The IPCS, correctly, saw the AHCS position as being in direct conflict 
with interests of the IPCS membership for whom open competition for senior 
positions was the only avenue to the higher grades.47   
A further problem arose which was directly due to the working relationship 
that the IPCS and the AHCS had themselves constructed.  This related to the so-called 
‘straddling grades’ of professional civil servants whose salary scales began below but 
extended above the HEO level.  The AHCS had a strict membership policy that 
excluded these officers.  Because the AHCS had recognition for discussions on 
general questions, which included salary levels, but refused to accept the ‘straddling 
grades’ these officers were effectively left without representation.48   
The AHCS added to the tension by canvassing all the professional and 
technical senior civil servants for their agreement to deduction at source of their 
subscription to the Association.  This was interpreted by the IPCS as an attempt to 
poach its members.  In a ‘full and frank’ exchange of views the IPCS argued that it 
should have sole right to represent all professional and technical officers because 
lacking the right to negotiate directly with the Department of Finance on general 
issues damages the prestige of the Institute; that officers in professional grades should 
not have dual membership; that the IPCS had no way of ensuring that the professional 
members of the AHCS represent properly the point of view of the Institute and the 
AHCS primarily represents the view of the general service administrative classes 
which is antagonistic the interests of the professional and technical grades.49  The 
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AHCS argued that acceptance of the IPCS position would mean effectively its 
disbandment and would advertise the conflict of interest amongst civil grades at a 
time when the Devlin Group investigation demanded the maximum emphasis on unity 
and the general interest.   For an individual professional civil servant the difficulty 
with the IPCS was that it was organised departmentally and therefore his or her 
representative may well be on a lower grade with little sympathy for the higher paid 
officer.  However it was very successful in creating an esprit de corps amongst the 
professional and technical civil servants and successfully represented them regardless 
of grade.  The AHCS on the other hand was organised by grade and all professional 
civil servants in the Association were represented by higher grade civil servants.  It 
however would not represent any civil servant, including professional and technical 
officers, below the grade of Higher Executive Officer.  The question therefore was 
which organisation best represented the interest of the professional, scientific and 
technical civil service and whether they were professionals who happened to work in 
the civil service or whether they were civil servants who happened to be 
professionals.50    
In February 1972 the IPCS applied to the Department of Finance for separate 
recognition in respect of professional grades.  The Department, not surprisingly, 
replied that ‘as the question of recognition was originally settled by mutual agreement 
between the AHCS and IPCS the Minister would prefer any alteration to be made the 
same way’.51  The IPCS then circulated branches instructing them to gather the 
signatures of any professional and technical civil servants who wished to be 
represented by the IPCS.52  However both the Minister and the AHCS remained 
unmoved.  The matter was not finally resolved until 1984 and the institution of a 
conciliation and arbitration scheme for Certain Higher Grades above those covered by 
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the main scheme and below the grade of Assistant Secretary.  The Staff Side Panel 
compromised the AHCS (six seats) the UPTCS (four seats) and the Veterinary 
Officers’ Association (two seats).  The new scheme thus confirmed UPTCS as 
holding exclusive recognition for all the professional and technical grades.53 
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A painful transition: 1973-1981 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1973 was a watershed year marking a transition from the optimism of the 
1960s to  a sense of  national crisis and self-doubt that was to last into the mid-1990s.  
Events that formed this watershed were entry to the European Economic Community, 
the violence in Northern Ireland that threatened to spill over the border into the Irish 
republic and the oil crises of 1973 and 1979.  
 
The EEC referendum 
A special conference of Congress held in January 1972 voted to oppose entry 
to the EEC in the forthcoming referendum.  This posed some difficulties for the IPCS 
that felt the role of the trade union movement was to protect the interests of the 
membership in whatever circumstances emerged from the referendum.  It was also the 
case that a civil service trade union would have difficulties in taking a public position 
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in opposition to government in a referendum. What was required, in the view of the 
IPCS, was information on terms and conditions on employment within the EEC and to 
let the members decide how to vote based on that information.  It was agreed that the 
newsletter of the Institute would carry both sides of the argument and to join in any 
campaign to ensure the public was fully informed on all the implications of joining 
the EEC.  Clearly the NEC was in fact in favour of joining the Community and 
decided not to circulate the Congress anti-EEC news sheet.  The motion in favour of 
joining the EEC was proposed by the Executive and Higher Officers’ Association at 
Congress.  The IPCS delegates were free to vote whatever way they wished.  The 
IPCS News of March- April was a special issue on the EEC debate which was in fact 
a case for the Yes vote.  On the first of January 1973, following the vote in favour, 
Ireland became a full member of the Community.  This was the final act in the 
opening up of Ireland to a wider world that had been initiated by the 1959 Programme 
for Economic Expansion.    
Entry to Europe marked a dramatic shift of focus for all civil servants involved 
in policy-making.  Previously civil servants were habituated to look to London for 
comparisons in any policy investigation.  Now they began to learn on the European 
stage, establishing contact with fellow policy analysts from across the European 
community.  New areas of policy also emerged as European directives shaped not 
only economic and agricultural policy but also began to drive new areas of concern in 
environmental and social policy, including an equality agenda.1   
With Ireland’s entry to the EEC the IPCS turned its attention to the 
implications of membership and identified the important issues affecting the 
members.  It was recognised that the economic community would evolve toward a 
political community, which would have long-term implications for the civil service 
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generally.  For the professional civil service the harmonisation of qualifications across 
the community also had implications to which attention would have to be directed.  
The general tone of the IPCS was however positive, even excited, as the EEC 
promised an expansion of horizons and wider experience which could only benefit the 
professional civil servant.2   
In November 1973 M.J. Barry, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, 
met with a delegation of the agricultural officers in the IPCS to review the 
implications of Ireland joining the EEC.  Explaining that a European Directive had the 
same force of law as an enactment by the Dáil , Secretary Barry made it clear the 
European farm modernisation scheme, beef scheme and sheep and lamb scheme 
would all mean that new methods and structures would have to be adopted by the 
Agricultural Officers, even though he was not too clear what these would be.3 
In 1972 the Institute affiliated to the International Federation of Employees in 
Public Service (INFEDOP) and to the European Federation of Public Service 
Employees (EUROFEDOP).4  INFEDOP was founded in 1953 as a Christian trade 
union movement of employees in the public services sector.  The foundation of 
INFEDOP reflects the Cold War influence on trade union development in the 1950s 
and the AFL-CIO role in encouraging non-political trade unions and introducing 
American concepts of productivity bargaining rather than shop floor confrontation.  
EUROFEDOP was a regional grouping of INFEDOP that promoted the interests of 
public employees across Europe.   Both were affiliated to the World Confederation of 
Labour, formerly the International Christian Federation, which was explicitly 
committed to expressing Christian principles in the world of labour relations.  The 
attraction to the IPCS was that these bodies seemed to be ideologically neutral and 
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devoted exclusively to gathering and disseminating information on European trends in 
pay and conditions for public service workers.5 
 
Northern Ireland 
In Northern Ireland the ‘Troubles’ escalated as 1972 saw the prorogation of  Stormont 
in March and the beginning of direct rule.  There was some optimism in 1973 as the 
Sunningdale Agreement promised a fresh beginning in a power-sharing executive and 
a north-south Council of Ireland, but in May 1974 the Ulster Workers’ Council strike 
swept away the power-sharing executive and with it any optimism for the future of 
Northern Ireland.  The Institute had to be careful in its reaction to the developing 
crisis in Northern Ireland and be always mindful of the difficulties of the government.  
A voluntary collection in aid of the victims of the violence collected £2,061 in aid of 
the Ballymurphy Family Adoption Fund, Internees Dependents Relief Fund and the 
Ardoyne Housing Committee.  As these organisations were largely dominated by 
republicans, the IPCS asked John Hume, Cardinal Conway of the Catholic church and 
Archbishop George Otto Simms of the Church of Ireland to take charge of the funds.6 
 
 
Changes in Government 1973-1981 
Encouraged by popular support for entry to the EEC, which he mistook as support for 
his government, Jack Lynch dissolved the nineteenth Dáil  and called a general 
election for 28 February.  Fine Gael, led by Liam Cosgrave and Labour, led by 
Brendan Corish, fought and won the election as a coalition.  The presence of five 
Labour ministers in the coalition cabinet and a government programme that promised 
greater emphasis on the expansion of social rights and greater equality in Irish society 
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suggested that the historic neglect of social issues in government policies was going 
to be redressed.  Entry to the EEC transferred to Brussels the subsidisation of Irish 
agriculture which was an enormous burden on the Irish exchequer, thus freeing up 
Irish revenues for the promised social services.          
The Minister for Finance was Richie Ryan of Fine Gael.  Elected as TD for 
Dublin South-West and primarily interested in Europe, Ryan had little experience in 
finance.  Added to his responsibilities was the new Department of the Public Service, 
one of the early initiatives of the coalition.7  The new department was introduced as 
being a further step in the PSORG recommended reforms.  Devlin had a vision of a 
single public service in which there would be a free flow of talent through local 
authorities, the semi-state sector and the civil service.  However Minister Ryan made 
it clear that the Department of the Public Service would continue to be under the 
Minister of Finance and, despite its title, would deal only with the civil service.8  Its 
main function was to act as an arm of the Department of Finance concentrating on 
civil service pay negotiations.  It proved successful in frustrating the civil service 
unions and clogging the conciliation and arbitration scheme by simply cancelling 
meetings, over-riding departmental proposals and creating log-jams in the arbitration 
stage.9  It was eventually wound up in 1981. 
The coalition was singularly unlucky in coming to power just as the oil crisis 
plunged the country into recession and the government faced dealing with a mounting 
deficit.  The 1973 oil crisis had a doubly catastrophic effect on world economies as 
the rise in the cost of energy had an immediate global impact on prices whilst the 
suppression in demand for goods, as more and money was spent on energy, led to a 
fall in economic activity.  The combination of inflation in the cost of energy with 
deflation in demand for goods and services led to the new phenomenon of 
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‘stagflation’.  Though it is debatable to what extent the 1973 oil crisis was the cause 
or the final blow to the post-war economic order that was crumbling, it does mark to 
moment when the long period of post-war economic growth came to an end and the 
world entered a sustained economic recession.  The high cost of policing and security 
in response to the escalating violence in Northern Ireland added to the narrowing 
budgetary options for the coalition.   
In 1972 the Fianna Fáil Minister for Finance, George Colley had borrowed to 
balance the current budget, thus breaching the axiom of governments borrowing for 
development only.  This was justified as opting for ‘growth rather than stability’.  
Anticipating that the oil crisis and the soaring costs of energy was a temporary 
setback, Ryan continued to expand public spending, partly to honour the social 
commitments of the coalition and also as a form of pump-priming of the economy in 
order to maintain employment and living standards.  This led to a rise in the public 
sector borrowing requirement from 8.6 per cent in 1972-3 to 12.9 per cent in 1976-7.  
Some new taxes were introduced to finance this expansion but deficit spending 
continued.  Low interest rates made this affordable.  In mid-term Ryan began to rein 
back on public spending and national indebtedness began to fall.10   
The 1977 election campaign by Fianna Fáil was blatant auction politics that 
bid to win the favour of the electorate.  Prices had almost doubled during the coalition 
government and living standards of the working class had declined.  The promise of 
an end to car tax, local rates on houses and cuts in income tax was irresistible to the 
middle class and Fianna Fáil was returned with an unprecedented majority of twenty 
seats in the Dáil.11  George Colley as Minister for Finance brought in a budget that 
could not have got it more wrong.  He combined substantial tax cuts, including the 
abolition of the coalition wealth tax and local rates, with an expansion in public 
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spending that was financed by even greater borrowing.  The abolition of rates 
undermined local government and began the erosion of the quality of regional 
governance in Ireland that has persisted to today.   
The architect of this policy was the academic economist Martin O’Donoghue 
who was appointed to be the new Minister for Economic Planning and Development 
on his first day in the Dáil.  With the failure of the Second and Third Programmes for 
Economic Development planning had gone out of fashion.12  The Fianna Fáil 
economic strategy was set out in a White Paper National Development 1977-80.  It 
was hoped that the private sector would expand in response to a massive pump-
priming stimulus.13  It was an extraordinary gamble, but gambling requires good luck 
and luck was running out for the Irish economy.   
The transition phase of entry to the EEC was coming to an end and the 
benefits to Irish agriculture were diminishing.  Joining the European Monetary 
System (EMS) in 1979 ended the so-called ‘Green Pound’ devaluations which had 
been a windfall for Irish agriculture.  European food over-production was exhausting 
the community budget and increasing pressure to cut prices and supports to farmers. 
In 1979 the revolution in Iran provoked a second oil crisis that sent both the cost of 
energy and the exchequer deficit soaring.  Speeches were now all about the urgent 
need to reduce the public sector borrowing requirement.  That could only mean cuts in 
the numbers of the public service and a curtailment of the services offered by the 
state.  In 1979 Jack Lynch resigned as leader of Fianna Fáil and in the election to 
succeed him George Colley, not for the first time, misjudged his support and lost out 
to Charles Haughey.  Fianna Fáil was to remain deeply riven for the next twelve years 
by factional struggles around the leadership of Haughey, his vindictive attitude to 
those who disagreed with him, his use of state power to award his friends, and his 
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amoral attitude to financial probity at a personal level.  In 1980  Haughey (betraying 
no sense of the ironic) went on television to lecture the nation on the folly of living 
beyond our means.  He sacked Martin O’Donoghue, abolished his department and 
proposed cuts in public services and in public sector borrowing.  A Taoiseach who 
bought his shirts in Paris was prescribing a hairshirt for the people.  
Feeling perhaps that his political options were running out Haughey dissolved 
the Dáil on 21 May (two weeks after the death of the hunger-striker Bobby Sands and 
one week after the death of the second hunger-striker Francis Hughes) and called the 
election for 11 June, the shortest campaign permitted by the constitution.  The 
leadership of the opposition had changed since the last election.  Liam Cosgrave was 
replaced as leader of Fine Gael by Garret Fitzgerald and Brendan Corish resigned 
from the leadership of Labour to be replaced by Frank Cluskey.  Though no formal 
coalition deal was announced both parties urged supporters to continue their 
preferences to the other party in an anti-Fianna Fáil vote.  Frank Cluskey lost his seat 
but the new Labour leader Michael O’Leary agreed a coalition government with 
Fitzgerald, who was elected Taoiseach on 26 June with the support of Labour and 
some independents in what was in fact a hung Dáil.14 
 
Planning for the future 
Most unions expand by simply recruiting additional numbers of the same kind of 
worker. By the 1970s the IPCS was expanding by recruiting entirely new sorts of 
members as the expansion of the State created new sorts of professional and technical 
expertise. By the mid-1970s membership had grown to 4,260 in 125 technical grades 
representing 2,578 members and 197 professional grades representing 1,682 
members.  Though 60 per cent of the membership the Institute was now in fact 
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technical and not professional, of the 322 grades for which the IPCS held recognition 
only 30 per cent were technical, the rest professional.  The rapid expansion in 
membership was mainly in new technical grades.  The Institute was finding it difficult 
to absorb and service the entirely new groups of grades with unfamiliar staffing 
structures.  Many of these were science graduates in technical posts working 
alongside non-civil service staffs in industrial workplaces.  The Department of 
Finance, with little research, sanctioned the creation of new technical posts which 
became one-person grades with no clear promotional structure or linkage to existing 
grades, leaving it up to the IPCS to argue a case.  These new grades often posed 
incompatible, and sometimes opposed, interests and considerable time had to be 
invested in intra-grade consultation to minimise friction in negotiation with the 
official side.  At the same time members awareness of trade unionism raised 
expectations of what could be achieved.  These expectations were increased by each 
success chalked up by the Institute.  Members demanded more action on claims that 
might be poorly argued.  Subsequent failure led to frustration and demands for better 
service. 
 There was also a feeling that the Institute was not making as significant 
contribution in the wider world in issues of concern.  Though the Institute had joined 
Congress its contribution to the Public Services Committee was not as significant as it 
ought to have been and though the value of the IPCS promoting candidates to the 
ICTU executive was recognised the time and commitment required to a successful 
campaign to get on to the Congress executive was not forthcoming.  Membership of 
the IPA was not being utilised fully and the contacts with the NIPSA in Northern 
Ireland and with the IPCS in England that would be of great value were not being 
developed.  The IPCS along with the other civil service unions was failing to counter 
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the hostile press reports which featured on a regular basis in contemporary analysis of 
economic problems.  Trade unions generally were also offering a more sophisticated 
level of service to members including discounts on insurance and legal and financial 
advice.  Clearly, if the IPCS was going to grow and become a leader in civil service 
trade unionism it needed to modernise.15 
 
A New Constitution 
In January 1972 a new constitution for the IPCS, adopted at a special delegate 
conference in April 1971, came into effect.16  Membership of the IPCS was open to 
any non-industrial civil servant, established, unestablished or temporary, engaged in 
professional, scientific, technical or specialist work.  The aims of the IPCS were 
declared to be to protect, promote, assert and defend the rights of its members; to 
maintain and improve the status of its members; to promote scientific knowledge and 
to promote efficiency in the Civil Service.  The supreme authority of the Institute was 
the Annual Delegate Conference (ADC), with each branch sending delegates to the 
conference, the number of delegates related to the size of the branch.  The ADC heard 
the annual report and financial statement; recommended action on, or rejected, 
motions proposed by the branches; and elected the honorary officers along with 
twelve members of the National Executive Committee (NEC).  The NEC, elected 
under PR by the delegates, replaced the former standing committee and was 
responsible for running the Institute from year to year.  The authority of the NEC 
derived from the ADC whilst the constitution gave it wide power.  The post of 
President became honorific, offered to those who had made a long and significant 
contribution to the IPCS, with the Chairman of the NEC now acting as the 
representative and governing authority of the Institute.  The work of the NEC was 
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analysed and grouped under the heads of administration and organisation, 
relationships with other organisations, negotiations, and inquiries into the civil service 
with members of the NEC assigned to work specifically on one of these areas.17  The 
new constitution and the creation of a powerful NEC directly elected by Conference 
marked the moment of transition from an alliance of largely autonomous associations 
to a single organisation of branches meeting at Conference and electing a NEC.  The 
Institute was on its way to becoming a Union.   
Reflecting the reluctance within the branches to concede full authority to the 
NEC, the constitution also created a Council directly representing branches and made 
up of the honorary officers, members of the NEC and one representative of each 
branch.  The Council, charged to assist and advise the NEC, was intended to act as a 
watch on the NEC by debating and giving the branch viewpoint on issues as they 
arose.  The actions of the NEC could be questioned and could be subject to the veto of 
the Council.  This created a structural tension in the relationship between the NEC 
and the Council whereby branches that were unhappy with a NEC decision used their 
representatives on the Council to re-open debates.18  These constitutional changes 
reflected the changing membership of the Institute.  The expansion in the public 
service and civil service had led to growth in the number of civil servants in the 
professional and technical grades.  The expansion of technical grades was particularly 
striking and many of these new posts were filled by the graduates of the universities 
and Institutes of Technology who wanted the Institute to fight for pay and status that 
reflected their qualifications. 
Establishing the authority of the NEC required that the Chairman be 
particularly able, an effective leader, a good communicator and popular with the 
membership.  The Institute/Union was fortunate in a run of particularly energetic and 
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committed chairman through these years: Austin O’Carroll (1972-3) of the Local 
Government Auditors branch; Des McHugh (1973-4) of the Engineering 
Draughtsman P&T branch; Anna O’Farrell (1975-6) State Laboratory branch; John 
Hennigan (1977-80) of the OPW Engineers branch and Jacqueline Doyle (1980-82) of 
the Marine & Fisheries Inspectors branch.  The NEC also developed as an organic 
environment as delegates were elected and worked together for many years as 
officers, gaining confidence and ability and learning to work as a team, gradually 
rising through the ranks of the NEC.  By bringing their branch concerns and their own 
agendas, Jackie Doyle for instance ensured equal pay for equal work went from being 
a pious aspiration to an immediate demand, delegates enriched the NEC and made it 
effective in the rapidly changing circumstances of the times.  John Hennigan was 
particularly respected not only by the membership of his Union but also by the other 
civil service unions who subsequently elected him as Chairman of the Civil Service 
Staff Panel.  His untimely death led to the creation of a trust fund to finance the future 
education of his children.          
 
Education and Training 
  The establishing of an Education and Training sub-committee led by the assistant 
secretary Sean O Briain was an important initiative which sharpened the calibre of the 
activists.  Recognising that the courses on offer to new activists were often of poor 
quality O Briain established contact with the English IPCS and attended their training 
courses to establish a model of an effective training course.  Induction courses were 
established for new members  with special courses and documents on relevant topics.  
The course and documents on ‘Making a Claim’ established a methodical approach to 
making a claim that was fell-founded and carefully prepared and presented with 
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optimum effect.  Briefing documents on industrial action set out with exemplary 
clarity the different forms of industrial action, the objectives of industrial action and 
the rules governing such action.  The skills of former activists and leading figures in 
the world of trade unionism were used in training seminars and workshops.19      
The branches continued to vary widely in their membership and structures and 
each retained considerable autonomy in running its own affairs.  Some branches 
catered for a single profession in a single department, other branches catered for 
several grades and professions within a single department.  However few, if any, 
branches had a membership from more than one department.20  The Archivists branch 
had six members in three grades, the six Oireachtas translators were organised in four 
grades whilst the three mapping draughtsmen in the department of lands were on a 
single grade.  All these branches retained the right to send two members to the ADC.  
Other larger branches, especially in the agricultural area where there were 1,186 
members in twenty-eight grades, had high membership numbers but these were 
widely dispersed and had great difficulty in organisation and communication.21  In 
1972 3,500 members were organised in 229 grades organised in forty-two branches.  
By 1981, there were 5,184 members organised in fifty-four branches representing 322 
grades.  
The inherited federal structure of the Institute continued to inhibit its 
effectiveness as a Union because, as Donal Egan of the NEC wrote in the newsletter, 
‘its total unity cannot be contained in our minds’.22  An investigation of the branch 
structure by a sub-committee of the NEC found that less than half of the branches 
were active participants in the NEC or the Council or were sending members to 
courses run by the Institute.  Smaller branches tended to be very active on their own 
behalf but made little or no contribution at decision-making levels of the Institute.  
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Some branches were very clear on what they expected from the Institute but it was 
less clear what they brought to the Institute.  Smaller branches resisted any attempt at 
enforced rationalisation and the dispersal of authority within the Institute between the 
multiplicity of virtual ‘republics’ continued.  At the same time some members 
expressed anxieties that the NEC was tending toward a tightly centralised and 
bureaucratic structure.23  Part of the communication problem was the failure to sustain 
a newsletter or similar journal that appeared regularly and kept members informed on 
developments across the service.  Between mid-1976 and January 1978 the newsletter 
was defunct.     
 
The General Secretary 
In April 1978 the Institute purchased new premises at 16 Earlsfort Terrace.  Members 
were asked to keep phone calls to a minimum as the office initially had only one 
phone line!24  The fulltime staff of the Institute continued to expand.  In April 1975 
Ralph Pares resigned as general secretary to take up the post of general secretary to 
the AHCS.25  His successor as general secretary was John Duffy, a native of 
Warrenpoint Co Down, who had been general secretary to the SDLP in Northern 
Ireland.  His column in the IPCS Newsletter “On My Mind” was a witty and 
provocative rumination on the issues of the day for the trade union movement.  
However Duffy’s view of the work of a general secretary was very different to that of 
the executive.  He saw his job as essentially confined to head office and ensuring that 
the organisation was run in a co-ordinated and efficient manner.  The NEC expected 
him to travel the country and act as an organiser and trouble-shooter but especially to 
be an effective negotiator.  However Duffy had no trade union background and very 
soon a difficult relationship developed with the NEC.  As soon as his probationary 
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period came to an end his contract was terminated.  Finding his successor caused 
problems as the NEC had to choose between the seasoned and experienced  Michael 
Downes and the younger and more combative Greg Maxwell.  Greg Maxwell had 
applied for and been appointed to the position of assistant general secretary in 
November 1976.26  Maxwell was an experienced trade union official who had already 
made his mark in the creation of the Northern Ireland Public Service Alliance 
(NIPSA) and was now seeking fresh challenges.27 It was a case of promotion by merit 
versus promotion by seniority.  The decision to appoint him deputy general secretary 
in September 1977 was a signal that he would not succeed in an application for the 
general secretaryship.  Downes himself, and many members, felt that he was being 
badly treated by the Institute, though he encouraged Greg Maxwell in his 
application.28 
The post was advertised and interviews held in November 1977.  After an 
impressive presentation on his vision for the future of the IPCS Geg Maxwell, who 
was only one year in the Institute, was the unanimous recommendation of the 
interview panel and, in December 1977, took up the post.29   In 1978 the new post of 
Research Assistant was created.  This was filled by Shay Cody.30  Shay Cody was a 
university graduate in history with a research profile in trade union and labour history 
as well as a family tradition of activism.    
 
From an Institute to a Union: UPTCS 
The 1979 ADC abandoned the vague title of “Institute” and approved the 
change of the name to the ‘Union of Professional and Technical Civil Servants’ 
(UPTCS) ‘Ceard-Cumann na Stat-Sheirbhíseach Gairmiúil agus Teicniúil’.  The 
adoption of the title reflects the central place attained by the technical grades within 
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the Union and also the growing identification by professional and technical civil 
servants with the wider trade union movement.  In 1980 UPTCS participated for the 
first time in the May Day labour march organised by the Dublin Trades Union 
Council, led by the new Union banner, with members wearing the new Union badge.  
The Union began to engage in issues of justice and civil rights in the wider world 
through Amnesty International and the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement, with 
Conference debating motions on social justice and agreeing to deductions funding 
campaigning organisations.  The Union was an early supporter of the Irish Labour 
History Society, founded in 1973 to promote the study of labour history and to 
preserve the records of Irish working class movements.  It was also a supporter of the 
People’s College, founded in 1948 by the trade union movement to provide adult 
education courses for workers.   
The Council was intended to act as a forum for branch representatives and the 
NEC could discuss the affairs of the Institute and review NEC decisions.  However 
the meetings of the Council developed as no more than briefing sessions on NEC 
decisions rather than the policy debates that were originally intended.  Where there 
was any input by the branch representative it was usually to elicit more information.  
The key power of reversing a decision of the NEC was in fact exercised on only one 
occasion.  Some members suggested that the power of the Council should be 
increased at the expense of the NEC whilst others suggested that the Council should 
be abolished entirely.  In response the 1980 ADC established a joint Council and NEC 
working party to report on the future role of the Council and its relation to the NEC.  
Rejecting the call to abolish the Council, the working party emphasised its usefulness 
as the place where the branches met, discussed issues and kept the NEC abreast of 
branch opinion.  Also rejecting the call to increase the power of the Council at the 
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expense of the NEC, the working party emphasised the key role of the ADC in 
scrutinising decisions and setting policy for the NEC.  At the heart of this debate was 
the question as to what sort of organisation the Union aspired to be.  Those who 
wanted the Council to have more power harkened back to the old federal structure of 
the IPCS on which branches were largely autonomous and direct democracy was the 
mode of decision making.  Those who wanted a concentration of power in the NEC 
and the abolition of the Council envisaged a trade union that was policy driven and 
focussed by a small and highly powered elite of the executive and fulltime officials.   
The recommendations of the working party were subsequently accepted.  
These changed the membership of the Council by requiring that the branch 
secretaries, as the most active and informed representatives at branch level who were 
also accustomed to keeping members informed of developments, should  where 
possible be the Council member for the branch.  Discussion was less heated than at 
Annual Conference with Council meetings sometimes taking on the form of seminars 
on issues rather than debates.  The NEC members and the editor and assistant editor 
of the Union journal continued to attend council meetings which were reduced to 
quarterly rather than bi-monthly.  On an issue that required a vote that would 
challenge a decision of the NEC, only the accredited branch representatives could 
vote.31   
 
Negotiating pay in the civil service. 
The conciliation and arbitration scheme which had been initiated in 1950 was 
straining to cope with a different world in the 1970s.  The dominance of agriculture in 
the Irish economy had been displaced by the service sector.  Irish population was 
rising and every year more were joining the workforce, especially women.  The 
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workforce was also better educated with higher life expectations that earlier 
generations.  The public sector as a whole had grown in response to the demand for a 
wider ranging and a more professional public service.  The recession that followed the 
oil crisis led to rising unemployment.  Most corrosive of living standards was the 
dramatic and inexorable rise in inflation that by 1980 had reached 20 per cent a year.  
In the decade 1975-1986 the Consumer Price Index increased by 258 per cent.  Some 
trade unionists took the view that inflation was a problem for the government to deal 
with and that the trade union movement should concentrate its energy on defending 
the living standards of workers by matching pay rises.  Pay should chase inflation and, 
if possible, outpace it.  Other trade unionists accepted that pay had a role in driving 
inflation and were willing to consider pay restraint as part of a broader agreement that 
addressed taxation, prices, rents and dividends.   
It had been expected that in the post-war wage rounds pay in the public sector 
would follow the lead of the private sector and this largely the case in the 1950s when 
pay had simply followed the rise in the cost of living.  Agreements were no more than 
a recommended floor for increases which the trade union movement had then to 
pursue in the workplace.  The 1964 wage round in the civil service was significant in 
introducing new status claims which led to a widely varying percentage increases 
across the state sector and realigned relativities.  The key professional marker grade, 
the Engineer Grade 1 (civil) won an increase of 22.6 per cent.   
The pay agreements of the 1970s were negotiated at national level by the 
Employer Labour Conference with government attending as an employer rather than 
as the State.  These were single agreements applicable to all employees.  The 1972 
and 1974 national agreements awarded large increases, the 1975 and 1976 rounds 
gave cost of living increases only, reflecting the new problem of surging inflation.  
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The increases were combinations of flat sum, which were better for the lower paid, 
and percentage increases, which were better for the higher paid.  These agreements 
tended to flatten out salary scales in the civil service as a whole.  The IPCS tended to 
be initially hostile to the national agreements because of the increasing restrictions on 
special claims.32   The department of finance found it useful to confuse, or refuse to 
clarify, its dual role as Government and its role as employer within the ELC, although 
the 1972 agreement did set broad social objectives for the agreement of working 
toward full employment, securing real increases in incomes whilst giving preference 
to the low-paid and aiming to end poverty.  The development of more complex 
agreements that addressed issues of tax equity found greater favour with the IPCS 
and, in time, it became a more enthusiastic supporter of centralised bargaining.33  The 
1977 agreement was in effect a tri-partite agreement in which the Department of the 
Public Service participated for the first time as the Government.  In return for tax cuts 
and measures to protect employment the unions agreed to low pay increases that were 
below the cost of living.  This followed the 1975 introduction of food price subsidies 
in an attempt to cool inflationary pressures.34   
An increasing feature of public discourse on pay and employment in the 
recessionary 1970s was the identification of the civil service as overstaffed and 
overpaid, a tendency which the government did little to discourage.  Commentators 
demanded a reduction in the public service, although always stopping short of 
identifying which particular public service the government ought to suppress.35   The 
government and society, and the trade union movement, were all avoiding 
fundamental questions about what social services ought to be provided by the State 
and how those social services were to be paid for.  There was also the problem that 
data on the economy and the role of pay in driving inflation was scant and anecdotal, 
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which tended to lead to a paralysis in policy.  Growing frustration at the failure of the 
government to tackle the economic crisis and growing social fragmentation led to the 
tax protests on 1979 which brought hundreds of thousands of protestors on to the 
streets in Dublin in the largest peaceful protest ever seen in Ireland.  Cautious of 
engaging in a political campaign, reminded perhaps of the forces unleashed by the 
Ulster Workers Strike in 1984, the NEC rejecting a motion by the Museum branch in 
support of the PAYE tax reform campaign, including demonstrations and stoppages.  
Regretting the decision of the NEC Paul Doyle of the sponsoring branch reminded the 
Union that as it had entered the mainstream of labour it needed to be sensitive to the 
broader trade union movement.36  The public service trade unions had to work hard at 
deflecting the anti-tax emotions into the more rational  demand for tax equity.37    
 IPCS had over four thousand members grouped in over four hundred grades. 
The distribution of members over the grades varied enormously; from single officer 
grades to grades with hundreds of members.  As most of these grades were 
departmental the IPCS had to process these increases under the Conciliation and 
Arbitration scheme individually, work which took up a great deal effort and time.   
The centralised bargaining and the 1979 National Understanding for Economic and 
Social Development offered a general solution to the problem of pay levels.  They 
also left the Union more time to concentrate on the problems of pay policy 
determination and the pay of members in the higher civil service professional grades 
that were not covered by the conciliation and arbitration scheme.   
 
Negotiating special increases  
The arguments in favour of increases that the IPCS brought to pay negotiations 
centred on the rise in the cost of living, the justice of civil servants participating in the 
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general rise in national prosperity and the need for the public service to keep pace 
with the general trend in salaries.  The principles on which pay in the civil service 
ought to negotiated were more elusive.  In fact, as Michael McGinley, who as a 
principal officer in the Department of the Public Service played a central role on 
public service pay negotiation, notes general play increases negotiated as part of the 
national agreements are only half the story.38  The other half is the history of special 
increases based on principles peculiar to the civil service.  A great deal of negotiation 
on civil service pay was actually less about determining levels of pay and more about 
determining the appropriate pay for particular posts.  For the professional and 
technical officers the myriad of posts, grades and departments made this exceptionally 
difficult in a culture used to dealing with a straight-forward clerical and administrative 
hierarchy.   The conciliation and arbitration scheme of the civil service had evolved 
an informal system of marker grades allied with a network of relative grades.  The 
advantage was that negotiations could focus on a single grade which could then be 
used to determine the award within a network of related grades.  The tactics of the 
official side negotiators was to use the marker grades as a brake on pay rises as 
holding the marker grade to low increases would automatically hold the related grades 
to the same low increase.  The staff side focused on the marker grades to win 
increases for all the related grades.   
The IPCS, like all other trade unions, used collective bargaining to win general 
increases whilst developing a cohesive pay policy to negotiate special increases at 
conciliation.  The criteria used to argue for special increases were fair comparison, 
internal relativities and value for money.  Fair comparison was using the current 
salaries of comparable non-state sector analogues as a basis for comparison with civil 
service rates.  Professional and technical posts that successfully used the comparative 
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argument were civil engineers, mapping draughtsmen, agricultural inspectors, 
laboratory technicians, engineering draughtsmen and clerks of work.  Choosing the 
analogue was crucial to this argument.  IPCS would usually argue on the basis of the 
average of several well-chosen non-civil service posts.  The official side however 
could and did with equal consistency choose a single non-civil service analogue to 
argue for a low increase or no increase at all in basic rates.  The accuracy of figures 
on pay could be disputed and the comparability of the actual work may not be agreed 
either.  Therefore agreeing the particular analogue could prove to be a long and 
difficult preliminary to the real negotiation.  If the pay of an agreed analogue should 
increase due to improved productivity then the official side could either deny the 
validity of maintaining the relativity or demand a related increase in the productivity 
of the civil service post before conceding the increase.   
Internal relativities were employed to negotiate the pay of the vast majority of 
the professional and technical grades.  In these negotiations the pay of a professional 
or technical grade is agreed to relate to another civil service grade.  Therefore an 
award to the relative grade would automatically lead to an increase in the professional 
or technical grade.  If the linkage was formally agreed than any alteration in the pay 
of the linked grade applied automatically without the need to make a separate claim at 
Departmental or Council level.  The key objective for the IPCS was establish a 
linkage at as a high a level as possible, Executive Officer or Higher Executive Officer 
usually.  The validity of a high linkage was argued on the level of qualification ( a 
third level degree) and responsibilities.  A whole range of professional and technical 
posts which had formerly been lowly paid on isolated pay scales were raised to 
executive level.39    However, unless the relativity was recorded and agreed by both 
the staff and official side then it could be treated in later negotiations as an ad hoc 
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arrangement that had no long-term  validity.  Also, if the relativity was not automatic 
the IPCS side had to pursue the increase through conciliation which, in the absence of 
any agreement on retrospection, could mean the increase not being effective for many 
months.  Value for work was rarely used as the basis for a claim unless the grade was 
in its development stage.  Closely related to the concept of productivity it was based 
on arguments on the work content  of the grade in question.  It was recognised by the 
IPCS that relying on this argument would imply a continuous relative increase in the 
value of the work to justify any later increases.  However the argument of 
productivity had obvious attractions to the official side.   
In the process of conciliation across the whole of the civil service departments 
a tendency began to emerge of separate bi-lateral departmental agreements that 
related the pay of a number of different grades to one common grade in a pay band.  
For the professional civil service the key grade was that of the civil engineer.  This 
began to be used generally as the professional recruitment grade.  However these 
trends were not the result of centralised agreement nor of any overall vision of the 
professional civil service and its place in the service of the state.  Rather it arose as a 
result of a series of ad hoc agreements.40   
The staff side strategy was largely based on the British Priestly Commission 
1953-5 inquiry into the civil service.  Priestly had set down comparability with good 
analogous outside employment and  internal relativities as the basis for civil service 
pay negotiation.  The Pay Research Unit developed from the Priestly Commission as a 
fact finding unit divorced from the process of negotiation.  Its task was to research 
and present to both sides of the civil service arbitration process well-researched 
evidence on rates of pay in the non-civil service.  This was a model the Irish civil 
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service saw as useful but limited in its Irish application because of the dominance of 
the State in many employments in Ireland.                     
 Most of the special claims went to arbitration having been rejected at 
conciliation.  In 1972 the IPCS, which was emerging as the most successful civil 
service organisation in the conciliation and arbitration process, had over eighty claims 
in the system ranging from architects to zoologists.41  The government grew alarmed 
at the growing success of the civil service staff side in winning special increases as 
each award led inexorably to a new wave of comparability and relativity claims.  One 
source of the luxuriant variation in special awards was that the various conciliation 
and arbitration schemes made awards without any cognisance of the impact it might 
have on other grades.  There were nine separate conciliation and arbitration schemes; 
the civil service, teachers, gardaí, local authorities officers, VEC staffs (who had two 
different schemes) professional staffs of county committees of agriculture, 
postmasters, and branch managers of employment exchanges.   An award by any one 
of these arbitrators could set off a entirely new round of claims in the other schemes.  
The government had wanted for some time to bring the arbitration phase of public 
service schemes into the Labour Court where an over-view could be maintained but 
the staff side resisted the move.42  The IPCS was prepared to consider this option if it 
was agreed that the departmental councils would be allowed to negotiate to finality 
without always having to refer back to the department of finance, if the upper limit for 
access to conciliation was raised to include all professional officers and if the Labour 
Court had access to a panel of technical assessors in cases touching its members.43 
The alternative strategy for the government was to use the general pay 
agreements to hold back special awards by either restricting them or by delaying the  
award.  The 1970 national agreement allowed claims for special pay increases which 
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removed ‘genuine anomalies’ in grade relativities.  The 1972 and 1974 national 
agreements attempted to tighten the criteria for these claims but also allowed claims 
based on falling out of line with the general level of pay for similar work.  In 1975 
Minister Ryan ordered a complete standstill on all conciliation and arbitration claims, 
a move the Institute regarded as a breach of the national wage agreement.44  The 
minister could not hold the line and the 1976 agreement allowed increases where 
there were serious inequities but if the increase was for more than 1.5 per cent it had 
to go arbitration.  The 1977 agreement allowed special claims submitted before 1 
November 1976 to go ahead, also with arbitration where it was over 2.5 per cent.  The 
1978 agreement allowed for negotiation on claims based on serious inequity, with 
arbitration being required for claims over 2 per cent.  The Institute continued to 
support the agreements but with less enthusiasm at the dominance of the money 
increases at the expense of percentage increases.45   The 1979 National Understanding 
allowed increases to restore previously well-established relativities applied in two 
phases, the first in July 1979.  The second National Understanding of 1980 delayed 
any special increases until April 1981.  The 1979 National Understanding was 
negotiated by Congress in the midst of a 130-day postal strike which made it 
impossible for UPTCS to circulate the membership on the terms.  A special council 
meeting debated the terms of the new agreement and, noting the commitment to 
income tax reforms and measures to increase employment, it mandated its Congress 
delegates to vote in favour.46  The second National Understanding of 1980 was 
accepted by a large majority, indicating growing acceptance of this new form of 
agreement.47    
 
Pay and the Higher Civil Service 
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Higher level civil servants were excluded from the conciliation and arbitration 
process.  Therefore there was a significant section of the membership of IPCS for 
whom national agreements or success at arbitration offered little.  In 1969 the 
government established the Review Body on the Remuneration of the Public Sector, 
under the chairmanship of Liam Devlin, to advise it on the pay of public servants not 
covered by the conciliation and arbitration process, the judiciary and members of the 
Oireachtas.  In 1972 the Review Body began to investigate the pay of the four general 
service higher grades of Assistant Principal, principal, Assistant Secretary and 
Secretary.  The Institute was vitally concerned as these grades were the marker grades 
for some of the senior professional posts, concerns which were detailed in its 
submission to the Review Body..  Although the absolute levels of remuneration the 
Review Body would recommend were of interest, greater interest was directed toward 
the principles by which these levels were arrived at.  It wanted the Review Body to 
adopt the principles of fair comparison and internal relativities, principles which it 
had been promoting as the only just method of determining pay in the Irish civil 
service.  What the Institute wanted was formal machinery to enable claims for 
increased pay at the higher levels to be negotiated.  The first task, so far as the IPCS 
was concerned, was that professional grades would be evaluated and that the finance 
circular 16/36 which forbad civil service professionals engaging in their profession 
outside the civil service should be removed.48   
The Review Group stated the obvious by reporting that there is no scientific 
method of determining pay.  However the report did move toward the IPCS position 
by accepting that comparison with a wide range of other employments at the same 
level is a reliable and inevitable criterion where the jobs are of the same level of 
responsibility.  Responsibility was therefore the key element of comparison in the 
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Review Group’s consideration.  Internal civil service relativities were also accepted as 
a valid criterion, whilst productivity was explicitly rejected.  The argument that the 
professional civil service ought to be able to work outside of the state sector was 
rejected.  The entire public sector was a unity and the State was entitled to expect that 
all those in the higher reaches of the public service would devote all of their working 
time to the State.49   
In 1974 the Institute applied without success to the Department of the Public 
Service for the extension of the conciliation and arbitration scheme to include higher 
paid professional, technical and scientific grades whose rate of pay did not exceed that 
of the Assistant Secretary.  This extension of the scheme was to get around the 
anomalies that had arisen as a result of the Review group award to the Assistant 
Secretary grade.  It covered those professional civil servants that previously had been 
excluded because they served as the principal officer in a section or department.  With 
the development of the various schemes across the public service this had become an 
anomalous restriction.  No teacher or ESB officer was excluded because they had a 
managerial function.  The IPCS argued that the simplest and fairest way to deal with 
the accumulation of anomalies was to extend conciliation and arbitration to the grades 
affected.50   
 Mid-1978 the Review Group signalled that it was preparing to look at the 
professional, scientific and technical civil service grades.  The Institute had to give 
careful consideration to the strategy it would adopt in it submission.  It could either 
ask that the whole of the professional and technical grades should be reviewed at 
departmental level or that a few key grades should be closely examined and used to 
establish vertical relativities and horizontal analogies.  The advantages would be that 
‘broadbanding’ of professional and technical groups across the departments would be 
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effectively achieved which would simplify future negotiations as accepted linkages 
could be invoked to disperse any increase through the grades.  The disadvantage 
would be that grades that traditionally were already linked to the administrative 
grades, which were doing well in negotiations, might lose the linkage and be 
disadvantaged.  Branches were asked to decide whether they wanted their branch 
structure referred to the Review Body, bearing the mind the difficulty of identifying 
analogues in many cases and quantifying responsibilities.  The decision by the 
Review Group that the examination of the professional grades would be delayed was 
frustrating for the IPCS, no one could be sure that the Review Group might not be 
dissolved at any time, but it did give the Institute time to develop its case.51 
 The Institute choose as key grades the agricultural inspectors, the legal, 
medical grades, and the engineers.  These were grades where outside analogies were 
easily established.  The expectation was that the engineers would set the standard with 
other grades related to them.  Other grades where analogies could be established were 
the National Museum and National Library staffs, architects, land inspectors, and in 
the aviation sector.52  The strategy worked well enough for the Union and the Review 
Body Report No.27 recommended increases for most of the membership, back-dated 
to June 1980.  The increases were in addition to any that those grades linked to the 
administrative civil service had already secured.  The breaking of the link with the 
general service grades was of great long term significance as it established an 
autonomous professional and technical scale within the civil service.53   
 
Equal Pay for Equal Work 
There is an impression that the campaign for women’s equality arrived in Ireland with 
the May 1971 ‘contraceptive train’.  In fact the demand for equality in Irish society 
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had been argued and fought since the foundation of the State.  In the civil service the 
issue of equality was founded on resistance to discrimination on pay.  Women had 
begun to enter the civil service in large numbers during the First World War when 
they were recruited to fill vacancies caused by men enlisting.  These women were 
paid on lower salaries to men within the same grade.  The Irish Free State introduced 
a different form of discrimination in the general service grades.  In 1925 a new pay 
scale was established which offered a higher scale to married men and a lower 
‘single’ scale to unmarried men and women entering the service.  The new single 
scale was the former female scale.  In addition married men received extra payments 
in the form of children’s allowances, up to five children.  Promoted as an 
encouragement to marriage, whereby the single man accepted a lower pay in order to 
receive higher along with the children’s allowance when he married, it was always 
regarded by the civil service as objectionable and a form of cheap labour.54    
The government continued to enforce a sex discrimination in the professional 
civil service, where every grade had a male and female scale.  In fact the IPCS 
congratulated itself on preventing the introduction of the marriage differential, 
accepting separate male and female grades as the norm.  The IPCS feared that to 
allow a single and a married scale would encourage the government to discriminate 
against older professionals attempting to enter the civil service.  All pay claims by the 
Institute included a separate and lower claim for female officers, usually set at 80 per 
cent of the male scale.  The 1956 conciliation agreement on pay scales for assistant 
architects in the OPW awarded a Male Scale 2 of £450-800 and a Female Scale 2 of 
£450-635.55  For women in the civil service it was surprising that the IPCS was 
prepared to accept that professionally qualified women graduates, good enough to 
become members of the Institute and doing the same work as equally qualified men 
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graduates and paying the same subscription to the Institute, were worth less money.56  
That the male and female scales had the same starting point underlines the effect of 
the marriage bar whereby women were required to resign from the civil service on 
marriage.  Sex discrimination was not as contentious as might be expected due to the 
expectation that most women would resign before they had advanced far up the pay 
scale to experience loss of earnings.  However for many of the professional women 
the differential was not only a loss of income but also a loss of status and objections 
to it began to gather in the immediate post-Emergency period.  The IPCS was to 
spend many years avoiding an issue that was of concern to many of its members and 
their status as professionals. 
 
EPEW Agitation 
In 1948 the women members of the Survey Branch in the Land Commission 
asked the IPCS council to protest against the differential rates of pay to the 
Department of Finance.  The council refused as it ‘had no mandate for action on equal 
pay’.57  An organisation of women civil servants, the ‘Women’s Civil Service 
Advisory Board’ attempted to use the post-Emergency consolidation agreement to 
win equal scales for men and women.  This was interpreted by the IPCS as 
introducing disunity in the ranks of the civil service by seeking an advance at the 
expense of the single men in the service.58  However the IPCS could not ignore the 
winds of change that were blowing in the ranks of the women civil servants and in 
1952 it was agreed that all future claims would be based on ‘equal pay’ and that the 
compulsory retirement of female professional officers would be fought.59  The AHCS, 
whilst sympathetic to the campaign for equality, decided that as they few members 
affected, the issue would left to the IPCS.60 
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 Motions deploring the sex differential became a predictable regular debate at 
the ADC through the 1950s as the Institute membership skirted the issue.  Nuala 
Gogan of the State Laboratory Branch, deputy general secretary during much of this 
period, attempted to drive the issue beyond pious sentiment but with little effect.  The 
council formed a sub-committee on the issue that wasted its time debating the 
meaning of equal pay and consulting Dr Newman, professor of Sociology at 
Maynooth Seminary, on whether equal pay for men and women was in conformity 
with social justice and the common good.  His reply, that it all depended on what was 
meant by the common good, was not very helpful.61  It was quite clear that some of 
the men in the IPCS could see advantages in adopting the marriage-single scale with 
additional children’s allowances. 
 The issue of whether the civil service ought, as a single body, prioritise the 
end of the sex discrimination scales or the marriage-single scale came to a head in 
1958.  At a discussion on equal pay at the arbitration staff side panel meeting of 6 
June 1958 the Civil Service Clerical Association raised the question as to whether it 
would be better tactics to try to remove the marriage-differentiated scales as a first 
step towards winning equal pay for equal work.  If the claim succeeded then all men 
would receive the same pay and all women would be on lesser pay.  A mass meeting 
of women civil servants, organised by the Women Civil Servants’ Advisory Body and 
held in the Mansion House, passed a motion protesting at the action of the civil 
service staff panel in seeking to abolish the marriage differential which was directly 
opposed to the interests of the women civil servants.  The IPCS council, as a result of 
this action, had a serious discussion on the precise meaning of equal pay and 
determined that the Institute policy was in favour of ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’ 
though with the caveat that ‘we cannot ignore the society in which we live’.62 
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 The 1960s marks a great deal of earnest discussion on equal pay at annual 
conference, council and in the pages of Scientific Service, though without decision or 
action.  For instance, a motion to the 1966 annual delegate conference by Miss 
Cunningham of the Surveyors Branch and Dr O’Toole of the State Laboratory 
directing the IPCS to take up the question of equal pay in the professional and 
technical grades was, of course, passed without dissent.63  In other civil and public 
services unions the issue was also moving to the centre of discussions.  The Irish 
Local Government Officers Union saw a major revolt by its women members when it 
accepted an arbitration award that introduced the marriage differential into local 
government where it was unknown.64  The Executive and Higher Officers Association 
found itself at the centre of the storm generated by the suggestion that abolition of the 
marriage scale was more important than abolition of sex differentials.65  Most of this 
discussion took place amongst women who were aware of the changes taking place in 
the wider world.  Article 23 of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
asserted as a principle that everyone had a right to equal pay for equal work.  The 
British Royal Commission on Equal Pay 1944-46 had accepted the justice of the 
principle, though it remained unenforced.  The 1951 General Conference of the 
International Labour Organisation at Geneva adopted the convention C100 which 
established the principle of equal pay for work of equal value.  The EEC, for which 
Ireland remained an applicant country through the 1960s, required equal pay for equal 
work from its member countries. 
  
ICTU and EPEW 
Two developments transformed this sincere but aimless debate into action; the 
decision to join Congress and the establishment of the Commission on the Status of 
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Women.  The issue of equal pay for equal work was, in the context of the Irish labour 
force, primarily an issue for the public service.  It was only there that significant 
numbers of men and women worked side by side at the same job but for different 
salaries.  The entry of the IPCS and most other civil and public service unions into the 
ICTU at the end of the 1960s made the public services committee of Congress the 
ideal platform for focused thinking and action.  Within the professionl and technical 
civil service there were many women who had the same qualifications, did precisely 
the same work in the same workplace, as men but were paid a lower salary.  Most 
other women were in fact in ‘women-only’ grades where the issue could be 
characterised as poor pay rather than discriminatory pay.  
 The 1970 Congress annual conference saw six motions on 
equal pay on the agenda, all brought together in a single composite motion that 
deplored the lack of progress made in the implementation of the principle of equal 
pay, considered that the absence of a commonly agreed definition of the principle is 
impeding its implementation, called for governmental acceptance of the principle, the 
commencement of “phasing in” in the public service, the introduction of an Equal Pay 
Bill, requested an interim report on equal pay before the end of the 1970, 
recommended that wage or salary settlements which do not provide for progression 
towards equal pay be rejected, called on Congress to obtain details from affiliated 
organisations in the form of regular progress reports on their efforts and successes in 
the implementation of this policy.66  The public service associations and unions led 
the clearly expressed debate, urging 1975 as a  target date for full equal pay.  In the 
vote on the composite motion there was no dissent. 
 
The Commission on the Status of Women 
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In 1967 the publication of the report of the UN Commission on the Status of Women 
inspired a group of Irish women to investigate the status of women in Ireland.  
Meeting in the rooms of the Women Graduates Association in TCD the group spent 
several months investigating and debating the question of status and then, in October 
1968, issued a memorandum to the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, requesting him to 
establish a National Commission on the Status of Women.67  The government was 
well aware of the importance of the issue but were determined to avoid it as long as 
possible.  It was estimated that the full cost of equal pay in the public sector would be 
over £5 million a year.  It was Patrick Hillery, Minister for Labour at the time, who 
urged Lynch to address the issue, saying that the failure of the government to adopt 
international standards on women’s rights was becoming an embarrassment and that 
discrimination in the public sector was indefensible.  In order to move the issue to the 
margins at a time when it seemed Northern Ireland was spiralling into civil war, and 
recognising that  a commission of inquiry into the status of women would fend off the 
issue of equal pay for the moment, Lynch agreed with Haughey in Finance that the 
government would appoint such a commission.68     
 The Commission on the Status of Women first met in April 
1970.  Its  brief was to ‘examine and report on the status of women in Irish society, to 
make recommendations on the steps necessary to ensure the participation of women 
on equal terms and conditions with men in the political, social, cultural and economic 
life of the country and to indicate…the estimated cost of such recommendations’.  
Composed of equal numbers of men and women and drawn from business, the trade 
unions and various women’s organisations, the Commission was strongly led by its 
chairman, and its most significant member, Thekla June Beere.  Thekla Beere was the 
former secretary general of the Department of Transport and Power from 1959 to 
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1966.  A formidable presence, she had to deal with the constant frustrations that 
attended a woman of intelligence in a world dominated by men of a lesser calibre.  A 
distinguished TCD student she graduated with the LL.B degree and a first class 
honours degree in Legal and Political Science, she was congratulated at her civil 
service interview on her excellent handwriting!  Fortunately John Hooper, director of 
the statistics branch, recognised her brilliance and brought her into his section in the 
Department of Industry and Commerce.69   
 The Commission put advertisements in the daily 
newspapers inviting submission from interested parties.  The IPCS submission had 
considerable statistical data on the sex differential across various departments and its 
eccentricities, which would be instantly familiar to Thekla Beere as civil servant, a  
woman and as a statistician.  The report summarised the Institute view;  
That there is no justification for offering a lower salary to people with 
equal qualifications carrying out the same duties.  We proceed on the 
assumption that our members are paid for the work they do and not for the 
accident of birth which determined their sex.  We are constrained at 
Conciliation and Arbitration to prove the levels and details of work which 
are being done by our members, in order to have their salaries adjusted, we 
therefore believe the assumption that pay is related to work performed to 
be correct.  On this basis where it can be shown, as it can in all our grades, 
that the work being done is identical as between men and women in the 
same grade, we can see no reasonable reason why the rates of salary 
should not also be identical.70     
 
On 23 September 1970 the Commission met with IPCS representatives where it 
concentrated on the equal pay for equal work issue, reserving the question of the 
marriage bar, promotion opportunities and other social aspects of the Commission’s 
inquiry to a later stage.   
 
Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value 
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The Congress statement to the commission on the Status of Women was prepared 
jointly by the Public Services Committee and the Women’s Advisory Committee.  
The Public Services Committee was chaired by Harold O’Sullivan of the ILGOU.  It 
included Dan Murphy of the Executive and Higher Officers’ Association, Patrick 
Cosgrave of the POWU, W.A. Lynch of the Civil Service Clerical Association, 
Hollingworth of the PO Management Staffs’ Association, Helen Burke of the ILGOU, 
D. Crowley of the Medical Union, J. Foster of the WUI, P. Murphy of the Federation 
of Rural Workers, S. O Murchú of the ITGWU, Donal Nevin of Congress and Ralph 
Pares of the IPCS.  The Women’s Advisory Committee included Anna O’Farrell, 
Jacqueline Doyle and Caroline Colclough of the IPCS.   
 The IPCS had been actively engaged on the question of 
equal pay.  Female staff were surveyed in late 1970 asking for their views on the 
marriage bar, access to civil service posts for married women and whether the salaries 
paid to all-women posts were depressed salaries.  The reply rate of 48 per cent was 
considered disappointing and was thought to reflect the lack of pressure being exerted 
by women members on the Council on the issue of equality.  However it also possible 
that women members considered the questions to be patronising and the answers 
obvious, which is apparent if ‘men’ was substituted for ‘women’ in the survey.71   
 In 1969 the IPCS was party to a Staff Side claim for equal 
pay which, by January 1971, had arrived at arbitration.  The claim was that ‘one 
salary scale be applied to every person in each grade, the scale to be, in the case of 
grades with sex-differentiated scales, the Man scale and in the case of grades with 
staff marriage-differentiated scales the ‘B’ scale’.72  The Interim Report of the 
Commission on the Status of Women was therefore making recommendations very 
similar to that of the Staff Side.  The Official Side, while sympathetic to the 
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philosophy of the claim, argued that as it had wide implications for the community 
generally, could not be dealt with in the public service in isolation.  The official 
estimate of the full cost of equal pay in the public service was now over £8 million 
which was an immense sum.  In the private sector those companies that relied on 
female labour in the main operated in a highly competitive market and any change 
would have to be scrutinised very carefully.  Furthermore such a dramatic 
redistribution of income would require changes in the taxation structure.  Accordingly 
it was urged that the claim await the report of the Commission, and after that was 
delivered, that it await the deliberations of the ELC. 
 The Staff Side objected to the issue being effectively 
diverted away from the conciliation and arbitration process into, firstly, the 
Commission over which they had no control, and then, latterly the Employer Labour 
Conference.  Nevertheless, with the Official side refusing to move until the 
Commission reported there was little could be done. In May 1971 Aer Lingus 
unilaterally offered equal pay for its female employees, anticipating the findings of 
the commission.  It was the first public service employer to concede equal pay and set 
the benchmark by this action.   
 In October 1971 the Interim report of the Commission 
recommended that women should receive the same pay as men when they are doing 
similar work or work of equal value and that the marriage bar, or any requirement that 
a woman resign her job on marriage, should be made illegal.73  Work of equal value 
was a nuanced term designed to avoid the sort of pointless and wasteful arguments on 
what exactly ‘equal work’ meant which had hampered the advance of equal pay in 
Great Britain..  Many men, and women, at the time equated work with physical labour 
and therefore deemed it obvious that women could never equal men in work.  Equal 
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value shifted the argument towards an assessment of worth.  In the civil service the 
value of work was generally accepted to equate with responsibility; posts that carried 
the same level of responsibility were accepted to be of equal value.74  The Interim 
Report recommended that in the public services the rate for the job was the ‘man’ rate 
or, where the marriage scale was applied, the married man’s scale.  Equal pay in the 
public service was to be achieved by phased steps to be completed by the end of 1977.  
The Interim Report on Equal Pay also recommended that the Labour Court should 
have Equal Pay Commissioners to adjudicate any disagreement concerning equal pay, 
its decision to be enforceable. 
 
Government and Unions respond on EPEW 
The government immediately passed the Interim Report to the Employer Labour 
Conference, suggesting thereby that it might be included in the wage round 
negotiations that were to begin in January 1972.  Although this was in line with the 
recommendation of the Commission, in truth the ELC was being used to shelf the 
claim for equal pay as the government used the ELC to explain a suspiciously long 
silence on the question of implementation of the Interim Report.  In short, the 
government decision was to accept equal pay in theory but resist its application in 
reality.  This was confirmed in the April 1972 budget statement when Minister Colley 
confirmed that equal pay for work of equal value was accepted in principle by the 
government, and was in fact a ‘National Aim’, but it awaited the outcome of the 
national agreement negotiations then under way within the ELC.75  As ‘National 
Aims’ included ending partition, restoring the Irish language as the language of the 
people and draining the Shannon, the question was how the trade union movement 
would respond to the addition of equal pay for work of equal value to this list. 
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 The then current National Wage Agreement closed the door 
on special claims in the public service until July 1973.   The negotiations on the 
successor agreement opened in January 1972 and it was clear that the question of 
delivery on equal pay was going to be decisive for the public service unions.  The 
IPCS wanted the current agreement amended to permit implementation of equal pay 
during its course but the general view in Congress was to accept the Commission 
proposal for a phased implementation to arrive at equality by December 1977.76  
however the vagueness of the Dáil  statement on the issue by Colley in the Budget of 
April 1972 (which introduced current deficits as budget policy for the first time), with 
no indication of a system for phasing in equality was worrying.  The IPCS was 
prepared to accept that equal pay would have a serious effect on both the public and 
the private sector, but now regarded it as a an issue of status and dignity rather than 
money.  It wanted equality phased in with a shorter time span of completion by 
November 1976.77  Nonetheless the fact was that EPEW was inevitably going to 
prove expensive.  It was only by addressing it as a moral and not an economic 
question that progress was going to be made.     
 The Minister for Labour in the coalition government with 
responsibility for equal pay and legislation against discrimination in the workplace 
was Michael O’Leary of the Labour Party.  As he struggled with the impact of the Oil 
Crisis and recession, along with the alarming threat to the security of the State, the 
equality agenda gathered dust.  The trade union movement maintained some pressure 
but it was clear that it was not a priority.  The 1972 National Wage Agreement 
maintained gendered-unequal lump sum increases.  The issue was finally won by 
women workers taking the government to the European Commission and asking the 
Commission to compel the Irish government to apply the directive.  It was richly 
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ironic that it was the former Fianna Fáil minister Patrick Hillery who, as European 
Commissioner for Social Affairs, compelled the government to comply with 
European law and concede full equal pay in 1977.  Perhaps the distance that gender 
equality had to travel in Irish society and the trade union movement is best illustrated 
by the response of the IPCS sub-committee to the Commission’s request for an 
opinion on non-pay barriers to full equality.  Genuinely puzzled, the sub-committee 
had to confess that it had no idea what the Commission meant by ‘cultural barriers to 
equality for women’! 
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From confrontation to consensus: 1982-1990 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
During the 1980s a culture of confrontation, born of political and social 
fragmentation and economic recession, was displaced slowly and painfully by a 
culture of consensus.  In politics, a series of general elections saw the electorate 
rejecting incumbent governments but with no clear majority emerging.  Social 
confrontation expressed itself in an assertion of traditional conservative values 
focussed on banning abortion by a constitutional referendum and on preventing the 
introduction of divorce.  Economic confrontation expressed itself in a struggle on 
wages and disagreement on the root causes of inflation.  The system of conciliation 
and arbitration with which the civil service were familiar required careful, methodical 
preparation and a convincing submission.  Cases were won by argument and UPTCS 
had been very successful in arbitration.  When conciliation and arbitration came under 
attack by government UPTCS had to turn to industrial action, where success 
depended on militancy.  A trend emerged in the Union for militancy in certain areas 
that expressed itself in an informal alliance of members with a strong trade union 
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rather than professional identity. The collapse of centralised bargaining in 1981 led to 
a wages free-for-all in which the public sector lost out badly as the trade union 
movement failed to keep wages ahead of inflation.  As both public finances and 
unemployment spiralled out of control there was no consensus on the way out of the 
mounting difficulties that threatened national sovereignty.  The 1987 Programme for 
National Recovery offered the first clear direction out of economic chaos as the 
government, employers and trade unions moved from a process of bargaining to 
searching for a consensus on the problem.   
 
UPTCS in the 1980s 
The NEC of UPTCS of the 1980s faced a continual struggle as the public 
service faced a hostile media and governments that, whatever their political 
complexion, were determined to drive down public service numbers, pay and 
conditions.  The Union was led by a remarkably cohesive team that learned from 
other workers and non-civil service trade unionists and showed that UPTCS was 
prepared to fight hard in defence of its membership.  Brian McCurtain of the 
Placenames branch of the Ordnance Survey (1982-3); Alan Craig of the Architects 
Branch of the OPW (1984-5); Paul Doyle of the National Museum Branch (1986-7); 
Noreen Cunningham of the Agricultural officers Branch (1988) and John Prior of the 
Foresters Branch (1989-1990) all gave the leadership that enabled the union fight all 
the way through the most difficult decade it had faced.  The Union also moved into 
the mainstream of the wider trade union movement as the general secretary Greg 
Maxwell chaired the Public Services Committee of Congress.  
 
The economy 
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The fundamental difficulty in the 1980s were economic.  That there was a grave 
economic crisis developing was evident.  What was not evident was why the crisis 
had arisen and what should be done about it.  The neo-conservatives argued that the 
problem was the expanding state absorbing more and more resources and stifling 
initiative.  Those of a more social-democratic view argued that the problem was a 
narrow tax net which excluded farmers, encouraged the wealthy to evade tax, and 
tolerated a flourishing ‘black economy’.  Inflation, unemployment and emigration 
soared.  The numbers of registered unemployed jumped from 91,000 in 1980 to 
226,000 in 1985.  This was 19 per cent nationally with close to 100 per cent in some 
working class areas.  National debt stood at £24 billion in 1986, absorbing almost all 
the revenues derived from income tax to service it.  Marginal income tax levels rose 
with the average worker paying close to 57 per cent in income tax.  A spiral of 
economic constriction threatened to strangle the economy as taxes, debt and 
unemployment climber higher and higher.  A generation voted with its feet as 
emigration once again climbed to reach figures not seen since the 1950s.  Those 
emigrating were different to the earlier generations in that they were skilled, highly 
educated professionals transferring the benefits of their education to other 
economies.1  Just as in the 1950s, it was feared that an independent Ireland was not 
viable.  By 1986 the London Times was confidently reporting that the IMF was about 
to descend on Ireland.     
 
 
 
Changes in government 
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The June1981 Fine Gael-Labour coalition under Garret Fitzgerald was elected 
with the help of the independents.  Fianna Fáil had 78 seats, the coalition 80.   The 
election of the Taoiseach therefore lay with the independents.  John O’Connell, who 
had stood as an Independent Labour candidate against Frank Cluskey and had 
defeated him, was neutralised by being voted Ceann Comhairle.  Jim Kenny, the 
Limerick Socialist Party TD, voted for Fitzgerald as Taoiseach.  Noel Browne, 
founder of the Socialist Labour Party and the parties only TD, voted against Haughey 
for Taoiseach but abstained on the vote for Fitzgerald.  Joe Sherlock of the Workers 
Party did likewise.  Clearly Fitzgerald was elected Taoiseach because Haughey was 
unacceptable and coalition was seen as the lesser evil.  When the extent of the fiscal 
crisis that faced the state became apparent Fitzgerald may well have wished he had 
not been successful.  A supplementary budget was introduced in July 1981 as an 
immediate corrective to a borrowing requirement that was in danger of running out of 
control.  Spending cuts were imposed along with increases in taxation.2   
In January 1982 the imposition of VAT on children’s shoes by the Minister of 
Finance John Bruton, and justified by the Taoiseach as preventing tax evasion by 
women with small feet, was too much for Jim Kemmy.  He voted the budget down 
and the coalition fell.  Haughey tried to smooth his return to power and avoid an 
election by exerting pressure on President Hillery to refuse a dissolution and invite 
him to form a government.  Quite properly Hillery refused to facilitate an unsavoury 
stroke and granted the dissolution of the Dáil.3    The February 1982 general election 
left Fianna Fáil three seats short of a majority.  With the support of Tony Gregory, 
secured by a £50 million deal for his inner-city constituency, and the three Workers 
Party TDs, placated by promises of an economic strategy less right-wing than that of 
the former coalition, Haughey was elected Taoiseach 9 March 1982.  His government 
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was emasculated by bitter faction fighting within Fianna Fáil as his style of leadership 
alienated many and his failure to control spiralling public debt brought his economic 
policies into question.  In November, following the publication of the Fianna Fáil 
economic policy document, The Way Forward, the Workers Party TDs along with 
Tony Gregory withdrew their support and the government that was only eight months 
in office fell.   
The election of November 1982 brought Fitzgerald back to power at the head 
of a coalition with Labour, led by Dick Spring.  This coalition was sufficiently stable 
to last to 1987, sending Fianna Fáil into opposition for five years where the party was 
free to concentrate on its internal struggle to remove, or retain, Haughey as leader.  As 
a result of this power struggle the Progressive Democrats was formed in January 1986 
as a new political party determined to ‘break the mould’ of Irish politics; liberal on 
social issues and unapologetically neo-conservative on economic issues   
Haughey returned to power in February 1987 without an overall majority but 
offered a Dáil consensus for budgetary cutbacks by the new leader of Fine Gael, Alan 
Dukes, in the grandiosely named ‘Tallaght Strategy’, supported by the Progressive 
Democrats.  This consensus of the right was an attempt to exclude the left-wing 
parties and the trade union movement from economic policy-making.  It set the 
context for the discussions between Congress and Fianna Fáil that led to the 
emergence of a shared view on Ireland’s economic difficulties and also on the 
strategy to escape those difficulties agreed in the Programme for National Recovery.4  
    
Responsibilities, promotions and top level appointments 
The departments of government had been remarkably stable for the first fifty years of 
the State.  In response to new responsibilities and new expectations the late 1960s and 
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the 1970s saw an increasing tendency to break with traditional departments and 
experiment with new responsibilities.  In 1966 the Department of labour was created, 
reflecting the centrality of labour relations to the programmes for economic 
development.  In 1977 the new Department of Economic Planning and Development 
was established, to be later abolished by Haughey.  The abolition of the Department 
of Economic Planning and Development brought a transfer of economists to the 
Department of the Taoiseach, and not Finance, as the Department of the Taoiseach 
began to acquire a new supervisory and often intrusive role over economic, social, 
international, legal and cultural affairs.5  In response to the second oil crisis ‘Energy’ 
was added to the Department of Industry and Commerce.  It became a separate and 
autonomous department of state from 1982.  The Department of the Public Service 
was established as a separate department by the 1982 coalition, with John Boland 
appointed as Minister.  Originally conceived by the Devlin Review Group as an 
engine of strategic thinking and reform on the public service it acted in reality as a 
buffer between the civil service and the Department of Finance in wage negotiations.  
John Boland was an enthusiastic fan of boxing and brought a combative style to 
negotiations.6        
During the 1980s this willingness to create networks of responsibility within 
single departments was increased by the formation of coalition governments in which 
each party required a significant presence in key areas of responsibility whilst 
restrained by the constitutional limit of fifteen seats at cabinet.7  The networks of 
departmental responsibilities almost meant that whole sections were transferred from 
one department to another with little or no consultation and often with no apparent 
rationale.  The Union had to adapt quickly to the new structures and new conciliation 
schemes with new personnel in the new composite departments.8  The Union was also 
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anxious about the function of the independent authorities that were being established 
by the government in increasing numbers and the future status of the civil servants 
transferred to them.  For UPTCS the establishment of new bodies to perform 
functions previously performed by civil servants implied a want of efficiency in those 
civil servants.  The establishment of An Bord Pleanála to deal with planning appeals 
in a system mired in corruption was actually directed at the political rather than the 
official side of the planning process.  However the National Agricultural Advisory 
and Research Authority, or the National Board for Science and Technology, despite 
the assurances of the Department of the Public Service, did seem implicitly to criticise 
the professional civil service.  The Union faced its greatest cultural challenge when 
the postal and communications service was transformed into semi-state corporations 
in 1984.  30,000 staff, including several hundred members of UPTCS, ceased to be 
civil servants as they were transferred to An Post and to An Bord Telecom.   The 
terms of their transfer to the new commercial environment allowed for the continued 
representation of the professional and technical officers by UPTCS.  Following the 
creation of ACOT, An Post and Telecom Éireann the Union now organised members 
outside the civil service.  This meant finding a balance between the opportunities 
offered by the new companies and the loss of security.9  
In line with more complex departmental structures, the number of senior level 
civil servants increased and promotions to these new vacancies became an important 
issue within the Union.  In 1973 the government established the Civil Service 
Advisory Council to drive change and advance a more managerial and functional civil 
service.  In response the IPCS began to debate a policy on promotion.  This was at a 
time when the impact of membership of the EEC was demanding a more sophisticated 
level of policy formation and delivery from the Irish government.  The Institute was 
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inhibited in developing a promotions policy by the heterogeneous character of the 
membership with many levels of professional and technical grades being represented.  
The questions that a Union policy on promotion would have to address included 
whether promotion should follow seniority or should it seek out the best candidate for 
the job, should academic qualification be preferred to experience, should promotion 
be kept within a department or should it be offered to outsiders?  It was also believed 
that the administrative grades had secured control of promotions and used it to further 
the generalist grades.  The Institute remained suspicious that promotion was being 
kept within the administrative grades as ‘jobs for the boys’ but recognised that its 
policy would have to be coherent, reasonable and capable of being defended by 
logical argument against the administratively-dominated official side.10   
Resistance to any agreement on all-grade service-wide promotion also came 
from the AHCS and from the Department of the Public Service as any expansion of 
the field of candidates would lessen opportunity on the one hand whilst also 
increasing the complexity of promotion on the other.11  The establishment of the Top 
Level Appointments Commission (TLAC) in 1984 by the coalition government 
enforced a more open and competitive system for appointments at the most senior 
levels of Assistant Secretary level and above, including professional posts, to all 
government departments.  Made up of the Secretary Generals of a range of 
departments and including non-civil service members, the TLAC was established as 
an independent assessor for promotions whose recommendations are accepted by the 
minsters of each department.  UPTCS welcomed the TLAC and the promise that 
ability alone would count in competitions for promotions.  The UPTCS conference of 
1984 was probably unique in welcoming John Boland with enthusiasm, such was the 
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resentment at the restrictions on opportunities previously suffered by the professional 
civil service.12  
  A lateral mobility scheme for the civil service was introduced in 1977 to 
provide civil servants with opportunities for broadening their skills and acquiring new 
experiences that they could bring back to their departments by encouraging movement 
across the public service.13  However the exclusion of the professional grades from 
this scheme was a great disappointment to the UPTCS as it might help answer the 
argument that the lack of general experience limited the possibilities for promotion 
that might be available to the professional grade.   In fact the lateral mobility scheme 
failed miserably as few in the senior administrative grades were willing to move out 
of their own departments for fear of losing out in the pecking order.  John Boland, as 
Minister for the Public Service, attempted to force movement by setting quotas but 
this also failed as the senior managers remained opposed to the scheme, fearing the 
loss of experienced staff at a time when all departments were under pressure due to 
staff reductions.  The failure to engage with the civil service trade unions and the 
private sector, along with the exclusion of the professional grades who were most 
willing and who would be more likely to find worthwhile positions in the private 
sector, doomed a worthwhile initiative.14 
Another innovation was the appointment by ministers of special advisers in 
the 1982-7 coalition.  Brought in from outside the civil service, which by definition 
was the primary advisor to ministers, often with no obviously relevant background, 
the role of these special advisors was never too clear.  It was suspected by some that 
their brief was to maintain a watching eye on the departmental civil service rather 
than on political partners in cabinet.  These special advisors was a central issue for 
UPTCS.  A key role of the senior civil service, especially in the professional grades, 
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was to offer dispassionate advice on policy questions, laying out the likely 
consequences of any course of action.  These special advisors seemed to acquire the 
role of offering political advice contradicting the professional advice being offered by 
the civil service in those same discussions.  Establishing the Office of the 
Ombudsman in 1984 and a new system of Dáil  committees in the 1980s added to the 
pressure on policy-advising levels in the departments.  Michael Mills, the 
Ombudsman, found a public service characterised by brusqueness at best and often 
wilful obstruction of the public whose interest it purported to serve.15 
In 1985 John Boland published the government White Paper Serving the 
Country Better.16  The White Paper aimed to improve the management of the public 
service by freeing ministers and departments from purely routine work allowing them 
to concentrate on important policy issues.17  Departments would be obliged to 
produce clear statements of aims and objectives, set clear targets, decentralise 
decision-making and deliver prompt service to the public.  Serving the Country Better 
did succeed in creating a less hostile and anonymous style to the public service.  It got 
rid of the ‘serving hatch’ style of welfare delivery and required that all public servants 
identify themselves to the public.  However, despite the rhetoric on the public service 
the White Paper was very much about the civil service only and despite also the 
fashionable emphasis on management systems, ‘reform’ was mainly about cutting the 
size of the civil service.18  This policy of deep cuts, mainly at the senior levels, 
inflicted long-term damage on the operational efficiency of the civil service.   
 
 
We know about this 
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UPTCS welcomed the proposals to delegate more authority to local managers.  It had 
long been a complaint of the membership that the professional civil servant had to 
constantly defer to technically ignorant administrative officers.  The Union 
encouraged the membership to use their expertise to explore innovative approaches to 
their fields, often supplying the strategic thinking lacking in the Department of 
Finance and in the senior administrative grades of the civil service generally.  In 1973 
the National Museum branch researched and published a report on the museum 
service suggesting that a National Museum Council be established to formulate policy 
and administer the museum service.  The report recommended the decentralisation of 
the museum with new centres throughout the country to which collections should be 
transferred, thus anticipating by many years the transfer of the Folklife Collection to 
Castlebar.   
In 1986 the Architectural Branch of UPTCS in the OPW researched and 
published a report on a public architectural service that would be substantially less 
costly than contracting out the service to the private sector.  In response to the 
designation of 1987-8 as the European Year of the Environment UPTCS sponsored a 
policy document on nature conservation in Ireland by the Union’s members in the 
field of heritage and natural history.  This was many years before it became apparent 
that the Irish government was neglecting its legal requirements under the European 
Directives on Environmental Impact Assessment and that irreplaceable natural sites 
were being destroyed.  UPTCS members were not afraid to suggest better ways of 
running their own areas of concern.  The members in the Patents Office researched 
and published a proposal for an independent review body for the Irish patent law 
system.   
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One of the most important policy papers published by UPTCS was Irish 
Forestry-A Review in 1984.  Researched by the technical workers in the forestry 
service the review was a response to the neglect which had overtaken the afforestation 
programme.  The Irish forestry policy originally envisaged planting 10,000 hectares a 
year to achieve a national forest of 470,000 hectares by 1990.  This was recognised as 
the size required for its efficient management and to develop a forestry industry. By 
the 1980s it was clear that forestry was not getting the long-term strategic thinking to 
ensure that its future exploitation would not suffer from uneven production.  An 
industry that anticipated planting at a rate of 10,000 hectares an year could not survive 
a shortage of supply that would follow any reduction in planting below that rate.  
During the 1970s the rate of planting had fallen off and there was a significant risk 
that the state forestry programme would simply wither away.  The UPTCS report 
made the radical suggestion that the development of the forests should be taken out of 
the civil service and transferred to a commercial semi-state body to ensure its efficient 
management, although this would necessarily mean that the technical and professional 
officers would lose their civil service status.  In time the sense of this policy was 
accepted, leading to the establishment of Coillte as a commercial enterprise, thus 
ensuring the viability of the forestry industry of today.   
The members of the professional and technical civil service who worked on 
these policy reports did so in their own time, putting many hours into research and 
discussion.  These were ‘bottom-up’ initiatives by professionals who felt that, they as 
professionals, should inform the debate on policy.  Their inspiration was the 
frustration at seeing neglect and mishandling in policy areas in which they offered 
considerable expertise.  They saw problems and in response offered expert analysis 
and viable solutions.  The National Museum report was a response to the inadequacies 
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of the accommodation and display space, poor communication with the public, the 
danger of damage to artefacts housed in unsafe conditions within the museum and the 
threat that this neglect posed to the national heritage.  The report on natural heritage 
responded to the threat posed by the EEC-driven intensification of agriculture which 
was causing the loss of a wide variety of grassland, wetland, moorland and bog 
habitats.  The lack of strategic thinking in the senior policy-making levels meant it 
was only the professional civil servants with expertise in nature conservation 
recognised the problem.  The traditions of the civil service regarded the formulation 
of policy as the preserve of the administrative elite, with professional civil servants 
offering advice only.  That some professional civil servants were not only engaged in 
suggesting policy but were actually publishing their advice, was regarded as highly 
audacious at least, in some cases as subversive of the natural order of things.  UPTCS 
provided cover for those branches daring to publish these reports but it was made 
clear to members that the senior administrative levels of the departments regarded 
these reports as an unwise trespass by subordinates into their territory.  Some of those 
who worked on these reports found themselves being invited by their administrative 
seniors to explain how this sort of work could be reconciled with their role as civil 
servants.  The Museum staff who worked on the policy document in 1973 were very 
careful to ensure that they could not be individually identified.  The value of these 
sorts of initiatives were not lost on the politicians however.  UPTCS discovered that 
the senior civil servants in the Department of Fisheries and Forestry had strongly 
argued against Paddy O’Toole, the Minister, officially launching the review into the 
forest service.  O’Toole resisted the pressure and did make the launch, though it was 
noted that he was not accompanied by many of his senior officials.  An Taoiseach 
Charles J. Haughey agreed to launch the report on the architectural services and 
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commended the report on natural heritage.  The difficulty for UPTCS members was 
that they were not immersed in the culture of the civil service, their natural loyalty 
was to the truth of their professional and technical training and they were 
uncomfortable at acceding to the arcane restrictions of an overly rigid hierarchy that 
seemed often incapable of strategic thinking.  
The Union also welcomed the commitment to promotion by merit, on which 
Minister Boland seemed to be genuine.  Problems that could be anticipated lay in the 
proposed ‘Merit Pay’ whereby ‘outstanding performance’ by an individual civil 
servant would be awarded by additional pay.  What ‘outstanding performance’ was, 
how it would be measured, and who would measure it, were all areas of difficulty.  
The Union therefore declared that it was available for negotiation and consultation on 
the White Paper, but privately remained sceptical as to whether it would produce any 
real reforms.19  The Union did co-operate with the introduction of a system of 
performance appraisal, a then fashionable instrument of management science.  The 
Union saw it as an important advance in career development, promotion and job 
satisfaction which would benefit members.  The scheme provided a framework in 
which staff and management could work together in a structured process of self-
assessment, appraisal and forward planning of each public servant.20  UPTCS may 
well have been more welcoming to the White Paper had it not been published in the 
middle of the most serious confrontation between the state and the civil service for a 
generation.  
 
The economy and the neo-conservative analysis 
In the 1980s economists acquired a new status as experts in government and as 
commentators on Ireland’s situation.  Government strategy in the 1970s had been 
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dominated by the TCD economist Dr Martin O’Donoghue who promoted the policy 
of the state using deficit budgeting to overcome the effects of the oil crisis and 
subsequent recession.  This was a generally accepted counter-cyclical strategy in 
periods of economic downturn.  The 1980s in turn was dominated by  a commentariat 
grouped around the UCD economist Brendan Walsh that included the consultant 
Colm McCarthy and the Irish Times journalist Paul Tansey.  This coterie was known 
as the ‘Doheny and Nesbitt School’ in reference to their usual meeting place.  Much 
of the economic commentary they inspired was not academic and amounted to 
nothing more valuable than opinions fuelled by pints.  Consciously or unconsciously 
influenced by Thatcherism and Reaganomics and the rise of the Chicago school of 
monetarism, these commentators encouraged an apocalyptic tone in their warnings of 
the dangers that the rising public debt posed for the State.   
The fundamental problem that they identified; the impossibility of indefinitely 
funding state expansion by borrowing; was being generally accepted by the early 
1980s as the core problem in the Irish economy.  Levels of taxation, both direct  and 
indirect, were stifling economic activity and cutting personal consumption and 
therefore feeding recessionary forces.  Current budget deficits were so out of control 
that they were becoming unpredictable as the underestimation of the real deficits 
varied from 81 per cent in 1979 to 46 per cent in 1982, making the whole budget 
exercise meaningless.21  How to deal with that problem was not so clear however, 
with arguments around whether the government ought to increase taxation even 
further or reduce public services, or a mix of both.22  In the background to this 
political-economic struggle, and keenly watched by all the protagonists, was the 
defeat of the British trade union movement, especially in the public sector, by the 
Thatcher-led Conservative government. 
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The 1981-82 Coalition 
  In July 1981 the new Minister for Finance of the coalition, John Bruton, 
introduced a supplementary budget that began to tackle the fiscal deficit through cuts 
in public sector pay and increasing taxation.  He imposed an embargo on new jobs in 
the public sector and on special pay increases, whilst increasing excise duties, VAT 
rates and extracting a £50 million levy from the banking sector.  Bruton identified 
inflation and the heavy level of national debt as the key problems threatening Irish 
economic sovereignty.  Failure to deal with the problem would lead inevitably to the 
arrival of the IMF.  The budget was based on the hope that reducing the national debt 
and controlling inflation would lead to a growth in employment.23   The implication 
was that the coalition government was moving towards a pay freeze in the public 
sector, by agreement if possible and by legislation if necessary.  The private sector 
was expected to follow the lead set by the government.   
The National Understanding of 1980 came to an end and the government 
signalled that it was not convinced of the value of centralised bargaining by allowing 
the talks for a successor agreement to fail.  The employer-government demand for a 
long pay pause followed by low pay increases was unacceptable to Congress.  A 
‘free-for-all’ period of wage bargaining in the context of rising unemployment was in 
prospect.  In October Congress recorded the breakdown of the national pay 
negotiations and advised individual unions to put in claims that would maintain their 
members living standards.24 
 In response to the July budget the UPTCS general council asked the NEC to 
call a special delegate conference to oppose the pay and jobs cuts.  So far as the Union 
was concerned the issue was simply one of the government breaching the conciliation 
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process and the terms of the National Understanding by an unilateral action.  The 
government circularised the civil service arbitrator with a copy of the budget 
statement and requested that in any decision the board should take would comply with 
the budget strategy.  The Chairman of the civil service arbitration board, Peter 
Maguire, replied publicly that the board ‘would not have any regard to the Minister’s 
statement’ as the availability of public funds was not relevant to arbitration arguments 
and was a matter for the Minister for Finance and not the arbitrator.  The conciliation 
and arbitration scheme and the public sector pay determination system was, it seemed, 
the main target of the government’s budget strategy.25  However the government then 
confused matters by entering negotiations on a new agreement with the public service 
committee of Congress which offered terms more generous than offered in the failed 
National Understanding talks.  The Public Service Pay Agreement demanded no pay 
pause and offered a three-phase increase of 2 per cent in December 1981, 6 per cent in 
March 1982 and a further 5 per cent in October 1982.26  The employers refused an 
invitation from the government to accept the public service agreement as the basis for 
a new national agreement and the 1980s the private sector saw localised bargaining in 
which hard-won increases were rapidly overtaken by tax and inflation.27  Then in 
January the attempt to extend VAT to children’s’ footwear in Bruton’s second budget 
brought down the coalition government.   
 
Fianna Fáil: February-November 1982 
Ray McSharry, who succeeded Bruton as Minister for Finance had to find the 
money to fund the Gregory Deal.  Rejecting the apocalyptic rhetoric of the previous 
government he promised that the ‘gloom and doom’ would be replaced by ‘boom and 
bloom’.  However a net foreign debt of £5,114 million could not be brushed aside and 
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in July 1982 he announced the postponement of the 5 per cent final instalment of the 
agreed public service pay deal, no further pay increases in pay for 1982 and 1983, in 
effect an eighteen month pay freeze, and staffing restrictions in which two out of 
every three vacancies were to left unfilled, along with cutbacks of £75 million in 
government programmes.  The Civil Service Staff Panel and the Public Services 
Committee of Congress rejected the embargo on new recruitment and called on the 
trade unions to participate in a campaign to defend existing agreements. UPTCS 
interpreted the government announcement as an attack on the industrial relations 
process within the public service.  Settlements arrived at within the established 
procedures of conciliation and arbitration could not be swept aside.  The NEC 
announced that UPTCS was in full agreement with Congress and recommended 
members to participate in a co-ordinated campaign of protests and work stoppages.28  
A special meeting of the Civil Service Staff Panel representing 60,000 civil servants 
also demanded that the government cease interfering with the conciliation and 
arbitration process and began to plan a series of public protests and rallies.29  UPTCS 
and the other public service unions therefore interpreted the government action as an 
attack on the hard-won process of wage negotiation which had secured civil servants 
some measure of control over their conditions.  Though the government publicly 
presented their action as being about pay only, it seemed clear to the public service 
unions that the main target was in fact the whole system of pay bargaining in the 
public service.  This was confirmed when, after a series of protest meetings and a 
threatened stoppage, the public services committee of Congress and the government 
met to agree a revised public services pay agreement.  The revised agreement offered 
no increase in pay until January 1983, with the amount forgone being paid in two 
instalments in February and in June 1983.  Special grade claims which had already 
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reached arbitration would also be paid, implying that future arbitration awards would 
not.  The embargo on recruitment would continue with no regard to the level of the 
post.  UPTCS members rejected the revised agreement as it worsened the original 
agreement and depressed living standards, but bowed to the inevitable when a 
majority of the public service unions accepted it.  It was clear that active opposition 
had little support across the public service and, in the context of frequent criticisms by 
commentators in the media of public service pay levels, a bad agreement was better 
than no agreement, so long as the government went through the motions of 
consultation. 
In contrast to the outright opposition on pay, UPTCS welcomed the promise to 
review government priorities but remained sceptical, citing the lack of consultation 
with the specialist grades.  Suspicion about the intentions of the administrative grades 
also clustered around the operation of the embargo on recruitment.  Many members 
were convinced that the senior administrative officers in the departments were 
manipulating retirement dates to ensure that administrative posts would be filled by 
artificially qualifying as the third of the ‘one in three’ vacancies.  This was done at the 
expense of the specialist posts which seemed to be often the first and second of the 
one in three.30  With the publication of the Fianna Fáil economic policy The Way 
Forward, which promised more cutbacks in public services, the Workers Party and 
Tony Gregory withdrew support from the government and in a confidence motion on 
4 November, voted with the opposition bringing down the government.  The general 
election followed on 24 November.  
     
The Second Coalition: 1982-87. 
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The second Fine Gael and Labour coalition of the 1980s was united on 
Northern Ireland policy and on social questions but had a very difficult relationship 
on budget policy, as the memoir of the Minister for Education, Gemma Hussey, 
reveals.31  Much time and energy was spent by Fine Gael and Labour on the abortion 
and divorce campaigns.  These campaigns made little progress on the liberalisation of 
Irish society whilst galvanising the most intransigent traditionalists.  Alan Dukes in 
Finance and his Fine Gael cabinet colleagues argued for reductions in expenditure 
financed by public sector pay cuts if possible but a pay standstill at least, along with 
cuts in public services.  The fall in public service costs were matched by increases in 
taxation as the government concentrated on reducing the public debt.  Labour found 
itself having to agree with the broad strategy whilst fighting on the details.  Thus the 
coalition stumbled from budget to budget and crisis to crisis, its cohesion threatened 
by the strains caused by the rescue of the private business Dublin Gas contrasting with 
the failure to rescue the public enterprise Irish Shipping in 1983, the withdrawal of 
subsidies on food prices in 1984, and the closure of Carysfort Teacher Training 
College in 1986.   
The government strategy for economic recovery was outlined in a policy 
document Building On Reality 1985-1987 published in 1984, at the core of which was 
the aim of ending budget deficits by rigid control of public sector salaries.32  The 
botched reshuffle of the cabinet in February 1986 brought John Bruton back to 
Finance and merged the Department of the Public Services with the Department of 
Labour under Ruairí Quinn, but the way the coalition would end was already 
apparent.  A budget based on the policy of Building On Reality led to the withdrawal 
of the Labour Party and the end of the coalition.  A brief period of Fine Gael minority 
government ended in a general election in February 1987. 
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The UPTCS Response 
UPTCS would have preferred a national approach to pay in 1983, with 
agreement of short duration offering a single phase increase that matched inflation 
but, recognising that a national agreement was unlikely, supported a new public 
service agreement or a civil service agreement.  A national agreement would deflect 
the efforts that the government and media were making to single out public service 
pay as the main problem facing the economy.  The Union also wanted the removal of 
the embargo on public service posts to be included in the discussion, whilst accepting 
that in fact the government would not lift the embargo.  What was required was a 
guarantee that the embargo was not the prelude to the suppression of the vacant 
posts.33  When, as expected, there was no national agreement, the Union suggested 
that the public service unions wait until pay trends had emerged in the private sector 
before putting in a claim.   The Union wanted to concentrate its resources on the 
embargo.  Branches were finding it difficult to implement the policy of opposing the 
embargo and wanted clear direction from the NEC on how they ought to respond.34  
The negotiation of a public service pay agreement was now the province of the 
Department of the Public Services and the Minister, John Boland.  In March the 
government announced that there would a public service pay freeze until the Autumn 
to be followed by a single low percentage increase to last eighteen months.  What the 
government wanted therefore was a two-year agreement with a significant pause and 
low percentage increases.  At a meeting with the Public Services Committee of 
Congress Boland seemed to indicate that the government position was one that 
offered scope for negotiation.  However when talks began it was soon clear that in 
fact the Minister was not going to depart from the stated government policy.  The 
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negotiating committee decided therefore that there was no point in further discussions 
and the talks broke down.  Some weeks later the minister revived the talks and in 
September the public service unions reluctantly accepted, recognising that it was the 
best deal could be done.  UPTCS decided to accept the offer after considering and 
rejecting the alternatives of arbitration or industrial action.  Arbitration was an 
uncertain and slow process whilst industrial action would not have received broad 
support across the Union and would have exposed internal divisions.  The public 
service pay agreement for 1983 ran from the beginning of September 1983 to the end 
of May 1984.  Thus the Minister got the pay pause the government had wanted.  Pay 
increases were in two phases of 4.75 per cent from September 1983 and 3.25 per cent 
from February 1984, a total increase of 8 per cent.35   
Following the conclusion of the pay negotiations the Union concentrated on 
seeking to break the embargo.  This was part of a strategy by the Public Services 
Committee of Congress to publicise the importance of the public services to Irish 
society.  A poster campaign highlighted the positive value of the public service and 
encouraged at least a questioning of the media hostility to the sector.  Branches were 
requested to provide information on the posts that were suppressed in each 
government department and agency in order that a campaign could be made on how 
the embargo was reducing the provision of an effective service to the public.36  
Unfortunately the branches were very lax in their response and by the end of the year 
only five case studies could be presented by the NEC working party, despite the 
general recognition that only a dramatic exposé of diminishing public services would 
undermine the embargo.37   The Union did not succeed in developing a successful 
response to the embargo.  Members found it difficult to refuse additional duties where 
these were clearly appropriate to their grade and post.  More significant was that the 
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public service unions were unable to show a common response except on pay.  The 
civil service unions were too suspicious of each other and too protective of their own 
members’ interests to find common ground on the embargo.  Each post lost to one 
grade was one not lost to another grade.  Each union was relieved to see the loss being 
endured by others.    
In April 1984 John Boland announced two new schemes to reduce civil 
service numbers.  The first offered ‘career breaks’ without pay of at least one and not 
more than three years to any public servant.  It was hoped that some public servants 
would undertake further education or simply travel.  The point was to achieve a 
temporary reduction in numbers that might become a more permanent one.  The 
second scheme offered ‘job-sharing’ by dividing a full-time job into two half-time 
jobs with pro-rata pay and conditions.  This was clearly aimed at women in the civil 
service who might be willing to job-share to cope with child-rearing.38  
1984 to1986 were testing years for the Union and the whole of the public 
service.  A sustained attack on the conciliation and arbitration scheme by the 
government received support from media commentators who accepted the 
government line that the public service pay bill was the key economic problem facing 
the country.  The background to these years was the unfolding attack on the British 
trade unions by the Thatcher government as the Cheltenham GCHQ civil servants 
were compelled to surrender their right to trade union representation and the full 
weight of the State was used to crush the miners’ strike.  The popularity of the new 
political party, the Progressive Democrats, suggested that there was significant 
electoral support for similar neo-conservative economic policies in Ireland. 
How the government was going to address pay negotiation became clear as the 
Public Services Pay Agreement expired on 1 June 1984.  Despite the long established 
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practice of seeking agreements at either national or public service level, and despite 
the willingness of the unions to negotiate, the government simply refused to engage.  
The coalition’s position on public service pay was revealed in a general statement in 
April and in the more detailed plan Building On Reality 1985-87, published in 
October.  The April statement by Alan Dukes gave the government approach to pay in 
general.  Noting that inflation was coming under control but unemployment continued 
to rise the government wanted a long pay pause followed by a pay increase of not 
more than a few percentage points, the pay agreements to run for at least eighteen 
months.  It was generally accepted that the figure the government had in mind for 
increases was 3 percent.  Building On Reality revealed a much hardened attitude on 
public service pay.  Putting it to the public service that employees who have relatively 
secure jobs would have to accept that the national interest required a virtual standstill 
on wages, the national plan made it clear that there would be further cuts in public 
service numbers and further cuts in real pay for those who remained.  The public 
service employees would have to bear the burden of solving national economic 
problems.  The aloof and moralising tone in which much of the report was written 
further irritated the public service unions and made negotiations more difficult.39 
In April Congress, in the absence of any centralised agreement, advised 
member unions to pursue claims that would protect living standards and to also seek a 
shorter working week.  UPTCS put in a claim seeking ‘a substantial increase’ in pay 
and an additional two days annual leave with a forward date for grade increases which 
were not due to be paid until September the following year.  The claim was brought to 
conciliation, with disagreement being recorded in June.  In August a statement of the 
claim was lodged with the arbitration board.  The term of office of the chairman of the 
arbitration board, Hugh Geoghegan, expired at the end of July.  With the failure to 
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either re-appoint Geoghegan or propose someone different the government’s tactics 
became evident.  A wages freeze would be imposed by the expedient of leaving the 
chairmanship of the arbitration board vacant.  Pay claims would line up as 
conciliation failed, but would remain sidelined for so long as the arbitration board 
could not meet.  Public support for the government was courted by frequent 
government statements expressing its intent to deal with greedy public sector 
employees.40  To UPTCS it seemed clear that much more than pay was at issue and 
the government was intent on undermining the whole conciliation and arbitration 
process for the public service. 
The Public Service Committee of Congress, agreeing with the UPTCS 
analysis, began to mobilise for industrial action to secure the re-appointment of the 
Chairman.  The threat of a national public service work stoppage scheduled for 3 
October led to the re-appointment of Geoghegan on 24 September, just over a week 
before the threatened stoppage.41  For the first time since 1952 a general pay claim for 
the public service went to arbitration as the government refused to engage in the 
conciliation stage and insisted that detailed figures for public pay as given in the 
national plan were non-negotiable.  It was in this context that Building On Reality was 
published.   
The official side to the arbitration hearing argued that the claim had to be 
considered in the context of the national plan Building On Reality 1985-1987 and 
used the hearing to make a detailed presentation on the economic background to the 
plan, detailing the low level of growth, high unemployment, high levels of taxes and 
the dramatic increase in government deficits.  The crux of the official side argument 
was that the government, as protector of the common good, in the prevailing 
economic climate had a duty to plead inability to pay, and the civil service had a duty 
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to act in the national interest and forego any increase in pay.  The tradition on which 
civil service pay had always been determined, comparability with outside rates and 
compensation for rises in the cost of living, was ignored and a different basis ‘the 
national interest’ was introduced.  The official side wanted the government to be no 
longer regarded as an employer but rather as the ‘Government’ that had to protect the 
common good.  The arbitrator’s decision, announced in January 1985, was a delicate 
balancing act that acknowledged the argument of the official side but noted that 
Building On Reality was political rather than economic in its origins and that whilst 
the arbitrator could not ignore the financial circumstances of the State it did not have 
to be bound by any particular statement of the Government.  The national plan 
represented the policy of the government as ‘Government’ and the arbitrator had no 
view on the merits of government policy.  Nor could the arbitration disregard outside 
settlements in determining pay.  However it had to take into account the ability of the 
‘government as employer’ to pay an award and the high level of borrowing that public 
pay already demanded.  The arbitrator awarded an increase of 3 percent from January 
1985 and a further 3 percent from July 1985, the agreement to last until the end of 
1985.42    
 
 
 
The pay freeze 
On the August Bank Holiday, 1985 the government announced that it was 
imposing a pay freeze in the public service which would last until January 1987 at the 
earliest.  The freeze included any outstanding arbitration findings or Labour Court 
recommendations.  The government announcement coincided with the termination 
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once again of the term of office of the chairman of the arbitration board.  Bearing in 
mind the problems experienced in 1984 the General Staff Panel side had written to the 
Minister for the Public Service early in April on the reappointment of the arbitrator.  
The minister replied that he would consider the reappointment but before that he 
wished to have discussions on requiring the arbitrator take account of government 
policy and the economic position, the procedures of the conciliation and arbitration 
scheme and the possibility of a single public service conciliation and arbitration 
scheme.  UPTCS was actually willing to enter discussions on revising the scheme as it 
had its own problems with the operations of conciliation and arbitration and was 
certainly open to new ideas.  However the announcement of the freeze changed the 
agenda as the Congress general secretary stated that the government had made a 
‘declaration of war on the trade union movement’ and called for industrial action by 
all public service unions with a one-day strike on 15 October.43  A standoff then 
developed with the Minister for the Public Service insisted that the whole system of 
public pay determination, a new pay round, existing agreements and the arbitrator’s 
re-appointment would have to be all up for negotiation as the public service unions, 
whilst not ruling out the minister’s request, insisted on the prior re-appointment of the 
arbitrator.   
UPTCS took the view that the attitude of the government meant that 
discussion on revising the scheme could not be meaningful.44  The Union NEC was 
worried that the one-day strike might not get full support from the members.  As Alan 
Craig the Union chairman regretted, UPTCS had grown from a collection of small 
branches and many branches still acted as if they were representing their own grades 
only, when what was required was for all the members to think, act and portray 
themselves as a ‘Union’ with a single interest.45  The Union spent a great deal of 
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energy planning for the national stoppage and ensuring complete solidarity from the 
membership.  The objectives were to protect the existing negotiation machinery 
through the reappointment of the arbitrator, to ensure the honouring of agreed awards, 
and to secure free negotiation of a new pay round within the current C&A scheme.  
The one-day stoppage, the first national strike by the public service in the history of 
the State, received complete support across the public sector unions, including 
UPTCS.  Most civil and public servants had never been on strike or patrolled a picket 
line, so the enthusiasm of the 160,000 who came out was impressive.  All government 
departments were closed as were the airports and public parks.  The strike brought 
home the usefulness and ubiquity of the public service and its role in civil life.  The 
strike was co-ordinated by the Public Services Committee of Congress.   
 
Defending the arbitration scheme 
Buoyed up by the success of the one-day action UPTCS began to plan for 
gearing up the industrial action with selective action by sections of the Union.  This 
was in line with action by the LGPSU and by the combined teacher unions, all 
designed to put pressure on the government to reinstate the arbitrator and honour the 
agreed awards.  However the October one-day strike was the high point of public 
service unity.  By year’s end the government’s strategy began to cause divisions and 
the united front began to disintegrate.  
 The government strategy was to link in a complex package several different 
issues on public service pay.  These issues were the terms of the 1986 pay round, the 
treatment of outstanding arbitration awards, and the phasing of existing or new 
claims.  The government insisted that these all be treated as a package, to be 
negotiated on an ‘all or nothing’ basis.  The General Panel Staff Side, including 
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UPTCS, would not accept this and wished to separate the issue of the pay round from 
all other issues.  The Union was more concerned than the other public service unions 
about the status of arbitration awards because almost all the outstanding awards were 
UPTCS cases.  This was because of the heterogeneous nature of the membership.  
Most of the public service unions had single grade members or else dealt with a single 
employer side.  UPTCS represented many different posts and grades which generated 
issues of pay and conditions not covered by national agreements.  Much of the day-to-
day activity of the Union officers centred on complex arbitration negotiations.  In 
1986 the Union had nine outstanding arbitration awards ranging from Air Traffic 
Control Officers to Foresters to Local Government Auditors.  The government’s 
policy of not implementing arbitration awards therefore had greater significance for 
UPTCS than for the other unions. 
 In November the government offered a two year agreement with 3 
percent increase for the first year and 2 percent for the second year, conditional on 
agreement being reached on the phasing in of existing awards, on how existing claims 
would be processed and on the position of future claims, as well as meaningful 
discussions on the machinery for pay determination.  The Public Services Committee 
of Congress in reply demanded the re-appointment of the arbitrator and suggested that 
discussions on the implementation of existing awards should be with the unions 
concerned in the awards rather than with the Congress committee.  The NEC of the 
Union rejected the pay offer but offered to negotiate on pay if the arbitrator was re-
appointed and if the government agreed that any meetings on outstanding awards 
affecting UPTCS members were with UPTCS directly.  The Civil Service Staff Panel 
met in early December but decided to defer any consideration until the new year.  
Then the Local Authorities & Health Services Staff Panel broke ranks and agreed to 
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negotiate with the Minister.   The Civil Service Staff Panel immediately decided to 
enter negotiations on the offer, despite the public objections of the UPTCS that it had 
no authority to change awards won by the Union.  A special meeting of the Panel met 
to censure the UPTCS and to vote on a motion to exclude the Union from discussions.  
The UPTCS stood its ground and secured agreement that the Panel had no role in 
discussions on awards already made by the Arbitrator or the Labour Court and that 
such discussions must be held with the Union concerned.46  However the splintering 
of the public service group of unions gave little grounds for optimism in the year 
ahead and the tough negotiations that both sides were gearing up for. 
The talks that began in January 1986 quickly collapsed as it was apparent that 
the Minister, John Boland, was primarily focused on changing the arbitration awards 
and without these in the package was not interested in negotiating.  Thus the 
arbitration awards, and these mainly UPTCS awards, became the breaking point.  
UPTCS urged the other public service unions on the Panel to stick to the agreed 
position that only UPTCS could discuss awards which were its concern, but with the 
minister refusing to discuss pay alone the pressure was relentless.  At the Panel 
disagreements emerged as legal opinion suggested that the panel was empowered to 
decide on any arbitration award, even if the Union affected disagreed.  However much 
of this discussion was becoming merely academic as the government, supported by 
the Progressive Democrats, secured a Dáil  majority on a motion to amend the 
arbitration award made to the teachers.  A similar motion on the professional and 
technical civil service arbitration awards would be far less contentious than the 
teachers and a government majority would be assured.47   
 
The 1986 Strike  
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With the government refusing to negotiate directly with UPTCS on the 
arbitration awards and with the other Panel unions failing to support the UPTCS 
position a decision was made to emulate the teachers and force the issue through 
strike action.  It was vital that the government should not be allowed pick and choose 
which arbitration award it would  honour.  It was feared that inaction and 
subservience would encourage a defeatist attitude in the membership which would 
only encourage the government side.48  Following an emergency motion and a 
fighting speech by the Chairman Paul Doyle of the Museums Branch at the April 
conference, it was agreed to take strike action using various groups in the Department 
of Agriculture as the shock troops.49   Agricultural Officers (AO) had long-standing 
grievances on their pay and status.  Their structure dated back to 1972 and over the 
years members had sought to re-align their grades to a higher level within the overall 
civil service grading system.  In 1972 the AO grade had submitted a claim for re-
grading within the terms of the 1972 National Wage Agreement, clause 18.  The AOs 
wanted better pay, but also better opportunity for mobility, re-training and promotion.  
Working in often difficult conditions in meat factories their work in meat 
classification and grading was vital to the industry.  Unusually for civil servants they 
worked alongside industrial workers, many of whom went home with a bigger wage 
than the average AO.50   
The May-June strike by the agricultural officers was the most important 
engaged in by the Union in its history.  The timing of the strike was of strategic 
importance.  The teacher unions were locked in a protracted dispute on the same issue 
of the status of arbitration awards.  It was argued that the union should not allow the 
government merge the teacher and UPTCS disputes as a single issue and therefore the 
union should wait until the teachers dispute had been resolved before acting.  On the 
 237 
other hand the decision to use the creameries as the site for the dispute was based not 
only on it being a major industry but also that its peak production was during the 
summer months.  Severe disruption could be caused by as few as one hundred 
members on strike, there would be maximum impact by the minimum of strikers.  
There was no other class of member that presented such strategic strength, a strike by 
museum attendants or archivists would excite little notice.  It was anticipated that 
within days this vital industry would be crippled and the government would be 
compelled to offer realistic negotiations. 
Seven-day pickets were placed on the cold stores which processed the butter 
going into intervention.  As this was the first strike by the union much had to be 
learned as the strike developed.  Although there was good turn-out for the first day of 
picket duty, poor co-ordination and failure to draw up timetables for picket duty 
meant that there was a real danger that some creameries would not in fact be picketed.  
Members of the union drawn from other areas were rushed in to fill the gaps in picket 
duty, the foresters proving particularly willing.  Some members were not correctly 
briefed on the meaning of a ‘picket’ and were unsure how to act.  The members of the 
NEC themselves appeared to perform the picket duty in order to bolster morale and to 
provide a vivid media event.   The intent was to use the farmers for leverage with the 
government.  In response the government brought in the army to process the butter 
coming into the cold stores and thus break the strike.  This mistake by the government 
was vital in gaining support and sympathy for the union.  Other unions were outraged 
at this strike-breaking tactic and public comment became noticeably more 
sympathetic to the AOs.  The army could not in fact do the job of the AOs and there 
was the possibility that the whole industry would suffer immeasurable damage to its 
reputation if incorrectly graded food products were released into the market.  The 
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Union then escalated the strike to cover the beef and lamb stores.  By now the 
government was spending more on breaking the strike than the arbitration awards, 
which were at the centre of the dispute, would have cost.  The strike had become a 
political and not an industrial dispute.   
By the end of May the unity and fighting spirit amongst the agricultural 
officers was breaking down and it was clear that the Union would have to settle, 
though this was hidden from the official side51.  Agreement was reached on an interim 
settlement of the outstanding arbitration awards and on the original pay offer, which 
the NEC recognised was the best that was going to be offered.  The objective of the 
strike had been to secure the full payment of the arbitration awards and to defend the 
integrity of the arbitration process.  In this the Union could claim a success.  
However, although the Union did secure some improvements in pay and in the 
payment dates of the arbitration awards, the result was at best a draw.52  The public 
service unions had not maintained unity under pressure, unlike the government which 
had a clear objective and pursued it with determination and unity despite the fact that 
the cohesion of the coalition had been weakened in the wake of the botched reshuffle 
of February 1986 and it was clearly in its final term.  
The 1986 pay round included an agreement to hold ‘meaningful discussions 
on changes desired by either party’ to the conciliation and arbitration scheme for the 
civil service.  The official side proposals for change, made at the first meeting in 
November, included a prohibition on public agitation and industrial action by groups 
on whose behalf claims were being processed; a requirement that account must be 
taken at all stages in the negotiation process of economic circumstances, government 
pay policy and the ability of the State to meet the costs of increases; that the grades 
coming under the C&A scheme would be restructured; that the proceedings of the 
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arbitration board would be confidential and that the provision requiring a motion of 
the Dáil  to modify or reject an arbitration finding should be removed.  The staff side 
wish list included the right for the Unions to bring any issue to the C&A process; that 
it should be possible that any issue raised at conciliation be carried to arbitration, 
including superannuation; where there is a failure to agree an arbitrator the Labour 
Court should be empowered to make a nomination which would have to accepted by 
both sides; that deputy arbitrators should be appointed with varying terms of office to 
ensure continuity of the arbitration function; time limits should be set for the whole 
arbitration process with Departmental councils functioning more effectively and with 
more input by the Department of the Public Service and that that agreements reached 
should be adhered to.  Further meetings were held in December and in January 1986.  
These two wish lists illustrate the frustrations and disappointments of both the official 
and staff side of the scheme, but also, in as much as the discussions took place within 
the process, its successes.  That the civil service had a right to be consulted on its pay 
and conditions was now accepted without question, the disagreement was on the 
detail.  In March the official side admitted that many of the issues raised required 
political decisions which were not forthcoming and so the revision of the Conciliation 
and Arbitration scheme ran into the sands as the coalition fell and Fianna Fáil returned 
to government. 
 
Fianna Fáil 1987-1990 
Ray MacSharry was appointed Minister for Finance in the minority Fianna 
Fáil government elected in February 1987 and followed the previous government 
policy of cuts in public sector pay and services.  Following the resignation of Garret 
Fitzgerald Alan Dukes became leader of the Fine Gael.  Under the ‘Tallaght Strategy’ 
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announced by Dukes in September 1987 Fine Gael voted with the government against 
Labour and the Workers’ Party on economic issues.53  These included cancelling a 
pay rise for civil servants and cuts in health, education and social welfare.  This 
consensus on the Right was bolstered by the Progressive Democrats who were 
pressing for the sell-off of state assets and privatisation.54  The increases in taxation 
and the fall in consumption was now leading to a socially catastrophic level of 
unemployment.   Belatedly it began to be realised on all sides that the Irish State and 
Irish society was trapped in a contracting circle of mass unemployment, economic 
stagnation, rising taxation and exploding debt.  The 1986 National Economic and 
Social Council policy paper ‘A Strategy for Development 1986-1990: Growth, 
Employment and Fiscal Balance’ offered a neo-corporatist analysis of the crisis that 
had the virtue of being a consensus view of what was wrong and how it might be put 
right.55  Agreed by the trade unions, the government, and the employer organisations 
it had to be formulated outside the political arena because it was recognised that 
consensus was impossible in the Dáil.  Drawing on the NESC report and working 
within this new culture of consensus the Programme for National Recovery was 
shaped and the economy, and employment, began to recover. 
 
The Programme for National Recovery 
The new cabinet saw the absorption of the Department of the Public Service back into 
the Department of Finance under Minister MacSharry.  The Department of Labour, 
under Bertie Ahern, assumed a new importance as it became central to the 
government negotiations with the trade union movement.  Minister MacSharry’s first 
budget, published just three weeks after the formation of the government, made it 
clear that he would follow the coalition government in reducing the national debt and 
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the borrowing requirement.  However, stating quite bluntly that the country could not 
afford the current level of public services he had decided to impose even greater cuts 
in all departments than proposed by the previous government.  An immediate freeze 
on special increases to civil service pay would be added to at the end of the current 
pay round, due to end on June 30th by a general public service wages freeze that 
would last until the end of 1988, at least.  In addition to the freeze in public service 
pay MacSharry announced a series of measures to reduce the size of the public service 
through staff reductions.  He ordered with immediate effect that no vacancy in the 
civil service could be filled without his permission, no vacancy in the public service 
funded by the exchequer could be filled without his consent, and he would exercise 
his authority as Minister for Finance to redeploy civil servants as required across the 
government departments.56  During the year the effect of this budget became apparent 
as vacancies that might ordinarily have led to promotions were left unfilled, the 
workload of the remaining staff increased and was simply ceased to be carried out.  
This was especially acute in the large public service departments of health and 
education. An ad hoc Alliance of Health Service Unions, which included UPTCS, 
staged protests and one-day stoppages to defend the health services but with little 
impact.57  
Civil servants attempting to return after career breaks were told they would 
have to wait up to twelve months to get his or her job back whilst new applicants to 
begin a career break were refused by departments anxious at the prospect of staff 
shortages as replacement was forbidden by Finance loss.  This was especially the case 
with specialist officers.  A scheme that had originally been established to create 
employment was now being used to reduce employment. The immediate effect on the 
UPTCS was the closing of the Farm Tax office, set up by the coalition to tax farm 
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incomes, making the contract staff redundant.  The permanent professional staff that 
had been on loan from the Department of Agriculture, found themselves in a 
precarious position as the department refused to implement the decision to redeploy 
them back, fearful of the impact on their overall numbers.  They were also informed 
that promotions gained in the Farm Tax Office were to be withdrawn, unless they 
opted for redundancy.  If they opted for voluntary redundancy however, then the 
higher earnings would be the basis for the severance package.  This was in the context 
of the next phase of the government plan to reduce the civil service.  UPTCS decided 
to fight back.  The sixty civil servants who had been seconded to the Farm tax Office 
took an action in the High Court challenging the government’s decision to cease the 
farm tax as the decision was not made by the Dáil  and therefore the Farm Tax Office 
was not ended in law. They asked that the Farm Tax Commissioner be directed to 
continue their employment and that the decision to end their employment at a higher 
grade was ultra vires.  Appearing for the civil servants was Mary Robinson S.C.58  
Justice Hamilton in his judgment ruled that the civil servants had no legal right to be 
continued in the higher grade in which they had been employed in an acting capacity.  
However as the abolition of the office had not been performed by vote of the Dáil 
equity demanded that they be compensated for the breach of legitimate expectations 
that their work would continue until completed or until the Farm Tax Office was 
ended in law.  They were therefore entitled to compensation.  This established that the 
action of the State in dealing with its civil servants would have to be ‘equitable’, the 
State could not deal with its civil service without regard to concepts of natural justice 
and fairness.59    
In July the government announced measures to further cut back staff numbers 
through voluntary redundancies.  The target set by the government was a reduction in 
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public and civil service numbers of 10,000.  It was implied that if the voluntary 
scheme failed to achieve the level of reductions require then a compulsory scheme 
would be enforced.  The permanent and pensionable status of established civil 
servants, which had been cited ad nauseum to justify low pay and poor working 
conditions was now revealed as a cynical pretence.  It was soon recognised that the 
specialist civil service had been singled out and that the long-term implication was 
that the state was intent on withdrawing from key areas of activity.60  The professional 
and technical staff targeted were in the OPW; the Land Commission; agricultural 
inspectors, officers and serological assistants in the Department of Agriculture; the 
staff of the drawing office of the Valuation Office and the architectural services in the 
Department of Education.  UPTCS, noting that the administrative officers in these 
departments were not invited to apply for the redundancy package, were alarmed that 
the intent was to destroy the specialist infrastructure of skills and expertise that had 
been nurtured in the civil service.  Nor were the professional and technical officers 
invited to apply for redeployment to vacancies in the administrative grades that might 
become available. The Union therefore strongly urged members not to apply for the 
redundancy package until it had achieved some clarification from the Department of 
Finance.  A suggestion of having a common approach made by the Union to all the 
civil service unions was not successful as each organisation circled the wagons around 
its own membership. 
Fianna Fáil had always enjoyed good relations with the trade union movement.  
Meetings had been held with trade union leaders whilst Fianna Fáil was in opposition 
at which a strategy for economic recovery began to be mapped out. In addition, the 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC) provide a forum in which trade 
unions, employers and government could talk freely and frankly about the economic 
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and social problems the country faced without fear that frankness might be used later 
against them.  The trade union movement in the private sector admitted that the free-
for-all in which wage demands had been chasing inflation through the 1980s had not 
delivered and members were probably worse off in 1986 then they were in 1981.  The 
public sector unions were fragmented and weary, most of them unable or unwilling to 
match the militancy of the teacher unions that had to fight a long and bitter campaign 
to secure an arbitration award.  Also, in a small open economy there was no escaping 
the fact that a generation was coming to adulthood with no prospects of a future in 
Ireland, regardless of how powerful their parents might be, as emigration rose to over 
30,000 a year and unemployment continued its relentless growth, sapping morale.  No 
one was immune to the sense of national failure.   
Out of these discussions the NESC produced the policy paper ‘A Strategy for 
Development 1986-1990: Growth, Employment and Fiscal Balance’.  The NESC 
paper was unique in that it was not arrived at in confrontational bargaining between 
unions, government and employers, but rather a consensus interpretation of the nature 
of the crisis the country faced and the way out of that crisis.  At the heart of the policy 
was a new way of analysing the public finances which, instead of emphasising how 
large the public debt was in absolute figures, examined it in proportion to the Gross 
National Product (GNP).  The national debt/GNP ratio could be reduced by either 
cutting the debt or by growing GNP, or by a combination of both.  A recovery plan 
would have to deal simultaneously with fiscal policy, tax reform, social equity and 
economic development.  The NESC policy paper then became the basis for discussion 
between the government and Congress on the three-year plan for national recovery 
that became the Programme For National Recovery (PNR).61 
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 The trade union movement had also been doing its own thinking on the 
national crisis.  Its response was the 1985 ICTU policy paper Confronting the Jobs 
Crisis.  This policy paper was as much a challenge to the trade union movement as to 
the government to be creative in thinking on employment.  Its authors realised that 
that the trade union movement had to work at being part of the solution rather than 
allowing media commentators portray them as the problem. 
After initial meetings in April between the government and ICTU three joint 
working parties were established to deal with employment and development issues, 
taxation, and social policy.  A further ministerial group, led by the Taoiseach and 
including Bertie Ahern and Ray MacSharry, dealt with the issue of pay.  The 
Department of the Taoiseach, and not Finance, took charge of the negotiations.  
Meanwhile similar meetings were being held with what were now being called the 
‘social partners’.62  The Public Services Committee of Congress succeeded in 
persuading the wider trade union movement to widen its thinking about wages beyond 
money to a broader concept of a ‘social wage’.63  The social wage included those 
state-provided services which led to a better quality of life for all citizens, such as a 
health or education service, clean safe neighbourhoods, and cultural institutions.  It 
was argued that a high social wage could balance a lower cash wage.      
The PNR was unveiled on 9 October 1987 as the joint agreement of the 
government, ICTU, the Federated Union of Employers, Confederation of Irish 
Industries, the Irish Farmer’s Association, the Irish Creamery Milk Supplier’s 
Association and the Irish Co-operative Organisation Society.  It committed the social 
partners to achieving the stabilisation of the national debt at an exchequer borrowing 
requirement level of between 5 and 7 percent of GNP by 1990; greater equity and 
fairness on the tax system with income tax reductions to match wage restraint; 
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diminishing social inequities by maintaining the value of social welfare benefits and 
an overall intensification of efforts to generate jobs.64  
 
Mac The Knife 
With the PNR secure Ray MacSharry revisited the book of estimates and announced a 
series of deep cuts across the entire civil and public service.  Recognising that a pay 
pause and low increases alone would not achieve the targets set out in the PNR the 
government, he announced, was going to achieve a major rationalisation of the state 
by targeting the many state agencies and was seeking significant redundancies in the 
civil service.65  These cuts, shaped by a report by the DKM Consultancy of Colm 
McCarthy, earned MacSharry the nickname of Mac The Knife.  The UPTCS 
membership supported the PNR by an overwhelming majority, even though it offered 
only token increases until 1990.66  For the UPTCS membership anxieties were still 
focused on the threatened redundancies.  With more cuts in evidence, targeted at 
‘surplus’ agencies and functions, the professional and technical officers were in the 
front line for redundancies.  An important achievement therefore in the PNR 
negotiations was the assurance that all redundancies would be voluntary.  It was 
agreed that there would be no compulsory redundancies, all posts that became vacant 
would be filled, there would be some element of promotion to encourage 
redeployment and that competitions for the vacant posts would be handled by the civil 
service commission.67  In November the government opened up the voluntary 
redundancy scheme to all civil and public servants over the age of fifty and extended 
it to cover early retirement.68  In the end the government secured the voluntary 
redundancy of 20,000 civil and public servants, which may be an index of the level of 
job dissatisfaction in the service after a decade of attack.   
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The UPTCS could then give full attention to the redeployment of those 
members who wished to stay in the service but whose specialist function was no 
longer required.  Redeployment required agreement on complex judgements of 
qualifications, promotions, salary levels and seniority, all of which were bound to 
create problems within the departments to which members found themselves 
redeployed.69  The question, on which future careers depended and on which many 
members in exposed areas were vulnerable, dominated the 1988 conference.  Between 
800 and 1,000 members were redeployed under the scheme, which was seen as an 
alternative to redundancy and a pragmatic response to the situation in which the 
Union found itself.70  Members had sufficient confidence in the PNR and how the 
Union was responding to the challenges it posed, to vote for the Programme for 
Economic and Social Progress which succeeded it in 1991, negotiated by 
MacSharry’s successor as Minister for Finance, Albert Reynolds.  By then the UPTCS 
had also reassessed its future as a professional and technical civil service trade union 
and joined with the LGPSU to create a new public service union. 
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IMPACT 
 
 
UPTCS had grown steadily through the 1980s.  In 1983 it had 5,865 members 
organised in 65 branches.  These branches varied widely in size, the largest was the 
Technical Agricultural Officers with 1,346 members, the smallest were the archivists 
with six members.  The growth of the union in the 1980s was mainly through the 
merging of established associations who joined the UPTCS as new branches.  In 1980 
the Ordnance Survey Staff Association, formerly an affiliate of the Civil Service 
Alliance, left the Alliance and merged with the UPTCS.  In 1982 the Aviation and 
Marine Radio Officers’ Association amalgamated with the union.  In 1983 the 
meteorological officers organised in the Cumann Lucht Meitéareolaíochta na 
hÉireann (CLME) joined the UPTCS.  In 1984 the Technical Staff Association, 
Stationery Office was wound up and the technical grades transferred to the union.  In 
later 1980s the merger with UPTCS with the Association of Inspectors of Taxes (AIT) 
and the Irish Tax Officials union (ITOU) brought the membership to 7,500.  The 
merging of these established associations did not however result in a significant 
growth in the total membership due to the loss arising out of the government embargo 
on staff recruitment.  
UPTCS still clung to its traditional structure of each professional and technical 
grade constituting itself as a branch.  Attempts to rationalise the branch structure 
inevitably met with stout resistance.  The influx of these new branches with high 
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membership led to the smaller branches fearing a loss of influence.1  Whilst loyalty to 
the traditional branch structure, which both reflected and fostered a professional 
camaraderie, may have been seen as a source of strength it is arguable that it inhibited 
an understanding of the rapidly changing context for trade unionism in general and 
public service trade unionism in particular.   
 The 1980s had seen the triumph of the neo-conservative ideologies 
represented by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.  The collapse of the Soviet 
union and its satellite Communist regimes in eastern Europe 1989-1990 seemed to 
vindicate the anti-state and anti-welfare politics of the conservative Right.  A new 
intelligentsia provided the academic validation for an attack on state provision of 
services.  Market forces, they argued, would be cheaper and more efficient.  A wave 
of privatisation swept away many state-owned enterprises.  The state withdrew from 
direct provision of services to its citizens by a system of sub-contracting its 
obligations to ‘service providers’ and  citizens became ‘consumers’.  In Ireland this 
new pro-competition, anti-state ideology was represented by the Progressive 
Democrat Party (PD), formed in 1985.  In July 1989 the PD party entered government 
as the coalition partners of Fianna Fáil.  It is highly unlikely that the social partnership 
model would have been successfully initiated had the PDs been part of the 
government in 1987.  Nor was the survival of social partnership assured as the PDs 
had been at best sceptical of the concept.   
Trade unions ultimately rely on the strength of numbers and solidarity to make 
gains for the membership; size matters.  During the 1980s trade unions found 
themselves having to deal with complex industrial relations in which confrontation 
and militancy was of less importance than detailed research.  If the employer side 
based its case on sophisticated numeric economic models, then trade unions had to 
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learn to talk the same language.  They were also required to offer more and more 
complex services to the membership.  In response to all these different forces of 
change trade unions went through a rapid period of merger in the 1980s.  In 1988 
Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff (ASTMS) and the 
Technical, Administrative, Supervisory Section (TASS) merged to form the 
Managerial, Science Finance (MSF) union with 30,000 members in Ireland.  The 
former rivals ITGWU and FWUI merged to form SIPTU.  In Northern Ireland the 
public service had united in a predominant powerful union; Northern Ireland Public 
Service union (NIPSA) alongside the UK mergers that created UNISON.  NIPSA and 
UNISON together represented powerful examples of public service trade unionism.     
The UPTCS had, through its membership of Congress, become more active in 
the broad trade union movement.  The union had been particularly active on the ICTU 
women’s committee and had a good record on women’s representation.  Women 
made up 19 percent of the membership, 14 percent of the NEC and 14 percent of the 
fulltime officials of the union by 1990, a very precise balance between membership 
and power.  This contrasts with the ITGWU where women were 33 of the 
membership but only 11 percent of the executive and a mere 5 percent of the fulltime 
officers.2  UPTCS representation on the ICTU Women’s Committee, where Sheila 
Hanley was elected as vive-chairperson, made a significant contribution on issues that 
aimed to advance the position of women in the public service such as education and 
training, the appointment of equality officers in each department, health and safety for 
women, and procedures to deal with sexual harassment at the workplace.  Greg 
Maxwell, as Chairman of the Public Services Committee had acted as an articulate 
and reasoned spokesman for the public sector in television and radio programmes and 
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in public debate.  UPTCS was now a mainstream union with a culture of public 
engagement that was new in a civil service trade union. 
The union with which UPTCS had a close affinity and a good working 
relationship in both Congress generally and in the Public Services Committee in 
particular was the local government officers’ union, the LGPSU.  In 1980 the two 
unions had co-ordinated their positions and strategies in negotiations in ACOT and 
other related work areas.3  The tax campaign and the fight for arbitration of 1985-6 
had further deepened relations between the two unions and their respective 
membership.  Paradoxically, the sustained attacks on the ‘public sector’ served to 
create a consciousness across the whole of the civil and public service that may not 
have arisen otherwise.  Also, there was a sobering realisation that the many public and 
civil service unions were all trooping in one after another to sit across the table 
opposite the same few Department of Finance officials who negotiated from a single 
and well-focussed point of view.  It made sense for the staff side to do the same.  
Congress was also urging the trade union movement to examine rationalisation.    
In 1986 the first tentative discussions were held on a possible merger of the 
two unions.  UPTCS had 5,714 members organised in 64 branches that were based on 
workplace.  The LGPSU had 15,533 members organised in 32 branches that were 
geographically based.  Talks focused on the rationale for the merger and the possible 
structures for the new union.4  By early 1988 it was agreed that the objective of the 
talks was to create a new union for the whole of the public and civil service.  The 
obvious model was that of NIPSA, which Greg Maxwell had helped to shape.  A visit 
by the executives of the two unions to Belfast confirmed the model.  The new union 
would be organised by divisions related to the employer, each division would have its 
own executive and hold its own conference.  There would also be a national executive 
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and conference to deal with matters of interest affecting the membership generally.5   
Though the proposed structures had implications for the UPTCS structure of myriad 
branches the 1988 conference massively approved the creation of the new union and 
mandated detailed discussions.6   
A financial crisis in late 1988 gave added urgency to the talks.  In the summer 
of 1988 it was discovered that £70,000 had been transferred from the union 
contingency fund to the current account without the sanction of the NEC.  There was 
an immediate suspicion of fraud but an investigation by Cooper & Lybrand confirmed 
that there was no fraud, but also discovered that the union was in a severe financial 
crisis.  The transfer to the current account had been to meet a deficit that was growing 
rapidly and would amount to £110,000 within a year if left uncorrected.  This 
represented about 25 per cent of the union budget.  Due to the rapid decline in 
membership following the agreement on voluntary redundancies and early retirement, 
its subscriptions had fallen and put the current account into the red.  Income had fallen 
by £25,000 whilst expenditure had grown by £15,000.  The union now found itself in 
the same situation as the country, income did not match expenditure and insolvency 
threatened if corrective action was not taken.  A percentage levy on the membership 
restored the union finances, but clearly funding was becoming more difficult.7 
The LGPSU was facing a similar loss of membership due to the government 
voluntary redundancy and early retirement programme.  There was a loss of over four 
hundred members in the course of 1987 and by March 1988 a further 1,700 health 
service workers had applied for early retirement.  In the local authorities nearly 3,000 
early retirements and redundancies had been agreed by the end of 1988.  The 
negotiations to form the new union took on an added urgency.8   
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Eoin de Buitléar of UPTCS was appointed by the two unions to act as co-
ordinator of the discussions and to draft new rules and prepare discussion and 
information papers and to liaise with the Registrar of Friendly Societies.9  As the talks 
progressed through 1989 anxieties began to emerge around the function of the 
divisional executives and the role of the branches.  By mid-1989 the LGPSU 
membership were showing much more enthusiasm for the merger and were urging 
their executive to speed up talks.  By now the Irish Municipal Employees Trade union 
was expressing an interest in also joining the new union.10  By the end of the year the 
path to the new union was becoming clear.  A document which detailed the 
organisational structure of the new union, its finances, and procedures was prepared 
and circulated to the membership and a Special Delegate Conference was called to 
discuss the document in detail.  Various names were considered: UPS, United Public 
Services; PACT, Public and Civil Trade union; UPS, union of Public Services, ASP, 
Aontas Seirbhísí Poiblí and IMPACT, Irish Municipal, Public and Civil Trade union.  
At a joint meeting of the two union executives, by secret ballot it was agreed to that 
the name of the new union would be IMPACT, the Irish Municipal, Public And Civil 
Trade union.  It was also agreed at the meeting that Greg Maxwell and Phil Flynn 
would be joint General Secretaries of the new union, the sharing of duties and 
responsibilities being by agreement between themselves.11   
Members of the UPTCS generally greeted the new name with bemusement;  
corny but catchy, and with impact!12  The SDC was deferred from April to June to 
allow branches time to discuss the proposal thoroughly.  Difficulties centred around 
the question of cash flow problems for the branches, the ‘buy-out’ arrangements for 
members attending the conferences of IMPACT and whether the central funds or 
branch funds would carry the cost, and specific arrangements for the first IMPACT 
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conference.13  At the heart of the difficulties may have been a reluctance finally to 
move away from a union that was unique in its membership and had developed an 
organic but very effective structure that commanded deep loyalties and affections in 
the membership.  It was always going to be difficult to finally bring such an historic 
union to an end. 
Special Delegate Conferences of both unions were held simultaneously on 29 
June 1990 to approve the Instrument of Amalgamation, along with the new name and 
rules for the new union.  The Registrar of Friendly Societies had made it clear that it 
would be necessary for each union to agree all amendments and to pass identical 
resolutions to enable the merger.  It was agreed by the two executives therefore that 
where both executives agreed to an amendment it would be supported at the 
conferences but where they were not agreed the union executive would oppose it.  At 
the special conferences the LGPSU delegates approved the resolutions to create the 
merger but, unexpectedly and against the recommendation of the executive, the 
UPTCS delegates carried six amendments to the Instrument of Amalgamation.  As the 
two conferences had therefore failed to carry the same set of resolutions the formation 
of IMPACT union was now threatened.  The chief difficulty for the UPTCS delegates 
was the question of annual conferences.  The resolution agreed by the two union 
executives was for biennial conferences of the divisional sections and the whole union 
alternately.  The reason for this arrangement was the danger that arranging the four 
divisional conferences and an annual conference of the whole union would 
overwhelm the officers and absorb resources better devoted to day to day needs.  For 
some in UPTCS the annual conference was a guarantee that the members and not the 
executive and officers would set the agenda for the union.  It was feared that a 
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biennial conference would make it difficult for ordinary members and smaller 
branches to assert their ownership of the new union.   
A further question for the membership was the staffing of the divisional 
sections.  Members wanted an assurance that the IMPACT staff would continue to 
deal with the interests of the Civil Service Division, which would be numerically the 
smallest of the divisions, and that the professional and technical civil service would 
not suffer neglect.  There was also a fear that the status of professional, technical and 
specialist civil servants would be marginalised in the new union which would be 
dominated by general service grades.  The members wanted an explicit statement 
within the objectives of IMPACT relating to the standards for these specialist grades. 
The executive restarted negotiations with LGPSU to secure agreement on 
measures that would address these issues, give confidence to UPTCS members in the 
new union, and permit another conference to agree to the merger.  The issues that 
were identified as key were the annual conference and the allocation of staffing.  
Agreement was reached that the annual conference would be held each year until 
1994 and that the decision to continue with an annual conference or a biennial 
conference would be made at the 1994 conference.  It was also agreed by both Greg 
Maxwell and Phil Flynn that ‘it is the declared objective of IMPACT that the 
combined resources of both existing organisations be used to effectively and 
efficiently provide an enhanced service to all members.  In this context and in the 
interest of members it is necessary that the union be in a position to plan and respond 
to changes in membership distribution and the developing needs of members.  It is, in 
any event, jointly agreed that there will be no diminution in the present level of 
service, including staff resources, to members’.14  The feeling of the executive was 
that with these two issues resolved the other issues could be raised in IMPACT and 
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dealt with there.  After further talks and clarifications a second UPTCS conference in 
October finally agreed on the merger.  This cleared the way for a national ballot of the 
full membership of both unions.  On 7 December 1990 both unions held simultaneous 
conferences to vote on the merger, each voting and agreeing on precisely the same 
resolutions.  UPTCS members endorsed IMPACT by 2,569 to 893 votes and on 1 
January 1991 UPTCS ceased to exist and IMPACT came to life.15  
UPTCS was a unique trade union, both within the wider labour movement and 
within the civil service.  Formed in the midst of the revolution that created the 
independent state it evolved a federal structure that united the diversity of its 
membership, proved adaptable to the changes in the state and in the demands being 
made on the scientific civil service, whilst always seeking to defend the status of the 
professional and technical officers in the civil service and improve their pay and 
conditions of service.  However trade unions are fighting organisations and not 
historic monuments and the arguments in favour of the new union were 
overwhelming.  Problems remained of inadequate career and promotional 
opportunities for the professional and technical grades.  Sustained but a ill-informed 
hostility to the public service was encouraged by politicians and fed by the media, 
although these attacks were never aimed at better provision of services but were 
simply about reducing its size and coat.  Related to these attacks was the end to 
consensus on the role of the state and the growing view that public services were too 
costly, inefficient and a burden on the taxpayer.  The erosion of ideas of equity and 
fairness marginalised the State in those areas of public policy in which expertise was 
valued; environmental protection, national development, ending poverty and 
encouraging social cohesion.  That there would be continuing need for the 
professional, technical and scientific expertise that had organised in UPTCS and its 
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forerunners there could be no doubt.  In the context of the rise of neo-conservative 
globalising forces and the increasing influence of the European Union the formation 
of IMPACT was, in truth, the necessary organisational advance to ensure the 
professional, technical and scientific civil service, in union with the rest of the public 
service, could move from merely reacting to change to themselves acting as agents of 
change in Ireland in the last decade of the twentieth century.     
 
 254 
 
                                                
1 UPTCS, annual report, 1983; UPTCS News, vol.2, no.4, Dec.1987. 
2 Ibid., vol.4, no.5, April 1990. 
3 UPTCS, council minutes, 1 Sept 1980. 
4 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1986. 
5 Ibid., 25 Jan 1988. 
6 UPTCS News, vol.3, no.2 & No. 3, Apr., June 1988. 
7 UPTCS, council minutes, 19 Sept., 27 Oct. 1988, report on financial situation’. 
8 Maguire, Servants to the Public, p265. 
9 Register of Friendly Societies, file  T588, UPTCS, ‘correspondence on merger’. 
10 UPTCS News, vol.4, no.2, Aug 1989. 
11 UPTCS, minutes of joint meeting, 8 Feb., 1990. 
12 UPTCS News, vol.4, no.5, Apr. 1990. 
13 UPTCS, council minutes, 30 Oct. 1990. 
14 UPTCS News, vol.4, no.8, Oct/Nov 1990. 
15 Ibid., Final Edition, Dec. 1990. 
MEMBERSHIP 
The early Institute of Professional Civil Servants did not preserve any record of the 
overall membership, leaving that to the branches.  The figures for membership are 
derived from occasional references in the preserved records, from UPTCS Annual 
Reports and from the Register of Friendly Societies file T. 588 
 
1920   438 
1932 449 
1949 1,000 
1957  1,381 
1963 1,888 
1964 2,175 
1966 2,566 
1970 3,300 
1971 3,500 
1977 4,261 
1979 4,369 
1980 5,010 
1981 5,184 
1982 5,491 
1983 5,865 
1984 5,872 
1985 6,000 
1986 5,714 
1987 6,035 
1989 6,750    
PRESIDENT 
From 1950 to 1982 a President was nominated by the Executive Council.  The President was a distinguished  professional civil servant, chosen to raise the 
profile of the Institute, who gave an opening address to the annual conference but took little part in the day to day affairs of the organisation.    
1950-1 Dr H.A. Lafferty. 
1952-4 J.A.K. Meldrum. 
1955-56 Dr Joseph Raftery.  
1956-58 Patrick J. Murphy. 
1959-60 John O’Loan. 
1960-62 Donough O’Donovan. 
1962-63 Dr Arthur E.J. Went. 
1962-66 J..M. McNicholl. 
1967-69 H.A. DeLap. 
1969-72 T. McEvoy. 
1973-78 Tim Shine. 
1978-80 Liam Condon. 
1980-82 Frank McLean. 
1982-86 Paddy Kenny.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAIRMAN 
The Chairman of the executive council, who acted to give direction and focus to the organisation, was elected by the delegates at annual conference. 
   
1920-1  W. Allberry 
1921-2  Maj. D.N. Brunicardi. 
1922-3  Dr.G. H. Pethybridge. 
1923-4  C.E. Browne.   
1924-5  F.W. Warwick. 
1925-6  J.P. Irvine.  
1926-7  J.P. Irvine.   
1927-8  J. Ingram.   
1928-32 Maj. D.N.Brunicardi. 
1932-4  M.J.Kenny.   
1934-5  Maj. D.N. Brunicardi. 
1935-7  Stephen Huggard.  
1937-8  Creuss Callaghan.  
1938-40 T.M. O’Byrne.  
1940-41 D.J. Manning.   
1941-3  J.M. O’Byrne.   
1943-5  J.O’Mahony.   
1945-7  C. O’Donovan. 
1947-49 T.P .O’Flynn. 
1949-51 J.J. O’Kelly. 
1951-5 5 Dr Arthur E.J. Went. 
1955-59 J.M. McNicholl 
1960-62 Tim. McEvoy. 
1963-65 T.A. O’Cuilleanáin   
1965-68 R. Walsh 
1968-71 Tim .F. .Shine 
1971-72 Austin. O’Carroll. 
1972-73 Desmond McHugh. 
1974  Paddy Connolly. 
1975-76 Anna O’Farrell.. 
1977-79 John. Hennigan. 
1980--81 Jacqui Doyle. 
1982-83 Brian McCurtain. 
1984-5  Alan Craig. 
1986-87 Paul Doyle. 
1988  Noreen Cunningham. 
1989-90 John Prior. 
 
Honorary General Secretary 
1920-22 Wm. Power-Steele      
1922-25 J. McConnell & Co.      
1925-43 W.J. Adams 
1943-44 T.M. O’Byrne 
1944-46 P.B. Connolly  
1946-47 N. Cunningham 
1947-48 L.J. McCarthy 
1948-51 T. O’Sullivan. 
1951-55 J. Raftery 
1955-67 Colm O’Sullivan. 
 
General Secretary 
1967-1975 Ralph Pares. 
1975-77 John C. Duffy 
1977-90 Greg Maxwell 
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